A Mongol Mahdi in Medieval Anatolia: Rebellion, Reform, and Divine Right in the Post-Mongol Islamic World

JONATHAN BRACK
HEBREW UNIVERSITY, JERUSALEM

The roots of the formation of a post-Mongol political theology that situated Muslim emperors and sultans at the center of an Islamic cosmos are found in the Ilkhanid court in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Iran. This article investigates the case of the short-lived rebellion (1322–1323) of the Mongol governor of Rūm (Anatolia) and Mahdi-claimant Temürtash (d. 1327). It demonstrates how the discourse of religious reform was recruited to translate and support the claims of non-Chinggisid commanders to the transfer of God's favor, thus opposing the Chinggisids' heaven-derived exceptionalism. Exploring affinities with the Timurid appropriation of the *mujaddid* tradition a century later, the article argues that Temürtash's rebellion signaled the early stages of the dispersion of a new political language that freed Muslim kingship from the restrictive genealogical and juridical Sunni models of authority.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Mongols claimed that Chinggis Khan's government was based on the auspices of heaven (Mong. *tenggeri*). According to their evolving legitimizing assertions that were most clearly, although succinctly, articulated in their ultimatums to Europe, Chinggis Khan was selected by heaven, which conferred upon him its blessing and an exclusive mandate to universal domination. He was furthermore in possession of a special good fortune (Mong. *suu*) that reaffirmed his selection by heaven and guaranteed his success as the fortunate world conqueror.[1] Chinggis Khan subsequently became the locus of sacred power, the transmitter of heaven's favor to his appointed offspring and, through them, to the lands the Mongols conquered and ruled.[2] The assertion of an inheritable superior auspiciousness is found in the early correspondence between the Ilkhan Hülegü (d. 1265), the founder of the Mongol state

Author's note: I would like to thank Kathryn Babayan, Rudi Lindner, Gottfried Hagen, Erdem E. Cipa, Hussein Fancy, Michal Biran, and Andrew Peacock for their help with earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful to the organizers and participants of the workshop *New Approaches on the Il-Khans* (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 2014), and to the *JAOS* anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The writing of this article was made possible through the generous funding of the European Research Council, under the European Union's Seventh Framework Program (FP/2007–13) / ERC Grant Agreement no. 312397.

1. I. de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundation of Chinggis Khan's Empire," *Papers on Far Eastern History* 7 (1973): 168–69; idem, "Heaven, Earth and the Mongols in the Time of Činggis Qan and His Immediate Successors (*ca*. 1160–1260): A Preliminary Investigation," in *A Lifelong Dedication to the China Mission: Essays Presented in Honor of Father Jeroom Heyndrickx*, ed. N. Golvers and S. Lievens (Leuven: Ferdinand Verbiest Institute, 2007), 117–31; B. Baumann, "By the Power of Eternal Heaven: The Meaning of *tenggeri* to the Government of the Pre-Buddhist Mongols," *Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident* 35 (2013): 233–84.

2. J. Elverskog, *Our Great Qing* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 48–62; T. Allsen, "A Note on Mongol Imperial Ideology," in *The Early Mongols: Language, Culture and History*, ed. V. Rybatzki et al. (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Denis Sinor Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2009), 1–8.

in Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan (r. 1258–1336), and the last Abbasid caliph al-Mustaʿṣim (r. 1242–1258), in which Hülegü asks,

> no matter how ancient and grand your [al-Mustaʿṣim's] family may be, and no matter how fortunate (*davlat*) your dynasty has been, "is the brightness of the moon such that it can eclipse the brilliance of the sun?"[3]

This Chinggisid hereditary claim to consecrated authority remained in force into the second half of the fourteenth century, after the collapse of the Ilkhanate.[4] With the establishment of Timurid rule in the first half of the fifteenth century, the authority of the Chinggisid line gradually waned, with the exception of Central Asia, where the charisma of the Chinggisid house retained its authority well into the eighteenth century, if not after.[5]

As Christopher Atwood observes in his study of the gradual formation of the Mongols' religious policies, however, the notion of the inheritability of heaven's selection of Chinggis Khan represented only one half of the equation. The Mongols rejected the notion that heaven's favor could be bound to one addressee by applying external measures such as ritual or confessional means.[6] Therefore, while on the one hand the Mongols inherited heaven's blessing and their superior auspiciousness through their imperial founder Chinggis Khan, on the other hand the ruler's appointment by heaven had to be confirmed also through empirical demonstrations such as his military and political successes. Although the lack of confessional or ritual "binding" and God's direct selection of Chinggis Khan and his offspring were, in fact, inseparable in the Mongol vision of a sacral and universal Chinggisid authority, recent discussions of how Mongol rule influenced post-Mongol political structures in the Islamic world have considered only the latter—the Chinggisid hereditary claim. Yet the notions of the transferability of God's favor and its personal and empirical validation were also assumed into the formation of a new political paradigm that became one of the benchmarks of the early modern empire-building enterprises.

3. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, ed. M. Rawshan and M. Mūsavī (Tehran, 1373/1994), 2: 997; translation from *Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jamiʿu't-tawarikh: A History of the Mongols*, tr. W. M. Thackston, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1998–1999), 3: 488.

4. J. E. Woods, *The Aqquyunlu*, rev. ed. (Salt Lake City: Univ. of Utah Press, 1999), 7–9. For the Chinggisid introduction of dynastic law into the Islamic world, see G. Burak, "The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Post-Mongol Context of the Ottoman Adoption of a School of Law," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 55.3 (2013): 579–602.

5. Along with the establishment of the independent Turkmen dynasties with their own mythical ancestries in Azerbaijan and Anatolia, and the institutionalization of Temür's imperial legacy. Woods, *Aqquyunlu*, 9; A. Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012), 31–37. The principle of Chinggisid descent, however, might have also contributed to the political landscape of the Islamic world through the Mongols' promotion of a general receptivity to hereditary forms of authority. Thus, it has been noted that Mongol dominance coincided with the rise in prestige and influence of hereditary groups in the Islamic world, mainly Sufis and Sayyids, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Sh. Bashir, *Messianic Hopes and Mystical Visions: The Nurbakhshiya between Medieval and Modern Islam* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 2003), 34–35; J. Pfeiffer, "Confessional Ambiguity vs. Confessional Polarization: Politics and the Negotiation of Religious Boundaries in the Ilkhanate," in *Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th–15th Century Tabriz*, ed. eadem (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 129–68, at 160–63.

6. "God, in distributing favors, did not limit himself permanently to one place or cult, but in each generation or epoch made his favor known through granting political, military, and economic success. The rejection of what might be called any 'binding address' of divine favor was at the root of the famous confrontation between Güyüg and Pope Innocent IV in 1246 [. . .]. Mongol political theology rejected confessional or ritual means of assuring the power of prayer and earning divine favor such as baptism: the moral uprightness of the one praying alone made God willing to listen." C. Atwood, "Validation by Holiness or Sovereignty: Religious Toleration as Political Theology in the Mongol World Empire of the Thirteenth Century," *The International History Review* 26.2 (2004): 237–56, at 253.

In this new paradigm, Muslim kingship became free from the restrictive genealogical and juridical Sunni models for the transmission of divine authority that the ulema drew up. Divine choice became personally validated for each ruler through his political, military, and economic successes. This innovative political theology, which positioned Muslim rulers at the center of the Muslim political, religious, and spiritual cosmos, nevertheless entailed further challenges for early modern monarchs: an ever-growing requirement for Muslim rulers to express their imperial authority through an assertion and reaffirmation of their personal cosmic and divine selection, in an increasingly expanding array of elaborate formats and mediums—from history, astrology, and the esoteric sciences to artistic and material representations. This imperial "hunger" in turn promoted the rise of a new class of influential mediators, who gained prestige and influence through their success in confirming and further elaborating their patrons' claims to divine appointment.[7] Furthermore, the empirically validated transferability of God's favor also offered an ideological platform that could support and fuel the aspirations of potential rebels who had no or less prestigious hereditary rights, and subsequently provided grounds for the consolidation of new dynastic offshoots.

This new vision of the Muslim ruler was expressed in the expanding royal appropriation and repurposing of titles that became symbols of divine selection: *mujaddid* (centennial renewer), *ṣāḥibqirān* (Lord of Auspicious Conjunction), and Mahdi (lit., rightly guided; eschatological redeemer and ultimate religious reformer).[8] First expressions of divine appointment and the personal charisma of the rulers, these titles were made to match a hereditary-based model of successive authority, thus retaining the Chinggisid dialectic tension between genealogical and empirical validations of heaven's favor. As Azfar Moin has shown, despite the astrologically driven title's obvious non-hereditary nature, the title of *ṣāḥibqirān* was subsequently employed by Temür's (d. 1405) successors to support their sacral dynastic authority as heirs to Temür's stature as the fortunate world-conqueror.[9]

This article proposes that the roots of the Muslim political theology of divine selection are found in the Ilkhanate during the decades following the Mongol conversion to Islam (ca. 1295), when cultural brokers—literati, historians, and viziers—sought to explain, reconceptualize, and further expand the now-Muslim Chinggisids' assertions of auspicious kingship, through God's selection of Chinggis Khan, by appropriating and experimenting with Perso-Islamic political vocabularies. Through their innovative experiments, Chinggis Khan's unique affinity with heaven found a parallel in Islamic messianism and reformism (*tajdīd*). Hence, the first Muslim ruler to be cast as a predestined, divinely appointed, centennial reformer (*mujaddid*) was the Ilkhan Öljeitü (r. 1304–1316).[10] The fourteenth-century

7. M. Melvin-Koushki, "Early Modern Islamicate Empire: New Forms of Religiopolitical Legitimacy," in *The Wiley-Blackwell History of Islam*, ed. A. Salvatore (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 353–75; İ. E. Binbaş, "Timurid Experimentation with Eschatological Absolutism: Mīrzā Iskandar, Shāh Niʿmatullāh Walī, and Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī in 815/1412," in *Unity in Diversity: Mysticism, Messianism and the Construction of Religious Authority in Islam*, ed. O. Mir-Kasimov (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 277–303.

