

all ages. It is used in the Quran as an attribute of God. In his Quran translation, Alan Jones correctly observed that it has become standard to translate *‘ālamīn* as “the worlds” in accordance with the development of the word in Arabic. However, it would appear originally to have meant “all created beings” (see also M. Carter, “Foreign Vocabulary,” in *The Blackwell Companion to the Qur’ān*, ed. A. Rippin [Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007], 131).

It should be noted that the extant fragment from *Kitāb al-Īdāh* of al-Nu‘mān (p. xxxvi n. 8) edited by Muḥammad Kāzīm Raḥmatī was originally published in Qom in *Mirāth-i ḥadīth-i shī‘ah*, ed. M. Mihrizī and ‘A. Ṣadrāyī-Khūyī in 1382/[2004], vol. 10. The Beirut edition of 2007 cited by the editor is a pirated one. The two dates suggested for the composition of *Da‘ā’im al-islām* are 347/957 and 349/960 (p. xxxvi n. 12; the source cited is S. Hamdani). The former was suggested by Wadād al-Qāḍī in her article “An Early Fatimid Political Document” (*Studia Islamica* 48 [1978]: 117–43) while the latter was indirectly inferred from a historical source by me in my “Al-Qāḍī al-Nu‘mān and Isma‘īli jurisprudence” (pp. 126–27, where I refute the speculative date 347/957 originally surmised by Ivanow).

I found a few typographical errors, of which I should note the following: p. xxx l. -5 should read: Ṣafar 1272; p. xxx l. -1 should read: Jumādā al-thānī; p. xxxvi n. 9 should read Waḥīd Mīrzā (not Waḥīd Mīrzā); and (in the same note) ‘Ārif Tāmir (not Tāmir ‘Ārif).

Stewart has rendered al-Nu‘mān’s work into intelligible and elegant English, in keeping with the goals of the Library of Arabic Literature series to open up certain valuable and influential works in the Arabic tradition to a wider reading public. Instead of retaining Arabic legal terminology, a procedure usually followed in translating books of Islamic law, Stewart judiciously chose to abandon that practice. The use of the same terms in differing situations with slightly varied meanings fails to convey the intent underlying the acoustic symbolism of its terms. Hence, Stewart has aptly translated those terms into English in varying contexts and occasionally with a little different nuance in their meanings. A good example is the term *taqlīd*, generally translated as “blind faith,” which has been rendered, depending on the context, as “submission to authority,” “illegitimate authority,” or “arbitrary submission to authority.” Another feature for which Stewart deserves full credit—and which oddly is not addressed in the introduction—is that innumerable Quranic verses cited by al-Nu‘mān are deftly rendered into idiomatic rendition. I do not think any existing English translation of the Quran would have adequately served his purpose. Contrarily, it would have interrupted the smooth flow of the translation. Stewart’s rendering of those verses is superior to others currently available to us.

ISMAIL K. POONAWALA
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb. By KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB. New York: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2015. Pp. xvi + 399. \$99.99, £64.99.

This is an important book. While the political and social history of the early modern Muslim world and especially the Ottoman empire has received a great deal of attention over the last few decades, the same cannot be said for its intellectual history. There have been some excellent studies of individual thinkers—a personal favorite is Stefan Reichmuth’s book on al-Zabīdī—but no synthetic overviews that offer a comprehensive narrative of the intellectual developments in the Muslim world from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries (the field of jurisprudence is a notable exception, but there, too, more is needed). This book does precisely that, and the research and effort that went into it go some ways to explaining why no one had written such a book before. Khaled El-Rouayheb’s accomplishment is to define criteria for measuring intellectual vitality and development in a broad number of fields—logic, dialectics, reading strategies, theology, and Sufism among them—and then to show how and why during what we might call the long seventeenth century the scholarship of the central Ottoman lands was revitalized in these areas. In doing so he acquaints his reader with an impressively broad array of

scholars, some of whom are well known—Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (d. 1690), al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī (d. 1691), ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1731), for example—but many more less so (the sheer number of lesser known but significant scholars featured here, along with their scholarly genealogies and most important works, is in itself a valuable contribution). El-Rouayheb shows that the Ottoman empire and neighboring Muslim lands experienced a notable increase in the study of the rational sciences in the seventeenth century along with an emphasis on rational modes of argumentation, often related to the use of the term *taḥqīq* or verification. It is a particular virtue of his analysis that he is able to show how this development began and ended, and how it relates to the subsequent intellectual developments associated with figures such as Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), al-Zabidī (d. 1791), and al-Shawkānī (d. 1834). In the process he makes a compelling case for the continued significance of intellectual history as a field and the counterproductive nature of European frameworks such as humanism and enlightenment when describing developments in the Muslim world.

