

*Al-Sāq ‘alā l-sāq* has very often been read from the point of view of the development of modern Arabic literature; it has been seen as a proto-novel or even “the first novel in Arabic literature” (Raḍwā ‘Āshūr, *al-Ḥadātha l-mumkina: al-Shidyāq wa-l-Sāq ‘alā l-sāq. Al-riwāya l-ūlā fī l-adab al-‘arabī al-ḥadīth* [Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2009]), and references to European writers such as Laurence Sterne and Rabelais have been made much of. Sterne’s typographical inventiveness appears to have inspired the pointing hand of volume two, chapter fifteen, and the book includes references to and even translations of short passages from European authors. Furthermore, al-Shidyāq thoroughly understood and took advantage of the many possibilities offered by printing as opposed to manuscript copying (see Geoffrey Roper, “Fāris al-Shidyāq and the Transition from Scribal to Print Culture in the Middle East,” in *The Book in the Islamic World: The Written Word and Communication in the Middle East*, ed. George N. Atiyeh [Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1995], 209–31). But his roots in Arabic literary culture went deep and his reading in it was vast. Not for nothing did the Lebanese critic Mārūn ‘Abbūd link his name to those of the great Abbasid authors al-Jāhīz and al-Mutanabbī (as mentioned in Fawwāz Ṭarābūsi and ‘Azīz al-‘Aẓma, *Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq* [London: Riad El-Rayyes, 1995], 411). The most obvious manifestations of this are his poetry, which is traditional in form and style both in the prestigious classical genres and in popular ones (the nine love-songs following the sarcastic and rather obscene “Two titter-making poems” after the account of the wedding [vol. 3: 93–107]), the four *maqāmāt*, and the mixture of prose and verse (*prosimetrum*). But the changes of tone from *jidd* to *hazal* (seriousness to frivolity) and the recourse to *mujūn*—a complex term covering anything from flippancy and frivolity to obscenity and scatology—that are found throughout are also typical of classical Arabic literature. Al-Shidyāq promises to investigate the praiseworthy and blameworthy qualities of women (vol. 1: 14), and the phrase he uses, *al-maḥāmid wa-l-masāwi’*, is almost identical to *al-maḥāsīn wa-l-masāwi’*, a category of classical Arabic prose works. Moreover, he applies this dualistic approach to other subjects, such as the good and bad points of London and Paris (vol. 4: chs. 16, 17, 18). These few links between *al-Sāq* and earlier Arabic literature are enough to show that as well as being passionately involved with the Arabic language, al-Shidyāq was steeped in the Arabic literary heritage; consequently his innovations need to be read against this background. As a result, his place in the history of Arabic literature will no doubt be reinterpreted.

The above remarks merely scratch the literary surface of *al-Sāq*, which can be approached from many other angles, too. This edition—a faithful reproduction of the original printing—and the outstanding English translation open up countless avenues for research into a crucial work of nineteenth-century Arabic literature—neither “modern” nor “classical,” but *sui generis* and pointing in directions later Arabic literature took, or might have taken.

HILARY KILPATRICK  
LAUSANNE

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*Dharmakīrti on the Duality of the Object: Pramāṇavārttika* III 1–63. By ELI FRANCO and MIYAKO NOTAKE. *Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Süd- und Zentralasiens*, no. 5. Berlin: LIT-VERLAG, 2014. Pp. xv + 173. €24,90.

Dharmakīrti (sixth to seventh c. CE), an Indian philosopher who belonged to the Buddhist epistemological tradition, is one of the few names of Indian philosophers that appear on title pages of books. Indeed, he highly influenced the course of philosophy in South Asia and the legacy of his thought continued in Tibet, where his works were accurately translated from the Sanskrit. Tibetan translations were the only sources for accessing Dharmakīrti’s ideas up to the 1930s, when, among other documents, Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana discovered manuscripts bearing the Sanskrit text of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* (“Commentary on the *Pramāṇa[samuccaya]*,” hereafter PV) and the commentaries thereon composed by Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin. For many decades his pioneering editions of these three texts (1938, 1938–40, and 1953 respectively)<sup>1</sup> together with Raniero Gnoli’s critical edi-

1. Unless otherwise indicated, for bibliographical references see the book under review.

tion of the first chapter of the PV (1960), which exceptionally adds prose to verse, have constituted the textual basis of Dharmakīrtian studies.