8. Although in Sunni Islam, the Mahdi often came to denominate an eschatological figure, an apocalyptic world-ruler, the Mahdi could also designate a cyclical reformer, or "a *mujaddid*-like Mahdi," who appears periodically to set the community aright after its corruption and restore morality to its pristine order. M. Garcia-Arenal, *Messianism and Puritanical Reform: Mahdīs in the Muslim West*, tr. M. Beagles (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 20.

9. Moin, *Millennial Sovereign.* On the title *ṣāḥibqirān* and its pre-Islamic Iranian roots, see S. Chann, "Lord of Auspicious Conjunction: Origins of the *Ṣāḥibqirān*," *Iran and the Caucasus* 13 (2009): 1–39.

10. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Kitāb al-Sulṭāniyya*, Istanbul Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi MS 3415, fols. 147v–150r. The work has several titles. The fullest appears to be *al-Risāla al-sulṭāniyya fī l-mabāḥith al-nubuwiyya* (The Epistle of the Sultan on the Debates on Prophethood) (or, on the Prophetic Ranks, *fī l-marātib al-nubuwiyya*). J. van Ess, *Der Wesir und seine Gelehrten* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), 17–19.

Ilkhanate also witnessed the first attempt to recruit this ideology of reform to support and develop the claims of non-Chinggisid Mongols to the transfer of God's favor and, therefore, to their succession to Chinggisid universal domination.

The attempt in question is the 1322–1323 messianic rebellion of the Mongol governor of Rūm (Anatolia) Temürtash (d. 1327) against the Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd (r. 1316–1335). According to the sources, Temürtash proclaimed himself the Mahdi. I argue here for a new understanding of Temürtash's rebellion, viz., as an attempt to challenge Chinggisid rule in the Ilkhanate by taking over the Muslim discourse of reform to reinforce the transfer of divine favor. Furthermore, whereas the agenda behind Temürtash's failed uprising might have been to ultimately replace Chinggisid rule in the Ilkhanate, I argue that the urban Persianate elite of Anatolia sought to rechannel this uprising to fit in with their own hopes to revive an earlier Perso-Islamic Saljuq order in Anatolia.[11]

II. THE REVOLT

In 1322 (722*h*), the Mongol governor of Rūm (Anatolia), the amir Temürtash, son of the powerful Mongol amir Chupan, declared himself *shāh-i islām* and had his name added to the Friday sermon (*khuṭba*). According to the contemporary Ilkhanid historian Mustawfī Qazvīnī, Temürtash was recruiting an army to overthrow Abū Saʿīd and was corresponding to that end with the Mamluks. He also declared himself Mahdi.[12]

Temürtash had initially accompanied his father Chupan to Anatolia in 1314, after Chupan was dispatched to Rūm by Öljeitü, who was concerned with news of Karamanid Turkmen insubordination and occupation of Konya. Once Chupan arrived in Anatolia, the Karamanids retreated from Konya to Larende. Chupan reinstated Mongol rule in Anatolia and, learning of Öljeitü's death in 1317, headed back east and left Temürtash in charge in Kayseri. When heading to Niğde to deal with another Karamanid insurrection, Temürtash learned about the uprising of the preceding governor of Anatolia, the amir Irenjin, against his father Chupan and the recently enthroned Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd. He fled to Danishmand lands until news of his father's victory over the plotting commander reached him.[13] Once the uprising was resolved, Temürtash was reinstated in office. Temürtash orchestrated his own rebellion shortly after, however.

In his bid for independence, Temürtash joined earlier failed Ilkhanid rebels who, taking advantage of the distance from the ruler's camp (*ordu*) and their long-standing connections to the region, used Anatolia as a base for declaring independent rule.[14] Like the rebellions

11. On the Perso-Islamic cultural and intellectual climate under the Rūm Saljuqs and its connections with the Islamization and urbanization of Anatolia, see C. Hillenbrand, "Rāvandī, the Seljuk Court at Konya and the Persianisation of Anatolian Cities," in *Les seldjoukides d'Anatolie*, ed. G. Leiser (= *Mésogeios* 25–26) (Paris: Hêrodotos, 2005), 157–69.

12. Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī Qazvīnī, *Ẓafarnāmah-i Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī: Bi-inżimām-i Shāhnāmah-i Abī l-Qāsim Firdawsī*, ed. N. A. Pourjavadi and N. A. Rastgār, 2 vols. (Tehran and Vienna: Iran Univ. Press and Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1377/1999), 2: 1460–61.