The book is divided into three parts, each focusing on how a group of scholars from outside the Ottoman empire played an important role in shaping the scholarship within it. The first, “The Path of the Kurdish and Persian Verifying Scholars,” demonstrates effectively how many previous generalizations regarding this period have been insufficient. It is divided into three chapters: the first addresses the focus on the rational sciences of the Kurdish scholars who entered the Ottoman empire in the seventeenth century; the second focuses specifically on the genre of *ādāb al-baḥṭh* (dialectics) in the Ṭīmūrīd east during the same period and its subsequent cultivation in Ottoman scholarship (and its influence on the field of logic); the third turns to the new focus on deep reading (*ādāb al-muḥāla’a*) in Ṭīmūrīd and subsequently Ottoman scholarship during the same period. Here El-Rouayheb sets the foundation for his argument that previous scholarship erred in equating Ottoman scholarship of the seventeenth century with a conservative *Ḳāḏizādelī* movement that impeded the study of the rational sciences. Not only was a lot more going on than just the *Ḳāḏizādelī* movement, but prominent scholars whom the *Ḳāḏizādelīs* referred to as authorities, such as the sixteenth-century Mātūrīdī Meḥmed Birgevi, and numerous scholars associated with the movement expressed themselves positively regarding philosophy and the rational sciences in general. Parallel to this openness to sciences such as logic, medicine, mathematics, and *kalām* was the growing importance for many Kurdish and Persian scholars of the concept of *taḥqīq*. The term, understood roughly as “independent logical demonstration” (p. 28), is central for El-Rouayheb’s overall argument. While its origins go back at least as far as Avicenna, El-Rouayheb uses it in the first and second chapters—where it is linked to *ādāb al-baḥṭh*—to demonstrate how deeply eastern Ṭīmūrīd scholarship first shaped and was subsequently appropriated by Ottoman Turkish scholars. Not all regions were identical: the Arab Ottoman lands did not turn to *ādāb al-baḥṭh* until the end of the seventeenth century due to the preponderance of Maghribī influence there, and Ṣafavid Iran did not take up the discipline much—perhaps, the author suggests, because prominent Iranian scholars such as Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1635) were less interested in the post-Avicennian tradition on which it was based than in the writings of Avicenna himself (pp. 69–70). The third chapter takes up the question of the changing nature of the Ottoman educational landscape from the angle of “deep reading,” in which the necessary personal relationship between teacher and student was replaced by the greater autonomy of the book and the written word. Much of this shift is traced through the works of Aḥmed b. Lūṭfullāh Mevlevī, known as Mūneccimbāṣī (d. 1702), and Meḥmed Sāçaḳlızāde (d. ca. 1732–3). This shift was likely linked to systemization of the Ottoman education system in general, in which certificates and government exams replaced the personal granting of an *ijāza* (pp. 125–26).

The second part of the book, “Saving Servants from the Yoke of Imitation,” turns from the Ṭīmūrīd east to the farthest western region of the Islamic world. Central to the three chapters here is the fifteenth-century North African theologian and logician Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī and his influence on later Moroccan scholars such as al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī. The field of logic, especially, was revived in the Ottoman Arab lands in the seventeenth century at the hand of this lineage of Moroccan scholars. The section’s three chapters first offer an overview of the Maghribī influence in Egypt and the Ḥijāz in the seventeenth century, then turn to the centrality of the condemnation of *taqlīd* for al-Sanūsī and his followers, and finally take up two theological controversies in which the logician-theologian-Sufi al-Yūsī was involved. Throughout, El-Rouayheb stresses the degree to which the scholars whom he is