As it is well known, and as is often the case with pioneering works, Sāṅkṛtyāyana's editions have to be revised. *Dharmakīrti on the Duality of the Object* is thus a particularly welcome publication, and the authors Eli Franco and Miyako Notake have to be congratulated for having undertaken the difficult task of presenting for the first time a critical edition and annotated English translation of a substantial section from the third chapter of the PV (devoted to direct perception, *pratyakṣa*). Their work reconsiders verses 1–63 of PV III in the light of the extant manuscript evidence (see Watanabe 1998, vol. 1, and Kellner/Sferra 2008) and of an array of literature on Dharmakīrti's philosophy that includes Hiromasa Tosaki's outstanding Japanese translation and contextual edition of the entire PV III. Eli Franco's introduction presents the issues that Dharmakīrti discusses in the verses under examination, their background, and the commentators' take on them. Franco's overview is based on his understanding of the text's structure (pp. 1–4), which differs from Miyako Notake's. Her 2011 article "Dharmakīrti's Argument over the Universal in the Third Chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, vv. 11–50" is thus an important complement to the work under review. The last section of the introduction (pp. 24–26) provides details about the text's witnesses and the contents of the apparatus. The book is appended with a useful index of Sanskrit terms by Franco and introduced with verve by Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer's foreword. Here, the philosopher points out the wider philosophical context in which Dharmakīrti's reflection can be considered, namely "the question how a particular object of perception can be the cause of its sensation" (p. viii), and observes how "[t]he deep point is that the very notion of efficient cause cannot be merely an empirical notion. . . It rather presupposes universals, expressed by standing sentences that articulate robust causal inferences" (*ibid.*).

The duality of the object is the first topic that Dharmakīrti discusses in PV III. Here, as in the rest of the PV, Dharmakīrti explains selected passages from Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* ("Compendium on the means of knowledge," fifth to sixth c. CE) and expands upon the main ideas presented there. It is one of Dignāga's main concerns to connect the duality of the means of valid cognition, which are direct perception and inference, to the duality of the object of cognition, which is distinguished in particular characteristic and general characteristic, or particular and universal (*svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). As Franco explains in the introduction, Dharmakīrti identifies four criteria for the distinction of the two types of objects of valid cognition. The first of them is the capacity for efficient action (*arthakriyā*), which characterizes the particulars and is in fact lacking in the universals. In the context of everyday life, however, a universal does function as an object of valid cognition, namely inference, since it is able to produce an efficient action, though indirectly. This is Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's somewhat sibylline statement concerning the distinction between universals and illusory objects such as floaters. In his explanation of the status of object of valid cognition that is ascribed to a universal in a conventional context, Prajñākaragupta resorts to metaphoricalness (p. 7), possibly drawing inspiration from Dharmakīrti's argument in PV III.33cd-37, on which Franco offers attentive remarks (pp. 14–16). This reminds us of *Metaphors We Live By* (G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Chicago 1980) and of how pervasive theories of metaphor can be in Buddhist approaches to language and conceptuality (see J. May, "On Mādhyamika Philosophy," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 6 [1978]: 233–41, and most recently R. Tzohar, *A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor*, Oxford 2018). In expounding the other three criteria by which universals—in opposition to particulars—can be identified, Franco explains with exemplary clarity that (1) "the universal is the object of cognitions that appear in the form 'a is similar to b'" (p. 9); (2) it is the object of a word and as such it cannot be directly connected to external objects; in fact, according to a recurrent argument, language can refer to past and future objects (pp. 10–17); and (3) the "universal does not produce a cognition because its form does not appear in a cognition" (p. 17). Franco is careful to identify Dharmakīrti's interlocutors, among whom there are also representatives of Buddhist traditions. Especially with regard to some arguments on language, he observes that the Sarvāstivādins might be the intended opponents; the commentator Śākyabuddhi, however, identifies them as Sāṃmitīya (pp. 11 and 56–57). Considering that the term used by Manorathanandin is Vaibhāṣika (see p. 56 n. 1), it cannot be excluded that on this point the divergence between the two commentators is only apparent, as is the case with regard to PV II.203, where the term Vaibhāṣika refers to a Pudgalavādin doctrine (see C. Pecchia, *Dharmakīrti on the*