13. Ch. Melville, "Anatolia under the Mongols," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 1: *Byzantine to Turkey, 1071–1453*, ed. K. Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 51–101, at 90–91 (based largely on Aqsarāʾī's account, n. 34 infra); idem, "Abū Saʿīd and the Revolt of the Amirs in 1319," in *L'Iran face à la domination mongole*, ed. D. Aigle (Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1997), 135–77.

14. Melville, "Anatolia," 82–87; A. D. Stewart, *The Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks: War and Diplomacy during the Reigns of Heʿum II (1289–1307)* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 128–36; R. P. Lindner, "How Mongol Were the Early Ottomans?" in *The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy*, ed. R. Amitai-Preiss and D. O. Morgan (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 282–89; A. F. Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 70–72.

of these precursors, Temürtash's revolt was short-lived. When Chupan learned of his son's insubordination, he personally headed an army mid-winter to Rūm, fearing his son's actions would reflect badly on his own position as the Ilkhan's right-hand officer, if not the de facto ruler of the Ilkhanate. After convincing his defiant son to avoid a military confrontation with him, Chupan dragged him to the court, where the young Abū Saʿīd had little choice but to pardon the rebel. Shortly after, Temürtash was reinstated for a second time as governor of Rūm.[15] According to Qazvīnī, two of Temürtash's culprits were blamed for instigating the uprising: an unidentified amir by the name of Hūkārjī (or Sūkārjī), and a judge by the name of Najm al-Dīn Ṭashtī.[16] The later Timurid historian Ḥāfiẓ Abrū adds that Chupan had the amir and the qadi executed, along with several others, for orchestrating the uprising.[17]

Although Temürtash's actions and policies in Rūm are noted in a variety of sources in Arabic, Persian, and Armenian, we lack a detailed historical account of the revolt itself or clear insight into the instigators' convictions. For this reason they have received little notice, but recently Charles Melville briefly addressed the rebellion, arguing that Temürtash's messianic declaration was "designed to win the support of the religious classes (if not also of the Turkmens and dervishes, who were more successfully cultivated by the Safavid *şeyh*s Haidar, Junaid and Ismaʿil at the end of the fifteenth century)."[18]

Two pieces of evidence, discussed below, shed new light on Temürtash's rebellion. The first is the identification of Najm al-Dīn Ṭashtī, which allows for the argument that the targeted audience of Temürtash's claim was not the antinomian, dervish communities of Anatolia, but the "mainstream" intellectual networks and the urban public spheres of post-Saljuq Ilkhanid Anatolia; the second is the little noted Armenian *Martyrdom of St. Grigoris Karnecʿi, Bishop of Theodosioupolis/Erzurum*, which speaks to Temürtash's persecution of the Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities in Anatolia prior to his rebellion, suggesting that Temürtash and his supporters set out on a larger campaign to restore Sharia at the outset of his uprising.

III. A TABRIZI *QADI* IN ANATOLIA AND HIS INTELLECTUAL NETWORKS

One account of Temürtash's revolt that mentions Ṭashtī's leading role in the rebellion is *Manāqib al-ʿārifīn* by Shams al-Dīn Aflākī (d. 1356), a disciple of the Persian mystical poet Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's (d. 1273) grandson Amīr ʿĀrif.[19] In this hagiography of Rūmī and his offspring, Aflākī situates Temürtash's self-declaration as Mahdi in the midst of his military campaign in Konya in 723 (1323).[20] According to Aflākī, after retaking Konya,

15. Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī, *al-ʿUmarī's Bericht über Anatolien in seinem Werke Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. F. Taeschner (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1929), 51–52 (Ar. text).

16. Qazvīnī, *Ẓafarnāmah*, 2: 1460–61.

17. Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, *Ẕayl-i Jāmiʿ al-tavārīkh-i Rashīdī*, ed. Kh. Bayānī, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Anjuman-i Āthār-i Millī, 1350/[1972]), 160. On Ḥāfiẓ Abrū's use of the *Ẓafarnāma*, see Ch. Melville, "Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī's *Ẓafarnāma* and the Historiography of the Late Ilkhanid Period," in *Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honor of Iraj Afshar*, ed. K. Eslami (Princeton: Zagros, 1998), 1–12 (Temürtash's uprising, p. 5).

18. Melville, "Anatolia," 91. Linda Darling, on the other hand ("Persianate Sources on Anatolia and the Early History of the Ottomans," *Studies on Persianate Societies* 2 [2004]: 126–44, at 136), suggests that the revolt was an indication that "fighting against the Mongol regime had by that time taken on an apocalyptic significance." Ali Anooshahr (*The Ghazi Sultans and the Frontiers of Islam* [London: Routledge, 2009]) has also suggested *ghaza*/jihad against the Mongols and Temür to be a central theme in fourteenth-century Anatolia.

19. Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad-i Aflākī, *Manāqib al-ʿārifīn*, 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1959–1961), 2: 977–78; tr. J. O'Kane, *The Feats of the Knowers of God* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 684–85.