discussing in this section are distinct from later scholars such as al-Zabīdī, Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlavī (d. 1762), al-Shawkānī, and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb in their focus on the rational sciences (p. 131). Indeed, particularly useful here is that El-Rouayheb provides both a terminus post quem and ante quem for the rise of the rational sciences in the Maghrib, dating the rise in interest in their study to the late sixteenth century with the arrival of the Tunisian scholar Muḥammad Kharrūf al-Anṣārī (d. 1558), who settled in Fez, and placing their decline with the revival of traditionalism under the Alawī ruler Sīdī Muḥammad (r. 1757–1790) (pp. 148, 170). During this long seventeenth century, scholars from the regions of central and southern Morocco, which had been economically reinvigorated following Morocco’s revival of the West African gold and slave trade in the late sixteenth century, either traveled or sent their students to the Ottoman Arab lands. Many of these scholars came from Berber backgrounds and had studied primarily at Sufi *zāwiyas* in rural areas instead of the *madrasas* of Fez and Marrakesh (pp. 151–52). El-Rouayheb stresses that the studies of logic they presented were superior to anything known until then in Egypt and that these works, often commentaries on the works of al-Sanūsī, proved influential in Ottoman Egypt (less so in Anatolia where the prevalence of Ḥanafī Māturidī scholarship was not as receptive to Mālikī Ash‘aris) (pp. 133–35, 143–44). It is worth pausing for a moment at the discussion of al-Sanūsī as a theologian, for the importance El-Rouayheb places in the fifteenth-century North African scholar and the significance he assigns to developments in *kalām* of the early modern period are decidedly greater than al-Sanūsī has received in most recent studies. Following El-Rouayheb, al-Sanūsī was the most important post-formative theologian in the Muslim world until the nineteenth century, much more so than, say, Ibn Taymiyya or Mu‘tazilī scholars, despite their ideas having been taken up by Salafis and modernists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who were opposed to the dominance of Ash‘arism in early modern Islamic thought (pp. 201–2). Al-Sanūsī’s thought contained a strict rejection of imitation or conformism (*taqlīd*) and he called for every Muslim to achieve a rational understanding of his or her faith. Without such an understanding, a supposed believer would not be treated as such on the Day of Judgment, although in this world Muslims should treat anyone uttering the profession of faith as a believer. Al-Sanūsī’s writings, with their focus on rational proofs and Aristotelian categories, had a greater influence on the Kāḏizādēlī movement than Ibn Taymiyya (p. 191), and by way of the popular works that commented on them spread the use of syllogistic argumentation beyond its previous domain.

In the last chapter of this section El-Rouayheb turns to the work of one of al-Sanūsī’s most influential commentators, al-Yūsī, who was caught up in two fierce theological controversies in seventeenth-century Morocco. The first involved the proper interpretation of the *shahāda* and took place near Sijilmāsa in the 1660s. In his response to a group of students who rejected all contact with Muslims who did not meet their standards of rational belief, al-Yūsī broke with al-Sanūsī’s more stringent requirements and argued that the common people needed to understand only the basics of their faith (p. 207). Still, the debate gave al-Yūsī occasion to argue for the importance of rational theology (*kalām*) and to take issue with the Egyptian al-Suyūfī’s (d. 1505) denunciation of logic (p. 219). The second and related controversy concerned the proper understanding of the phrase “no God” in the Muslim profession of faith (“There is no God but God”). Al-Yūsī addressed the revival of what had already been a contentious dispute in the sixteenth century in Morocco in which scholars debated whether the negated term referred to a false god or the real God. In a long work al-Yūsī argued on logical grounds that the first term referred to the true God, as Muslims would otherwise be professing that the true God was in fact the only false divinity (p. 227). It is perhaps not surprising that this type of influence of the discipline of logic on theology would be disquieting to later scholars such as al-Zabīdī, who complained of the Maghribī-inspired Egyptian study of logic in the eighteenth century (pp. 227–31).

