of tensions with respect to his insistence on self-awareness as a continuous phenomenon on the one hand, and how the notion of a stable self remains somewhat opaque (to itself) on the other. But here, too, one wonders how the notion of self-reflexive opacity matches up with Ṣadrā's emphasis on the higher forms of awareness at which the human soul arrives precisely through the soul's *tajrīd* or "peeling away" from materiality through its increase in *wujūd*, self-remembrance, and self-knowledge (for a related and profound discussion, see W. Chittick, *In Search of the Lost Heart*, ed. M. Rustom et al. [Albany, 2012], ch. 19).

Now that we have a broader understanding of the interdisciplinary and geographical vastness of post-Avicennian Islamic philosophy, there is at our disposal a minimum of knowledge that allows us to carry out substantial research on the variegated intellectual strands that intertwine so firmly in the post-classical period of Islamic intellectual history, thereby expanding our horizons when it comes to envisioning the nature and scope of Islamic intellectual activity over the past one thousand years. This entails that, at minimum, we have a number of categories in the study of Islamic intellectual history that are no longer mutually exclusive. There is, for instance, a sizeable amount of literature now on the manner in which Avicenna was naturalized into both Islamic theology and Islamic mysticism. This allows for two sub-disciplines in the study of Islamic philosophy to emerge—Islamic philosophical theology and philosophical Sufism—which themselves also splinter off into other unique and original synthetic forms, potentially taking the sphere of coverage of Islamic philosophy to unforeseen heights.

Kaukua's *Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy* is therefore not only relevant to the mainstream Islamic philosophical tradition. Self-awareness becomes, for example, a major area of inquiry among the followers of Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1240), with their own points of interest, technical language, and emphasis on the nature of the self/Self, thereby presenting new possibilities for envisioning the scope and efficacy of this key insight in Avicenna, al-Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā. Of course, asking of Kaukua to have also included in his inquiry the manner in which self-awareness functions in the writings of the more philosophically oriented Sufis would be equivalent to demanding another book. Within the confines of his inquiry Kaukua has indeed covered all the necessary ground. This in itself is a major feat and a serious scholarly accomplishment. By way of an Avicennian *ishāra*, *Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy* also points to the need to examine the problem of self-awareness and a cluster of other related issues in metaphysics and psychology within the wider tapestry of the post-classical Islamic intellectual tradition, philosophical Sufism being one of its most important yet seriously understudied dimensions. Suffice it to say, awareness of this need would not have been possible without the necessary ground covered by Kaukua's phenomenal study.

Mohammed Rustom
Carleton University, Ottawa

The Arabic Version of Ṭūsī's Nasirean Ethics*: With an Introduction and Explanatory Notes*. By Joep Lameer. Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science, vol. 96. Leiden: Brill, 2015. Pp. ix + 550. $189, €136.

The volume under review is an edition of an early Arabic translation of the Persian *Akhlāq-e Nāṣerī,* one of the most acclaimed compendia of philosophical ethics in the Islamic tradition and one of the best-known works of the polymath Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). In this work, composed at the behest of the Ismaili governor of Quhistān, Nāṣir al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Abī Manṣūr (d. 655/1257), Ṭūsī drew on the writings of Miskawayh alongside a number of additional sources to offer a synthetic account that went beyond Miskawayh's narrower focus on ethics, and included detailed treatments of ethics, economics, and politics. The work enjoyed a vibrant afterlife, spawning a plethora of summaries, commentaries, and adaptations in both Persian and Arabic in the centuries after Ṭūsī's death. The Arabic translation presented here is a reflection of this lively afterlife, and opens a welcome door to

closer investigation of the reception of Ṭūsī's work and the development of Arabic philosophical ethics. The translation was the work of Rukn al-Dīn Jurjānī (alive in 728/1327), one-time student of the Shiʿite theologian al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, author of numerous works, and self-confessed admirer of Ṭūsī's writings; *Akhlāq-e Nāṣerī* was one of several to have been translated by him.