*Cessation of Suffering*, Leiden 2015: 215–16, and with regard to the names Puḍgalavādin, Sāṃmitīya, etc., p. 31 n. 57). Franco's discussion on the problematic points of the last two thematic portions of the text provides remarkable material for philosophical reflections on the implications of posing the duality of the objects of means of knowledge and the duality of the means of knowledge.

The bulk of the work under review is formed by the text's edition with the pertinent apparatus, the translation, and the notes, where Franco and Notake discuss notable terms and concepts of the text and translation. The latter embeds in square brackets much additional material that mostly reflects one or the other commentary, but also without notice puts together different opinions (see, for example, p. 70 n. 1). The reader should thus carefully consult the notes, where the authors explain the interpretations displayed in the translation. Even though translating this type of text is an endlessly perfectible undertaking, Franco and Notake have provided a clear and helpful rendering of Dharmakīrti's verses. Different renderings that one may see as possible or preferable would mostly derive from slightly different ways of understanding the content.

The Sanskrit text is followed by an apparatus which consists of three levels. The first and second levels respectively record variant readings from the manuscript witnesses and the printed editions, while the third level presents references to quotations of the PV text in other sources, providing not only support for specific readings, but also an important tool for considering the reception and impact of Dharmakīrti's text in later philosophical works. As part of the text's edition, the authors additionally present two Tibetan translations of the PV verses under examination, the one from the Peking and Derge editions of the PV itself and the other from Ravigupta's commentary on the PV (only extant in Tibetan), where the PV verses are embedded. For both translations, divergences between the Peking and Derge editions have been duly reported below the pertinent texts. All these materials are presented as a continuous sequence whose sections are identified by individual stanzas of the PV, but sometimes by one or more verses. This favors an analytical reading of the PV and Franco's and Notake's study thereon, but probably penalizes a philosophical reading of the text, which would be stimulated by a comprehensive view of the arguments both in Sanskrit and in English.

Turning to the witnesses used for the edition, those displayed in the first two levels of the apparatus are the three extant manuscripts that bear the relevant part of the PV (one of them beginning with v. 38) and seven modern printed editions. The manuscripts are mentioned at pp. 24–25, where also the printed editions by Sāṅkṛtyāyana and Tosaki are alluded to, while reference to the editions by Y. Miyasaka, D. Shastri, and R. C. Pandeya (1972, 1984, and 1989) is only made in the preface (p. xiii). It is to be noted that Sāṅkṛtyāyana's editions of Prajñākaragupta's and Manorathanandin's commentaries display editions of the PV verses that are not on the same level. In fact, the former is based on the evidence of the manuscript(s), while the latter is not, since the only extant manuscript that bears Manorathanandin's commentary does not include the PV verses (see Pecchia 2015: 87–90). Similarly Tosaki's edition is not based on manuscript evidence, but presents a PV text as it is reflected in the relevant Tibetan translations, which the author has very carefully studied. With regard to the printed editions, it should also be noted that Shastri's and Pandeya's works have in common another procedure, namely editing the text as found in the previous printed editions with interventions on formal aspects and revisions made on the basis of their understanding of the text itself (see Pecchia 2015: 90–93). Miyasaka seems to share the same editorial procedure. With the sigla PS and VA (only mentioned in the introduction, p. 25), Franco and Notake have reported the variants of two further manuscripts of the PV that were used by Sāṅkṛtyāyana and are no longer extant. Their readings can thus be gleaned only from his edition, in particular from the apparatus (but the edited text too should be accounted for, since Sāṅkṛtyāyana's apparatus displays only what differs from his choice). Even though these readings derive from manuscripts, the authors seem to have given prominence to the fact that their record is taken from a printed edition because they have reported them in the second level of the apparatus. In this way, a mixed record of printed editions and manuscripts is generated, with the latter type of evidence being underlined through the adoption of the siglum  $\Sigma$  ("all editions") in opposition to readings of PS or VA (pp. 71, 127, and 129), and the siglum  $\Sigma-1$ —"all editions except one" in combination with the record of a *varia lectio* in PS or VA (pp. 49, 65, 71, and 127). Another case of mixed record of manuscripts and printed editions occurs at p. 35 (some mistake very likely crept into the record at p. 83). The authors

