

proto-NWS system. Also, she is able to point to parallel examples in other NWS languages. Further, the fact that she identifies mixed texts (i.e., those that contain both archaic and classical verbal features) distances the archaic verbal system from other stages of BH. This becomes a relevant piece of evidence for the diachronic study of Hebrew (pace Robyn Vern).

Perhaps one of the greatest contributions of her work is the conclusion that not all the texts typically regarded as “archaic poetry” represent the archaic verbal system. However, such a conclusion may be problematic since these texts do contain other archaic features (morphology, vocabulary, etc.). Although her research is limited to the verbal system, the reader can only wonder how she might resolve such a tension.

The innovativeness of her methodology is also worth mentioning. While different linguistic studies have been carried out regarding the verbal system of BH, the application of a discursive approach comprehensively to a poetic corpus is truly innovative. Hopefully, this work will pave the way for further research by setting an example for how to interpret poetry while maintaining a high linguistic standard.

It should be pointed out, however, that while Notarius does a great job of adhering to rigid linguistic criteria, this work is not totally free from subjective interpretation; this is a fact which Notarius herself acknowledges. In my opinion, this tension is most significant when determining the underlying value of a *yiqtol* form (as preterite *yaqtul* or imperfective *yaqtulu*). A number of Notarius’ determinations regarding the underlying value of a particular *yiqtol* form could be challenged. It should be kept in mind that these interpretive decisions could influence her conclusions. Nevertheless, Notarius has made a great contribution to the field and has laid a solid foundation for further research.

Unfortunately, there were a noticeable number of typos and some issues with formatting. For example, on p. 310 the book reads, “all prefix conjugation forms . . . are in bold, the non-initial among them are italicized, the perfect is in larger font.” However, this is inconsistent with the following block of Hebrew text. It is unfortunate that easily correctible issues like this sometimes made the reading of an otherwise excellent book more difficult.

BENJAMIN KANTOR
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

A Prophet Like Moses: Prophecy, Law, and Israelite Religion. By JEFFREY STACKERT. Oxford: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2014. Pp. viii + 243. \$74.

Jeffrey Stackert’s *A Prophet Like Moses: Prophecy, Law, and Israelite Religion* takes on Wellhausen’s classic question of the relationship between prophecy and law in Israelite religion, a question whose answer is embodied in the character of Moses. Wellhausen asked the right question, but his characterization of Moses fit his understanding of the development of Israelite religion and the relationship between the two sections of the canon. Stackert makes essentially the same argument Wellhausen did—that law replaces prophecy—but based instead on an analysis of the literary sources and with much more subtlety and nuance: Legal religion is not the characteristic of a late P but something that exists in tension with prophecy through three of the four sources.

Wellhausen’s dichotomy between law and prophets on the canonical level is blurred by pentateuchal texts that present Moses as a prophet. Scholars have often downplayed these, but Stackert makes a firm case for the prophetic element of Moses’s character by showing that his portrayal in all four sources involves elements of prophecy typical throughout the ancient Near East. The Pentateuch is unique in two ways: it is a narrative construction of the past (not a typical prophetic genre), and it presents Moses as a prophetic mediator of *law*.

J depicts Moses as a prophet who is legitimated through the performance of signs and receives fully comprehensible divine messages but does not see God (e.g., Exodus 24 and the J portions of Exodus 4, 8–9, and 33). But J has no interest in law; about this, Wellhausen was right. But his inability to separate

J and E meant he could not fully appreciate what E had to say about prophecy, and it is with E that he began to get it wrong.

Older advocates of the documentary hypothesis tended to view E as supportive of prophetic religion, but Stackert makes a case for the opposite: E is skeptical of prophecy because its trustworthiness is difficult to establish, and because it produces new messages that are “fundamentally innovative and uncontrollable” (p. 124). E uses prophecy only to legitimate the Covenant Collection as *divine* law by having it mediated by a prophet. Moses is legitimated as a “singular prophetic figure” (p. 77) in the E portions of Exodus 3–4, 19–24: the unmediated speech of the Decalogue legitimates the mediated law to follow. Once the law has been given and its legitimacy established, prophets are written out of the narrative in the E portions of Numbers 11–12 and replaced with elders.

Moses’s typical practice of seeking an oracle at the tent of meeting, now in the E portions of Exodus 33, was situated in the E source *after* Moses descends from the mountain (Exodus 34) and before the E portions of Numbers 11, where it provided the context for Moses’s complaint that he cannot bear the burden of the Israelites alone—namely, the burden of prophecy. Elders are the solution to this problem, and they show up at the tent of meeting to be legitimated in the eyes of the community. Rather than becoming prophets, though, they only simulate prophetic behavior, and their activity involves no prophetic message. Miriam and Aaron “serve as the mouthpiece for” (p. 108) readers who might object to the need to establish a different institution to do what prophets do, but they also give E a chance to indicate in response that prophecy—apart from law mediated by Moses—is “inferior and unreliable” because God speaks with these prophets only in dreams and visions but with Moses face to face (p. 109). Thus, even as E holds up Moses as the archetypal prophet (Deut. 34:10–12), it neuters the institution of prophecy.

The “shift from a prophetic religion to a legal one” is thus not a hallmark of D, as Wellhausen claimed, but is already present in E (p. 127). D shares E’s skepticism about prophecy but offers a more tempered vision in which prophecy is combined with law and subordinated to it rather than eliminated. At the core of that vision is an effort to subvert the Covenant Collection and replace it with D’s own law collection. Whereas the Decalogue functioned in E to legitimate Moses as prophet and his mediated legal message, it functions in Deuteronomy 5 as the part of the covenant mediated at Horeb, while Deuteronomy 12–26 constitute the rest of the covenant, which Moses heard at Horeb but did not mediate until Moab. Placing this law at the end of the wilderness narrative was an effort to “prevent a later author from doing to [D] precisely what it has done to E” (p. 133).