This edition is based on the sole manuscript identified to date, which is housed at Leiden University Library and was copied in or before 768/1366. The manuscript appears to be in excellent condition and is written in a clear legible script; among its distinctive features are the numerous marginal and interlinear glosses it incorporates. Lameer prefaces the edition with an introduction that provides helpful context for the author, translator, content, and sources of the work, as well as useful orienting remarks on the quality of the translation and on his own editing method. One of the special challenges of this work derives from its linguistic character, and more specifically from its numerous deviations from Classical Arabic, which Lameer identifies as features of Middle Arabic. His approach to editing the text is based on the (persuasive) argument that these features were part of the original text and were not introduced by a copyist's hand, and it involves the decision to amend the text according to the norms of Classical Arabic only selectively, rectifying orthographical deviations but retaining morphological and syntactical deviations, among others.

Overall, the edition is scrupulously executed and demonstrates meticulous scholarship. Much of this scholarship appears in the footnotes, where Lameer goes beyond what is often encountered in editions of Arabic texts. Throughout he undertakes extensive comparison between Jurjānī's translation, the Persian original, and the English translation produced by G. M. Wickens (1964), using this comparison to clarify the meaning of the text, shed light on some of its syntactical and semantic peculiarities, and evaluate the accuracy of the Arabic translation, pointing out cases where Jurjānī clearly went astray (and often appealing to the Persian to explain why). He uses his readings to suggest emendations of other source texts, such as Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, to propose corrections to the English translation of Ṭūsī's work, and to offer new support for particular readings of the Persian edition. He also provides selective information about Ṭūsī's sources, both Arabic and Greek. The notes additionally include extensive detail regarding the glosses that accompany the main text at many junctures of the manuscript. The meticulousness of the work is reflected in the relative paucity of obvious errors, typographical and otherwise; I only found a handful of spelling and vocalization errors—to mention some, read *tazkiyatuhā* not *tadhkiyatuhā* at p. 95.8, *arghadihi* not *arghadahu* at p. 177.3, *bi-aqalli ṣawt* not *bi-aqalla ṣawt* at p. 188.9, *yattafiqu* not *yattaqifu* at p. 195.2, *ashkhāṣ* not *ashḥāṣ* at p. 210.11, *wa-aḥabb* not *awḥab* at p. 265.6, *takhfā* not *takhfī* at pp. 278.12 and 348.11, *yuʿjab* not *yuʿjib* at p. 296.11, *inqiṭāʿ* not *inqitāʿ* at p. 319.5, *yattaṣifu* not *yuttaṣifu* at p. 405.1.

This meticulous multi-layered scholarship will be of great service to readers of Jurjānī's translation and can only be commended. There are two aspects of the work that are likely to trouble readers, however—one regarding the decision about how to handle the linguistic character of the work as outlined above, the other regarding the approach to annotation.

The question how editions should negotiate the presence of Middle Arabic elements in manuscripts is a divisive one and there has been growing dissatisfaction in some circles with the frequently adopted approach of purifying editions of these elements in order to produce a "Procrustean" conformity with the privileged norms of Classical Arabic ("Procrustean" is Joshua Blau's term, referring to Christian Arabic texts, in *A Grammar of Christian Arabic, Based Mainly on South-Palestinian Texts from the First Millennium* [Louvain, 1966], 1: 36 n. 28). Taking a stance on this question demands drawing delicate distinctions between cases where Middle Arabic can and should be recognized as a "discrete variety of the language" or "special brand of Arabic" (as argued with respect to Judeo-Arabic and Christian Middle Arabic), cases where Middle Arabic is intentionally used and carries literary significance (as in *The Arabian Nights*, famously purged of their Middle Arabic elements in many editions, or in some forms of poetry), and cases where it seems more appropriate to speak of mistakes committed by writers whose intention was to conform to the norms of Classical Arabic. (My remarks here draw on Kees Versteegh's helpful discussion of Middle Arabic in *The Arabic Language* [Edinburgh, [2]2014], chap. 9). These distinctions are not only delicate but slippery, given that even those treating certain kinds of Middle Arabic (such as Christian Arabic) as separate linguistic types take the authors' intention to be conformity with Classical norms (see, e.g., Blau, p. 50). The increasing scholarly interest in