20. Aflākī mistakenly has the year 720 instead of 723 for Temürtash's retaking of Konya. Anon. (ca. 765/1363), *Taʾrīkh-i āl-i Saljūq dar Anāṭūlī*, ed. Nādira Jalālī (Tehran: Āyina-yi Mīrāth, 1377/1999), 132. Abū Bakr Ahrī too

Temürtash proclaimed (*daʿwa kardī*): "I am the Lord of Auspicious Conjunction; why indeed, I am the Mahdi of the End of Time!" (*man ṣāḥibqirānam balki mahdī-yi zamānam*). Despite Temürtash's harsh treatment of another of Rūmī's grandsons, Chalabī ʿĀbid, Aflākī nevertheless describes Temürtash as "a young man firm in religion and chaste (*javānī būd mutadayyin va-pāk dāman*)."[21] According to Aflākī, the Mongol rebel received widespread support, and he lists a group of prominent men (*jamāʿtī az kubarāyi dahr*)—judges, religious scholars, shaykhs—"from every city" (Tūqāt, Kayseri, Niğde, etc.), including the *qāḍī-yi lashkar* and the *khaṭīb* of Kayseri, who "out of greed" went to great lengths to praise the Mongol amir and urge others to swear obedience to him. The first name in Temürtash's list of supporters is Mawlānā Najm al-Dīn Ṭashtī.[22] Ṭashtī's is also the only name on the list that Aflākī notes more than once.[23]

The remarkable contemporaneous biographical dictionary, *Majmaʿ al-ādāb fī muʿjam al-alqāb*, by the Maragha librarian Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (d. 1323), also refers to Najm al-Dīn Ṭashtī. Although his full biography is not found in what remains of Ibn al-Fuwaṭī's once extensive work, the biographer personally knew Ṭashtī and links him to key Ilkhanid intellectual-religious figures, such as Niẓām al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik (d. 716), the chief judge of the Ilkhanid realm and an influential figure at the court.[24] Renowned for his undisputed supremacy in court debates, Niẓām al-Dīn won over Öljeitü, who under his influence changed allegiance from the Ḥanafī to the Shāfiʿī school of law and then, after a debate Niẓām al-Dīn had with Ḥanafī scholars, began to have doubts about the Muslim creed and ultimately converted to Shiʿism.[25] Niẓām al-Dīn's status in Öljeitü's company was believed to be so great that al-Qāshānī claims that were it not for his absence from court during the winter of 1309 (709*h*), Öljeitü would never had finalized his conversion.[26] A year later, Niẓām al-Dīn was appointed to teach in Öljeitü's "mobile madrasa."[27]

Ṭashtī's name emerges as part of the lively scholarly scene of Tabriz and Baghdad in two other documents as well. A copy of Rashīd al-Dīn's *Kitāb al-Tawḍīḥāt*, the first book of his *Majmūʿa*, dated to Ramaḍān 714 (1314), includes the signature of an individual by the name of M. b. M. b. Abī Bakr al-Ṭashtī al-Tabrīzī, in accordance with Rashīd al-Dīn's stipulation

links Temürtash's attacks on the Karamanids to his rebellion. *Taʾrīkh-i Shaikh Uwais: An Important Source for the History of Adharbaijān in the Fourteenth Century*, tr. J. B. van Loon (The Hague: Excelsior, 1954), 53 (trans.), 152 (Pers. text).

21. Temürtash's decision to order Chalabī ʿĀbid to be an envoy to the amirs of the Uj (frontier) might have been linked to complaints about the unorthodox and immoral conduct and reputation of Rūmī's followers in Konya and therefore to Temürtash's role as a moral regulator. Aflākī repeatedly addresses such accusations, e.g., Aflākī, *Manāqib al-ʿārifīn*, 2: 977–78.

22. Aflākī lists the following individuals: Ṭashtī; Shaykhzāda Tūkātī; "the late" Ẓāhir al-Dīn, *khaṭīb* of Kayseri; Shaykh Nāṣir-i Ṣūfī; Mawlānā Amīr Ḥasan-i Ṭabīb; the judge Shihāb-i Nakīdī; the army judge Vayghānī; and the preacher (*vāʿiẓ*) Ḥusām-i Yārjanlaghī.

23. Ṭashtī's death is confirmed by the fact that he is referred to as "the most excellent of latter-day men (*mutaʾkhkhirīn*), the blessed martyr (*al-saʿīd al-shahīd*), the qadi Najm al-Dīn-i Ṭashtī." Like Rūmī, Ṭashtī seems to have been known as *mawlānā* (implying a Sufi affiliation). Aflākī has Ṭashtī state that this title has become attached to Rūmī, whom it fit best, which suggests that Ṭashtī had gained prominence and recognition among Anatolia's intellectual and religious circles. Aflākī, *Manāqib al-ʿārifīn*, 2: 597; tr. O'Kane, 409.

24. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *Majmaʿ al-ādāb fī muʿjam al-alqāb*, ed. M. al-Kāzim, 6 vols. (Tehran: Muʾassasat al-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1416/[1995]), 3: 515; 4: 498; 5: 80–81.