Rather than being the last prophet, as in E, D’s Moses is the standard against which future prophets are measured. Deuteronomy 18 indicates that future prophets should be like Moses in that they are appointed directly by Yahweh, they speak the words of Yahweh and no other deity, and their message accords with that of Moses. But D limits the institution of prophecy to oracular inquiry; other divinatory practices are ruled out as associated with other deities, and prophets can no longer function as recipients of divine messages as Moses did. Prophetic messages are legitimated not by signs and wonders (as in J and E) but by comparison to Moses’s (legal) prophecy. By making conformity with D law the basis for evaluating a prophetic message, D bolsters its case for its centrality and shuts down any possibility of innovation. Law takes precedence over any other form of prophetic message.

P, on the contrary, has no significant treatment of prophecy. Where Moses has prophetic characteristics in P texts, they are accommodations to the wilderness narrative (efforts to “historicize,” in Stackert’s terms). P’s concern is “cultically administered law” (p. 170). Oracles, such as the *urim* and *thummim*, are a means of legal ruling and the prerogative of priests. H further includes the four cases of *ad hoc* legal exegesis (Leviticus 24; Numbers 9, 15, 27), which serve to ground legal innovation in already existing P law. It is Moses who seeks the oracle, but he functions more as priest than prophet in these texts. The P call narrative (Exodus 6–7) is also less about Moses as prophet than about elevating Aaron to the role of (legal) mediator.

A Prophet Like Moses bristles with excellent insights that will provoke further discussion—arguably the best thing a scholarly monograph can do. For instance, Stackert points out that D’s punishment of death for any prophet who turns out to deliver a false message would have made prophecy essentially impracticable, but at the same time claims that D tempers E’s take on prophecy because it finds it “too harsh” to be workable (p. 126). Are we supposed to believe that D has given us an unworkable model of prophecy in its effort to correct the unworkability of E’s? This warrants further comment.

The book contains some overstated claims: Stackert argues that P is strongly anti-prophetic, that it “effectively undermines the prophetic religion it rejects” (p. 184), when what emerges from his discussion is that P simply doesn’t make an issue of prophecy. Stackert himself notes that, for P, “prophecy is an idiosyncratic relic, valued only for its legacy” (p. 192). P clearly adopts the prophetic characterization of Moses common to all the sources, but Stackert does not show us the polemics we would expect to find in a text with a strong anti-prophetic stance—the kind amply demonstrated for E and D. The discussion is also at points skewed to Stackert’s interest in the prophecy-law dynamic: He claims that the sources present Moses more as a mediator of divine messages (law) to the Israelites than as intercessor (p. 55), but this is a curious claim in light of the complaint episodes, where Moses often does initiate an intercession on behalf of the people, and one wonders what an account of prophecy in the Pentateuch would look like if it dealt with these cases more fully.

All that said, Stackert’s advocacy for the idea that characters and plot developments in pentateuchal narrative embody arguments about social institutions, situated in a narrative fiction set in the distant past, is hugely promising. Like Wellhausen, Stackert moves the discussion forward by asking the right questions and giving us much to contend with as we strive to answer them.

Stackert takes as the starting point for this study the Neo-Documentary Hypothesis—a powerful, even compelling reorientation of the Graf-Wellhausen version that corrects many problems with it. But Wellhausen’s synthesis was also powerful and compelling, which had much to do with its broad acceptance in spite of reservations from the start. We should be equally cautious here. Sweeping syntheses are inspiring and motivating and, as such, play an important role in scholarship, but they are no substitute for detailed literary-critical studies of individual texts. Stackert argues that biblical studies should find its academic home in religious studies in order to benefit from the descriptive, analytical, and historical study of religion. I would add that biblical studies as a whole—and not just its synchronic corner—should also become bedfellows with literature and literary theory, since everything hinges on whether the readings that differentiate the sources are the most compelling readings, not whether the model as a whole is compelling.

ANGELA ROSKOP ERISMAN
BROOKLYN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

Rameside Inscriptions: Translations. Vol. 7. Addenda. By K. A. KITCHEN. Walden, Mass: WILEY BLACKWELL, 2014. Pp. xxxvi + 274. \$400.

Rameside Inscriptions. Vol. 4. *Merenptah and the Late Nineteenth Dynasty: Translated and Annotated, Notes and Comments*. By BENEDICT G. DAVIES. Malden, Mass.: WILEY BLACKWELL, 2014. Pp. xl + 397, maps, charts. \$400.

The translations of Kenneth A Kitchen’s *Rameside Inscriptions* have recommenced. In volume 7 of his series the expert has provided once more fresh, and in many cases new and useful, renditions of the addenda texts that concluded the first series (*KRI*) of this so important arduous work. Once more, the author has also provided literary analyses of key texts, e.g., the account of Userhat-Hataiu-Peniya, a chief sculptor but also a wise and erudite composer of praise to deities. The example chosen is particularly revealing as it demonstrates Kitchen’s deep understanding of Egyptian prose as well as poetry—see his *Poetry of Ancient Egypt* (Jonsered, 1996). This should indicate that these translations are not mere mechanical ones, akin to oft-repeated new editions into modern languages of ancient words belonging to a far-away and dead tongue.

But non-poetical materials, or perhaps better put—those of a non-literary nature—are also analyzed with deliberation and consideration upon the original set-up. The oft-consulted Papyrus Butler, to take a case in point, an account that records an offering to Osiris by a military cohort, is neatly presented in columnar format so as to allow the reader and investigator a relatively easy understanding of this