Middle Arabic has led to more principled discussions of the dilemma—one that Paolo La Spisa ("Perspectives ecdotiques pour textes en Moyen Arabe: L'exemple des traités théologiques de Sulaymān al-Ġazzī," in *Middle Arabic and Mixed Arabic: Diachrony and Synchrony*, ed. L. Zack and A. Schippers [Leiden, 2012], 187–208) parses as a choice between a more interventionist editorial approach that valorizes readability and a less interventionist approach that valorizes (and runs the risk of "fetishizing") fidelity. Given that the present edition is based on a single manuscript, a more interventionist approach seems even more problematic to apply, to the extent that this typically involves (and is legitimated by) selecting among possibilities presented by different manuscripts. Being a translation rather than an original work, another external reference point highlighted in these discussions is also unavailable, namely, the possibility of deciding among competing options by reference to the author's thought as expressed in other works.

The approach followed by Lameer leans heavily toward the non-interventionist end of the spectrum. Readers habituated to "cleansed" Arabic editions will unavoidably find themselves somewhat jarred by the abundance of syntactical and other deviations that lace the edition throughout. This includes above all the frequent failure of gender concordance, which often sees a single sentence switching back and forth between gender agreement and disagreement (by way of sampling: *idhā lam yakun bi-ʿaraḍin lazima an takūna jawharan*, p. 99.1; *fa-inna al-bāṣira lā tudriku al-ibṣāra . . . wa-lā yatanabbahu li-l-ghalaṭ*, p. 103.12–13). Lameer often helpfully signposts these deviations with an asterisk, but not in every case (a fact, incidentally, that makes it hard to judge when something has gone awry in the edition itself as against forming a feature of its manuscript basis). As a reader perhaps a little too happily accustomed to Classical norms, I must admit that I find it difficult to see such inconsistent usage as a rule-following practice or "intrinsic structure" in its own right, to be respected rather than normatively appraised as deviant or mistaken or as the result of mere carelessness.[1] In the same vein, it is not clear to me how Lameer's remark that such features "are more readily associated with 'mistakes' and 'misunderstandings' than simple variations of orthography" (p. 24) serves as a defense of his policy of retaining them. At the same time, one appreciates Lameer's discomfort with the heavy-handed decision to "simply cleanse the text of everything that is not Classical Arabic" (p. 22), given the sheer amount of Middle Arabic elements the text contains (Lameer estimates them at two percent of the entire manuscript) and given the absence of other manuscripts to legitimate alternative decisions.

Readers will differ about the wisdom of this non-interventionist approach, but, as already noted, it is not an approach that makes for easy reading, all the more so given that it is expressed in a broader policy of allowing problematic or nonsensical passages to stand in the main text even while compelling grounds are offered in the footnotes as to why the text is unsound and what would be a better reading (e.g., pp. 130 n. 7, 173 n. 2, 193 n. 4, 274 n. 6, 412 n. 1, 417 n. 2). The edition is thus impossible to follow without constantly consulting the copious glosses provided in the footnotes, making for a highly fragmented reading experience; only those with a primary interest in engaging the philological complexities of the text as such will likely find it pleasant.

This brings me to the second troubling point of annotation. Having found consultation of the footnotes to be indispensable, the reader will then wish that Lameer had shown a little more temperance in introducing them. The footnotes invariably display impressive erudition and control of the text, and an admirable determination to iron out every semantic and syntactical wrinkle and provide insight into the editorial decisions taken. There are notes clarifying the referents of pronouns where Lameer judges them to be obscure, justifying decisions about the vocalization of specific terms, explaining choices of punctuation, or transcribing the glosses found throughout the manuscript (even glosses scratched out by later hands). As helpful as many of these notes are for unpacking the (real) complexities of the text—

1. "Intrinsic structure" is Blau's term in *The Emergence and Linguistic Background of Judaeo-Arabic* (Jerusalem, ²1981), 115, where he cautions against disregarding this structure in editing Judeo-Arabic texts (and indeed texts of Muslim and Christian origin by extension); "carelessness" is also his term in characterizing the phenomenon of gender discord in *A Handbook of Early Middle Arabic* (Jerusalem, 2002), 46. In *A Grammar of Christian Arabic* (§1.7) he highlights the carelessness and inconstancy that characterizes Christian Arabic and indeed wonders whether it may not "even be considered paradoxical to try to establish the limits of a language so inconstant" (p. 50 n. 57).