The third section of the book, “The Imams of Those Who Proclaim the Unity of Existence,” turns eastward again, to assess the influence of Sufi orders from Anatolia and India that, in promoting a greater engagement with the concept of *wahdat al-wujūd* (unity of being), brought Ibn al-‘Arabī’s (d. 1240) thought to the center of much of seventeenth-century scholarship. The first chapter focuses on the shift from a sixteenth-century veneration of Ibn al-‘Arabī as a saint, but a studied lack of engagement with the more radical aspects of his thought, to the ways in which many Ottoman scholars of the seventeenth century, such as Aḥmad al-Qushāshī (d. 1661), his student Ibrāhīm al-Kurānī, and

ʿAbd al-Ghānī al-Nābulusī, fully embraced the theory of “the unity of existence.” These scholars were affiliated with the Shaṭṭāriyya and the Naqshbandiyya, Sufi orders that had their origins in India, but with the example of the Ḥanbalī Khalwatī order, the chapter also introduces the potentially surprising description of Ḥanbalīs who supported the thought of Ibn al-ʿArabī (p. 264). Here El-Rouayheb makes the point that present-day scholars need to work harder to understand the ways in which early modern Muslims drew in varied ways on Ibn al-ʿArabī’s thought, and not to reduce them to pro- or anti-Ibn al-ʿArabī camps. The second chapter continues to unravel the link between Ḥanbalism, Ashʿarism, and Sufi writings inspired by Ibn al-ʿArabī, drawing attention to interesting ways in which prominent thinkers such as al-Kurānī rejected aspects of Ashʿarism such as occasionalism, in favor of a belief in secondary causality that was professed both by Ḥanbalīs and Ibn al-ʿArabī (pp. 297–99). Perhaps provocatively, El-Rouayheb argues in this chapter’s conclusion that the complex Salafi movement of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries has its origins in part in this confluence of Ḥanbalism and Sufism that had made inroads into Sunni thought in the previous centuries (p. 311). The third chapter addresses the ways in which al-Kurānī and al-Nābulusī defended the theory of *waḥdat al-wujūd* theologically against Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī’s (d. 1389) critiques, arguing that these two thinkers were just as radical in their adherence to the full implications of the concept as Ibn al-ʿArabī’s early followers had been.

El-Rouayheb’s conclusion gives a concise and useful overview of the book’s trajectory and makes an eloquent case against measuring debates in the early modern Muslim world according to Muslim scholars’ engagement with European texts. He similarly brands as irrelevant other past attempts to find an index for Muslim creativity in this period, such as the debate on the closing of the doors of *ijtihād*.

As I stated above, this is an important book and one that scholars of the early modern period will no doubt read avidly. El-Rouayheb has been writing on this subject for almost a decade now, and the content of several of his book chapters and articles has been incorporated here. Those who follow his work will be satisfied that this is more than the sum of these previous writings and that it goes well beyond them in its overall analytical ambition. But there is a good chance that scholars of Islamic history who work on the formative or modern periods will pass over this at times dense book, perceiving it to be of only marginal relevance to their own research and teaching. That would be a mistake. Pressed for space, I cannot present a rounded argument and so will only claim that how we understand the intellectual trajectory of the early modern Muslim world has had substantial implications for both how we understand what is still often called the Golden Age of Islamic thought and how we approach the so-called reformist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In its nuanced and detailed readings of the long seventeenth century, El-Rouayheb’s book contains numerous insights into the significance and nature of both earlier and later periods and should be read by intellectual historians of Islam, regardless of the period in which they specialize.

JUSTIN STEARNS
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY-ABU DHABI

Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire. By LIANG CAI. Albany, N.Y.: STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS, 2014. Pp. xii + 276. \$85 (cloth), \$27.95 (paper).

Liang Cai’s book concerns the history of the classically trained officials during the Western Han period. As her title suggests, the Han empire became a “Confucian empire” only after the witchcraft affair of 91 B.C.E. In Cai’s view, this event, which started when accusations of black magic were brought against the heir apparent, wiped out the hereditary groups that until then had enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the highest political offices and created opportunities for classically trained scholars to claim a larger share of high political offices. Huo Guang, who had a stronghold on the central court after Wudi (r. 141–87 B.C.E.) died until his own death in 66 B.C.E., was a key figure in this process. He bolstered his own power by employing and promoting several *ru* willing to use their knowledge of