25. Abū l-Qāsim ʿAbd Allāh al-Qāshānī, *Taʾrīkh-i Ūljāytū*, ed. M. Hambalī (Tehran: Shirkat Intishārat-i ʿIlmī va Farhangī, 1384/[2005]), 96; J. Pfeiffer, *Twelver Shiʿism as State Religion in Mongol Iran* (Istanbul: Orient-Institut der DMG, 1999), 8–9.

26. Al-Qāshānī, *Taʾrīkh-i Ūljāytū*, 96–100.

27. Ibid., 106–7.

that each copy made of the *Majmūʿa* be confirmed by a Tabrizi judge.[28] More significant, however, is an autograph *ijāza*, a teaching certificate, issued in 701 (1302) by the physician, philosopher, astronomer, and overall polymath Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 1311), al-Ṭūsī's most famous student from Maragha. The *ijāza* was granted to Najm al-Milla wa-l-Dīn M. b. M. b. Abī Bakr al-Tabrīzī, whom al-Shīrāzī honors with the titles *qudwat al-aʾimma al-mujtahidīn* (exemplar of the *mujtahid*s) and *maljaʾ akābir al-muḥaqqiqīn* (refuge of the great verifiers). The *ijāza* lists the works that Ṭashtī studied with al-Shīrāzī, giving us insight into Ṭashtī's intellectual background. These include several well-known hadith compilations and philosophical studies, such as al-Shīrāzī's commentary on al-Suhrawardī's philosophy of illumination, al-Ṭūsī's commentary on Ibn Sīnā, and the first book of Ibn Sīnā's *al-Qānūn* (Canon of medicine). Al-Shīrāzī explicitly states that he also grants his student Ṭashtī permission to transmit all the works al-Shīrāzī himself authored.[29]

Ṭashtī's career path follows that of his master al-Shīrāzī. In the 1270s, after spending nearly a decade in the company of al-Ṭūsī (up until 1268), al-Shīrāzī was appointed chief judge of Malatya and Sivas.[30] Despite the distance, al-Shīrāzī maintained close ties with the court, and in 1282 (681*h*) he was sent by the Ilkhan Aḥmad Tegüder on a diplomatic mission to the Mamluk sultan Qalāwūn.[31] According to the Ilkhanid historian al-Qāshānī, Ṭashtī also served as chief judge (*qāḍī al-quḍāt-i mamālik-i rūm*) and like al-Shīrāzī was sent by the Ilkhan on a diplomatic mission. In 1316 (716*h*), Öljeitü chose him from among the men of Tabriz, as Qazvīnī writes, for a mission to the Chagataid rebel prince Yasawur (d. 1320), who had fled from Central Asia to Khurasan with the intention of submitting to the Ilkhan.[32] Before delivering to Yasawur the letter concluding the agreement (*ʿahdnāma*) between him and the Ilkhan, Ṭashtī stopped at Abū Saʿīd's camp to report on his mission. When he arrived at Yasawur's camp he was questioned by a group of eminent scholars from Bukhara and Samarqand on matters of legal theory and jurisprudence. They were impressed by his answers and reported back to Yasawur, who showed Ṭashtī great favor. Al-Qāshānī implies that the mission's success was on account of the impression Ṭashtī's intellectual vigor and praiseworthy conduct left on the Chagataid prince.[33]

In sum, a student of the famous polymath al-Shīrāzī, Najm al-Dīn Ṭashtī, whom Chupan executed for instigating his son's revolt, was a Tabrizi judge, who was appointed chief judge of Rūm. Ṭashtī had close ties to the Ilkhan Öljeitü's court and to the court of his heir, Sultan Abū Saʿīd, and was a member of the Shāfiʿī intellectual circles of the Ilkhanate, which included influential figures such as the vizier Rashīd al-Dīn, al-Shīrāzī, and the chief judge Niẓām al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik.[34] Other individuals from these circles appear in Temürtash's company as well. In 1317 (717*h*), shortly after Abū Saʿīd's enthronement, Rashīd al-Dīn's son Jalāl al-Dīn was tasked with the financial managing of the province (as *ṣāḥib dīvān*) under

28. D. Krawulsky, *The Mongol Īlkhāns and Their Vizier Rashīd al-Dīn* (Frankfurt: Lang, 2011), 82; J. van Ess, *Der Wesir und seine Gelehrten* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), 37.

29. R. Pourjavady and S. Schmidtke, "Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311) as a Teacher: An Analysis of His *ijāzāt* (Studies on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī III)," *Journal asiatique* 297.1 (2009): 15–55, at 24–27.

30. He likely held this position into the reign of the Ilkhan Arghūn (r. 1284–1291). Ibid., 15–17.

31. J. Pfeiffer, "Reflections on a 'Double Rapprochement': Conversion to Islam among the Mongol Elite during the Early Ilkhanate," in *Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan*, ed. L. Komaroff (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 369–89, at 386.