have also taken into account variant readings extracted from the commentaries on the PV by Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta, and Manorathanandin. However, these readings are discussed in the notes and do not appear in the apparatus. In a case such as *tathābhāve* in v. 8a (p. 49) this choice results in missing a potential variant that, in view of widespread writing conventions of the Sanskrit language, can hardly emerge from written records of the PV.

Trivial as they undoubtedly are, issues of representation of texts with multiple witnesses and versions have been noted here because they are of concern in relation with the accessibility of scholarly editions and the philological approach that they reveal. This concern is today more relevant than yesterday not only because digital scholarly editions are now being shaped, but also because of the more recent return to philology that has stimulated contextualized reflections on method and has made readers increasingly aware of the breadth of the philological approach that scholarly editions presuppose and the wealth of information that they contain. Especially with regard to the latter aspects, the authors seem to have largely downplayed the complexity of their work, the reflections on which it is based, and the richness of the materials that it generates. From the remarks on methodology and the materials used for the edition (pp. xiii–xiv and 24–26), readers may get the impression that editing the PV is not such a difficult matter. However, as specialists of philosophical śāstras well know, to edit this type of text implies a wide understanding of the debates in which specific works participate—debates about which our sources and understanding are often limited. Furthermore, in the case of some Indian Buddhist works, the paucity of Sanskrit sources and the presence of Tibetan translations require specific methodological reflections, procedures, and of course competences. In the specific case of Dharmakīrti's PV, then, the extent of the commentarial tradition and history of reception makes its textual condition even more complicated. Birgit Kellner (2010) has devoted a specific study to methodological issues connected with the edition of a section of PV III, describing the sources that are instrumental in a critical assessment of the PV, disentangling their different contributions towards this end, and providing the edition of representative cases of variation. Further considerations relevant to the critical edition of Dharmakīrti's works are found in the two volumes that contain the *Pramānaviniścaya* (Steinkellner 2007, Hugon and Tomabechi 2011) and in Steinkellner 2013, where the question of a Dharmakīrti's autograph is also posed (pp. xxiii–xxvii).

The matter is not settled, though, and Franco's and Notake's work will have, among other merits, that of offering elements of discussion on philological method, textual representation, and history of interpretation, as any scholarly edition does. And most of all their work will allow readers from various backgrounds to access Dharmakīrti's discussion on the duality of the object.

CRISTINA PECCHIA  
AUSTRIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

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*The Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntabhūṣaṇa of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, part 1, with the Nirañjanī Commentary by Ramyatna Shukla and Prakāsa Explanatory Notes by K. V. Ramakrishnamacharyulu.* Critically edited by K. V. RAMAKRISHNAMACHARYULU. South Asian Perspectives, no. 6; Shree Somnath Sanskrit University Shastragrantha Series, no. 2. Pondichery: INSTITUT FRANÇAIS DE PONDICHÉRY; Veraval, Gujarat: SHREE SOMNATH SANSKRIT UNIVERSITY, 2015. Pp. xl + 592. Rs. 1200, €52.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntabhūṣaṇa* "The ornament of the conclusions of the grammarians," also known by the shorter title *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* "The ornament of the grammarians," is a commentary written in about 1600 on Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's *Vaiyākaraṇamatnamajjana* "Emergence of the views of the grammarians," a short work consisting of seventy-two verses that describe the conclusions of the grammarians concerning the semantics of parts of speech. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's nephew, in this work and in his shorter *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntabhūṣaṇasāra* "Essence of the ornament of the conclusions of the grammarians," elaborates the positions indicated briefly by his