the translation reads well overall, but awkward constructions and opaque passages abound—I feel that much of this interpretive work could have been profitably entrusted to the competent reader. Many of the notes now seem overly elaborate and somewhat gratuitous, and they wear out the reader who must have continuous recourse to them. Where, for example, questions of vocalization provoke lengthy discussion (e.g., the discussion of the vocalization of *m-l-k* at p. 156 n. 2), I wonder whether it would have been wiser to omit the vocalization altogether and leave the matter to the reader's judgment.

The above is not meant to detract from the value of the work but to indicate ways in which its value could have been enhanced. Readers interested in the development of philosophical ethics in the Islamic world will be grateful to have this meticulous scholarly edition at their disposal.

Sophia Vasalou
University of Birmingham

Ibadi Theology: Rereading Sources and Scholarly Works. Edited by Ersilia Francesca. Studies on Ibadism and Oman, vol. 4. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2015. Pp. 331. €68.

The study of Ibāḍism has matured considerably in past decades; the inevitable impact of this fact on Islamic studies is only "a question of when." This collection of twenty-seven contributions from a 2012 conference gives much cause for optimism in that regard. Scholars of Islam—both well established and aspiring, with academic and confessional approaches (these not being mutually exclusive categories)—have joined here to give a representative depiction of the state of Ibāḍī studies in its greater discursive emphases and topical concerns. The success of such an initiative will ultimately be measured by the field's willingness not only to engage with the historiographical implications of this research, but also to expand our understanding of the development of Islamic theology along a broader textual and conceptual basis than has been the norm.

In light of the conference's convening in Naples, we are reminded by Ersilia Francesca (pp. 13–20) of the need to recall the pioneering contributions of Italian scholars such as C. A. Nallino, L. Veccia Vaglieri, and R. Rubinacci in using Ibāḍī sources for the study of early Islam. Their boldness and creativity in utilizing the writings of a group ordinarily categorized as a Khārijite heresy are felt even today. This same fact explains a recurring point of emphasis found in the articles in this volume, namely, the rehabilitation of Ibāḍism as more "moderate" or "rationalist" than is commonly believed—a matter of concern in justifying the study of a topic that might otherwise induce prejudice or squeamishness.

Key Ibāḍī discourses of "anathemization" (*takfīr*), in fact, do not stray far from either of these two poles, as theological rationalism may create new exclusivist forms of orthodoxy even as it opens new intellectual horizons; likewise, a rigorous public discourse of *takfīr* may invite soteriological gradations perceivable as a gray area of moderate pragmatism. Precisely such matters are helpfully problematized by John Wilkinson (pp. 47–52) in an article that emphasizes the need both for historical contextualization and for grounding our own analytical categories in specifically Ibāḍī terminology, e.g., "affiliation" (*walāya*), "disavowal" (*barāʾa*), and "suspension of judgment" (*wuqūf*). Readers who would pursue this line of inquiry would be well advised to refer to Yohei Kondo's excellent exposition of the early elaboration of these teachings in the eighth and ninth centuries (pp. 185–97), which is not only amply sourced, but also explores their practical function in the context of conversion. Addressing a related topic, Moustafa Bendrissou (pp. 165–75) shows how the Ibāḍī view of sins (great and small) was not only expressed theologically, but juridically mediated as well—a "disbeliever" could still be treated legally as a Muslim. Sunni Islam never formulized an elaborate doctrine of *walāya* and *barāʾa* despite the Quranic origin of the terms; hence, the "rediscovery" of the concept in some forms of salafism (the archetype of Islamic extremism in the modern mind) necessarily revisits the initial theological-exegetical questions faced by Ibāḍism's Khārijite progenitors—whether to treat sin on the part of individuals and their leaders as faith-defining (and thus impacting *walāya* and *barāʾa*) and, if so, what types of rulings were to apply to them. Ibāḍism's perceived moderation, then, comes from the ability to