32. L. J. Ward, "The Zafar-namah of Hamdullah Mustaufi and the ll-Khan Dynasty of Iran," 3 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Manchester, 1983), 3: 606–8 (misread as Ṭabshī).

33. Al-Qāshānī, *Taʾrīkh-i Ūljāytū*, 218–19 (misread as Najm al-Dīn Ṭayyibī).

34. Niẓām al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik also had a close relationship with the Ilkhanid vizier Rashīd al-Dīn, and moreover seems to have owed his appointment as chief judge to his affiliation with the vizier. Al-Qāshānī, *Taʾrīkh-i Ūljāytū*, 95–97.

the governorship of Temürtash. When his father Rashīd al-Dīn was executed, Temürtash protected Jalāl al-Dīn from the envoys sent by the court to arrest and execute him. He was later appointed by Temürtash as a deputy (*nā'ib*), and was possibly with Temürtash during his revolt, perhaps even, as A. H. Morton suggests, accompanying him back to the Ilkhanid court for his sentencing and subsequent pardon.[35]

IV. TEMÜRTASH AND THE *MARTYRDOM OF ST. GRIGORIS KARNEC'I*

Ṭashtī's background, his relationships at the Ilkhanid court, and the appearance of his name at the top of Aflākī's list of rebel supporters all suggest that this Tabrizi scholar was more than a mere scapegoat for the rebellion but played a significant role behind the scenes—if not in orchestrating the uprising, then in providing it with ideological justification. As stated above, he was familiar with the writings of the vizier Rashīd al-Dīn, who promoted in his works the image of the Ilkhan Öljeitü as a reformer king. In *Kitāb al-Sulṭāniyya*, for example, the Ilkhanid vizier deploys a slightly altered version of the *mujaddid* tradition to cast Öljeitü as a prophesized, centennially designated reformer king whose reign ends a century of infidel revival.[36]

Several accounts indicate, moreover, that the start of Öljeitü's reign was marked by an immediate and tangible worsening in the conditions of Christian communities under Ilkhanid rule. According to Qazvīnī, when Öljeitü ascended the throne he reinstated the poll tax (*jizya*) on dhimmis—Jews and Christians—and re-enforced the distinguishing dress code (*ghiyār*).[37] Armenian colophons confirm the reports about Öljeitü's reinstatement of the anti-dhimmi policies, but note that after sending high-ranking clergymen to Öljeitü, the Ilkhan was persuaded to reverse his decision on reinforcing the *jizya*.[38] The colophons accuse Öljeitü of being a "servant of Satan" and the anti-Christ, planning to "efface Christianity from Armenia and Georgia" by issuing orders "that levies should be collected from all Christians on account of their faith in Christ, and that a blue sign should be sewn on the shoulders of the believers."[39] According to Rabban Sauma's *History*, it was only through the intercession of Öljeitü's uncle, the amir Irenjin, that the Nestorian monasteries and churches in Tabriz were spared from becoming mosques and Muslim trusts.[40] Al-Qāshānī writes that Öljeitü enforced

35. Karīm al-Dīn Aqsarā'ī, *Musāmarat al-akhbār va musāyarat al-akhyār* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1944), 313–15; A. H. Morton, "The Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn: Īlkhānid Fact or Timurid Fiction?" in *The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy*, ed. R. Amitai-Preiss and D. O. Morgan (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 178–79.

36. Thus, Rashīd al-Dīn cites the *mujaddid* tradition (*Kitāb al-Sulṭāniyya*, Istanbul Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi Ms. 3415, fols. 147v–150r), but describes the Ilkhan not as the "renewer" but as the centennial "strengthener" (*muqavvī*) of Islam. I further discuss this account in "Theologies of Auspicious Kingship: The Islamization of Chinggisid Sacral Kingship in the Islamic World," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 60.4 (2018): 1143–71.

37. Ḥamdallah Mustawfī Qazvīnī, *Ta'rīkh-i guzīda*, ed. ʿA. Navā'ī (Tehran: Mu'assasa-yi Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1362/1983), 606–7.

38. As Ghāzān had done earlier; see A. K. Sanjian, *Colophons of Armenian Manuscripts, 1301–1480* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969), 60–61. The successful "lobbying" of high-ranking Christian clergy with the ruler to exempt the churches from paying the *jizya* suggests that the traditional Mongol understanding of the function of the religions as the "securing of blessings through prayer," as Atwood states, was still determining Mongol religious policy, even after their conversion to Islam in the Ilkhanate. In the Mongol empire, clergy were exempt by royal decree only after their representatives visited the court, established their moral standing, bestowed blessings on the khan, and showed that they were praying for the khan's success. Atwood, "Validation by Holiness," 252–53.

