six sites (p. 42), while the English version identifies twenty-five (pp. 76–77). In terms of translation, Pettit relied on Taoïsme et connaissance de soi, but he and Despeux collaborated, with Despeux guiding the overall style and many of the translation preferences. Finally, although perhaps asking too much of a scholar who has already done enough, I believe that more engagement with contemporaneous Daoist communities and materials may have aided in elucidating the context-specific meaning of the Xiuzhen tu. Here Despeux’s vast erudition may be a slight hindrance, as she cites materials from many different historical periods and movements. While clearly relevant and accurate, one wonders about the forms of late imperial Daoism that informed and are documented in the Xiuzhen tu (p. 43). Along these lines, Despeux does helpfully cite texts like the anonymous early seventeenth-century Xingming guizhi 性命圭旨 (Imperial Decrees on Innate Nature and Life-destiny; JHL 67; ZW 314) as well as the Wu-Liu 伍柳 textual corpus (pp. 141, 174, 214, 222–23).

Beyond these minor concerns, Taoism and Self Knowledge is a model of scholarship in Daoist Studies. It profoundly explicates Daoist views of the human body and grants deep access to the Xiuzhen tu, one of the most influential and widely disseminated Daoist body-maps. Despeux’s work may, in turn, be understood as an expression of an emerging subfield within Daoist Studies that might be labeled “Daoist Somatic Studies.” The late Joseph Needham (1900–1995), Kristofer Schipper, Livia Kohn, Fabrizio Pregadio, and I are among those with such interests. It also fits well into an emerging interest in Daoist material culture, which might be labeled “the material turn” in Daoist Studies, and perhaps academia more generally, represented by scholars such as Stephen Little, Lennert Gesterkamp, Shihshan Susan Huang, Luk Yu-ping, and myself.

One may in turn recognize the stellar contribution of Taoism and Self Knowledge, and Pettit deserves our gratitude for helping to make Despeux’s scholarship more accessible to a larger audience. This includes not only individuals interested in Daoism and Chinese religion, but also those who might undertake comparative and cross-cultural work on embodiment and material culture.

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This is a challenging and valuable treatment of Mesopotamian myth and ritual that takes risks few in ancient Near Eastern studies would take. It attempts to holistically reconstruct the mental world behind one of the most interesting Mesopotamian myths, that of Adapa (who began life as the Sumerian Adaba), and while not every Assyriologist will accept its interpretations, it does two things the field can learn from: first, it treats a pattern of Mesopotamian culture as not just a historical relic, but as something of broad human interest. Second, it integrates material from the whole span of the cuneiform record according to meaningful theoretical questions: How did Mesopotamian exorcists see themselves? Can a coherent underlying ritual pattern unite the complex range of texts associated with the ancient discipline of ḥšp̄tu?

This book makes a number of fascinating and original points about the Adapa myth within a wide-ranging and deeply learned discussion of materials that moves rapidly between early Sumerian literature, Neo-Assyrian and -Babylonian literatures, Manichaean mythology, neurology, and cognitive psychology, and (occasionally) the New Testament. It is worth reading as the first twenty-first-century interpretive study of the figure of Adapa and Mesopotamian exorcism, and the first English translation of the difficult Sumerian Adapa myth. While it does not begin from the viewpoint of social history (the reviewer’s 2017 From Adapa to Enoch represents this alternative approach), this is hardly the point—ancient people had imaginations and psyches, and this is where the book distinguishes itself.
In a history of research focused on the ultimate mortality and implicit humanity of the semidivine Adapa, Annus argues for two parallel versions of the myth. The version in which he returns to earth to rejoin mortals has been widely recognized, but there happens to be an alternative version preserved in Neo-Assyrian MS D where Adapa remains in heaven, and it makes sense for Annus to connect this to the implication that Adapa remains enthroned in heaven, as found in Tintir (pp. 81–84, compare the alternative interpretation in Sanders, *Adapa*, pp. 18, 58) as sources, he does not credit the author who actually originally proposed the idea over sixty-five years ago, G. Roux ("Adapa, le vent et l’eau," *Revue d’Assyriologie* 55 [1961]: 13–33), then argued by W. von Soden ("Bemerkungen zum Adapa-Mythus," *Fs. S. N. Kramer* [1976], 424–34, at 433).

A second important proposal is the suggestion that during the Old Babylonian period in Sumerian literature, when "the distinction between the antediluvian and postdiluvian periods was introduced into historiography, Adapa’s narrative also changed accordingly." As a sage he was attributed antediluvian origin, but the change in historiographical tradition began to elaborate Adapa’s fishing episode in analogy with the flood myth. While there is no direct evidence of an earlier independent Adapa narrative, this idea is worth further consideration.

A few points of interest to both Assyriology and the history of religion are covered below, as well as the contribution of broadest general interest, the useful but sometimes puzzling English translation of the Sumerian myth of Adapa. On p. 6 Annus states that Adapa is from Eridu, where kingship originates (as in the Sumerian King List), but in fact the Old Babylonian Sumerian Adapa myth pictures kingship as founded in Kish, as the author states on p. 20. His statement that “in the Akkadian texts Adapa belongs to the group of seven antediluvian sages” conflates the Akkadian Adapa narratives with Akkadian Adapa ritual texts. In the narratives, the flood is not mentioned (as the author points out on p. 21) and so he is not specifically ante- or postdiluvian.

Annus writes that “[t]here are indications that the relationship between Ea and Marduk in such narratives are [sic] shaped by the older relation between Enki and Adapa, a pair of father and his wise son” (p. 72) but does not make clear that in the Old Babylonian period these are actually Enki-Asalluhi relationships (see M. Geller, *Udug-Hul Forerunners*), which are in later periods transferred to Ea and Marduk, an originally separate god from Asalluhi, and there is no clear evidence for them being shaped by a prior Ea-Adapa relationship.

One of the few theorists cited to justify broad claims about the nature of religion is the cognitive neurologist P. McNamara, whose work echoes van Gennep and Turner (pp. 4–6), but it is worth noting that McNamara’s claims about widespread narrative and ritual patterns do not necessarily flow directly from brain science. Here more detail on precisely how modern cognitive-science claims about religion are justified, and how they actually relate to earlier anthropological and history of religions arguments, would be helpful.

Finally, the author’s translation is, understandably, shaped by his reconstruction of the Sumerian mythic background of the Adapa narrative, but this can lead to some assumptions being forced onto the translation that may not make the best sense of the already very difficult Sumerian.

Compare the beginning of Annus’s translation (pp. 105–6):

1. In those days the Sun god set into motion,
2. in those nights when the darkness had always been there
3. in those years when the years were completed.
4. After the flood swept over,
5. and the uniting rope of the land was set aright,
6. the humankind came out into the soil.
7. All the lands from the high to low were completely flattened.
8. Anuna-gods of heaven and earth—where were they?
9. There was nothing to eat, nothing was around,
10. no living places to lean upon, (and) to save from hunger, the long arms did not tire.
11. An, Enlil, Enki, Ninhursaga hastened [there],
12. the seed of humankind was [preserved],
with a more straightforward translation (after A. Cavigneaux):
1. In those distant days, when heaven and earth [had not yet been separated]
2. In those far-off nights . . .
4. After the Flood had swept over,
5. and the destruction of the land had been brought about;
6. When humanity had been reduced to dust
7. And all the land from north to south had been flattened
8. None of the high gods had
9. Food or an eating place (= temple)
10. Their (the gods’) dwellings had not been set up, nobody worked to provide their meals
11. Anu, Enlil, Enki and Ninhursag
12. Preserved the seed of humanity.

If we assume, with Annus, there was no antediluvian period, and the flood was the origin of the
world and not its destruction, what is line 12 doing there? It seems to imply that there were already
humans to be “preserved.”

The book’s concluding sentence, that “[w]hereas the Adapa myth created the exorcistic identity
within national boundaries, the Christian message promoted a new universalistic narrative for salvation
with the promise of a new identity” (p. 103) seems to echo the arguments of S. Parpola that Christianity
as well as Kabbalah are continuations of Mesopotamian tradition, and before that of such older works
of Assyriology as P. Jensen’s Moses, Jesus, Paulus: Drei Varianten des babylonischen Gottmenschen
Gilgamesch (1909). Oddly, although Jesus appears several times in this book, he does not appear in the
index. But as Jerrold Cooper pointed out in this Journal (“Assyrian Prophecies, the Assyrian Tree, and
the Mesopotamian Origins of Jewish Monotheism, Greek Philosophy, Christian Theology, Gnosticism,
and Much More,” JAOS 120 [2000]: 430–44), Assyriology is not a province of Christian theology, and
there is a reason why Jensen’s arguments are treated with such caution.

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For many years, the civil war in Syria has rendered any kind of archaeological activity in the
area impossible, while military campaigns contributed to unprecedented destruction of the country’s
cultural heritage. This damage affected both the best-known archaeological sites and dozens of small
ones. Among the most dramatic consequences were those observed in Palmyra and Dura Europos. The
current political situation in Syria also offers scant likelihood that researchers will be able to return to
the abandoned sites, or begin excavations in new ones, in the near future. It is therefore all the more
pleasing to note those publications containing documentation of the research conducted in the years
preceding the outbreak of war in Syria. Their value lies in the fact that in many cases they are perhaps
the only remaining trace of irrecoverably destroyed relics and archaeological sites. On the other hand,
the descriptions, plans, and photographs they contain may in future provide essential data for the con-
servation or reconstruction of these sites, but also for recommencing research.

Rüdiger Gogräfe’s book certainly fits into this category, documenting and describing the archaeo-
logical digs of his research in the 1990s in Isriye, a town in central Syria identified, on the basis of
modest sources, with ancient Seriana. Although the ruins preserved in Isriye were mentioned in the
accounts of travelers visiting this region of Syria as early as the seventeenth century, it was not until