39. Sanjian, *Colophons*, 52 (dated to 1307), 60 (dated to 1318).

40. E. A. W. Budge, tr., *The Monks of Kûblâi Khân, Emperor of China: The History of the Life and Travels of Rabban Ṣâwmâ* (repr. New York: AMS Press, 1973), 255–60.

similar policies at the court as well, refraining with his commanders and intimates from consuming alcoholic beverages, above all kumis, fermented mare's milk.[41]

Öljeitü's anti-dhimmi measures bear a resemblance to what was enforced when his brother and predecessor Ghāzān Khān (r. 1295–1304) began his rule. The Christian sources unanimously blame the Mongol amir Nawrūz, who orchestrated Ghāzān's conversion, for the reinstatement of the *jizya* and the *ghiyār*, the persecution of Christians and Jews, and the looting and destruction of churches after Ghāzān's enthronement.[42] For the Ilkhanid historian Vaṣṣāf, Nawrūz's enforcement of the Sharia on the Mongols and on the non-Muslim populations of the Ilkhanate and his pro-acculturation policies in Khurasan made him worthy of praiseworthy titles such as *ghāzī* ("warrior"), *muḥyī-yi dīn* ("reviver of religion"), "the second Abū Muslim," and Mahdi.[43] Vaṣṣāf's praise of Nawrūz as a Mongol reformer, even a Mongol Mahdi, is echoed in the work of the contemporaneous Mamluk biographer al-Ṣafadī (d. 1363). Al-Ṣafadī states that like Temürtash, Nawrūz entertained messianic aspirations and that the conflict between Nawrūz and Ghāzān, which led to the former's downfall, arose from the amir's belief that the time of the rise (*khurūj*) of the Mahdi had come and that he, Nawrūz, was predestined to pave the path for him (*mumahhid lahu*).[44] In any case, Vaṣṣāf's praise of Nawrūz suggests that in the early fourteenth-century Ilkhanate, the reinstatement of dhimmi measures under Mongol rule was interlinked with a discourse about religious renewal and claims to the restoration of Sharia.[45]

Temürtash's rebellion was preceded by a similar anti-dhimmi atmosphere in Anatolia. According to the Armenian *Martyrdom of St. Grigoris Karnec'i, Bishop of Theodosioupolis* (Erzurum), after Temürtash raided Armenian Cilicia, he pillaged and burnt down in 1321 the Armenian cathedral of Etchmiadzin, an important site for the Armenian church.[46] He

41. Al-Qāshānī, *Ta'rīkh-i Ūljāytū*, 25.

42. Ch. Melville, "Pādshāh-i Islām: The Conversion of Sultan Maḥmūd Ghāzān Khān," in *History and Literature in Iran*, ed. idem (London: British Academic Press, 1990), 170–71. See also R. Foltz, "Ecumenical Mischief under the Mongols," *Central Asiatic Journal* 43.1 (1999): 42–69, at 62–65; B. Dashdondog, *The Mongols and the Armenians (1220–1335)* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 197; Budge, *Monks of Kûblâi Khân*, 210–19; Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abû'l Faraj . . . Bar Hebraeus*, tr. E. A. W. Budge (London: Humphrey Milford, 1932), 506–8; S. Orbélian, *Histoire de la Siounie*, tr. M. Brosset (Saint Petersburg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1864), 261–62.

43. In a clear evocation of the precedence of the Abbasid revolution: Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faḍl Allāh Vaṣṣāf, *Tajziyat al-amṣār va tazjiyat al-aʿṣār*, repr. of 1269 Bombay ed. (Tehran: Ibn Sīnā, 1338/[1959]), 313–14. On Nawrūz in Khurasan, see M. Hope, "The 'Nawrūz King': The Rebellion of Amīr Nawrūz in Khurasan (688–694/1289–1294) and Its Implications for the Ilkhan Polity at the End of the Thirteenth Century," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 78.3 (2015): 451–73.

44. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl ibn Aybeg al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt*, ed. H. Ritter et al., 32 vols. (Leipzig: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, 1931–2013), 25: 230–31. Al-Ṣafadī also mentions Temürtash's messianic pretensions: *Aʿyān al-ʿaṣr wa-aʿwān al-naṣr,* ed. ʿA. Abū Zayd (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), 2: 112.

45. See, for example, the earliest Ilkhanid conversion narrative of Ghāzān, where these themes are further entwined with the notion of his predestined rule as the Muslim reviver king and the restoration of a Persianate—or eschatological—utopian justice. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, ed. ʿA. ʿAlīzāda (Baku: Farhangistān-i ʿUlūm-i Jumhūr-i Shuravī-yi Sūsīyālistī-yi Āẕarbāyjān, 1957), 3: 604–7. The vision of Ghāzān as a divinely sent reformer king was further promoted in the letters issued by Ghāzān's chancery during the short-lived Ilkhanid occupation of Damascus during 1299–1300. Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 73–80.

46. Following a Mamluk invasion of Sis in early April–May 1320, Temürtash sent ambassadors to the Mamluk court later that year (November–December), and possibly also sent a message to the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, requesting military support for his campaign against the Armenians. According to Abū l-Fidāʾ, toward the end of 1321 Temürtash joined forces with the Karamanids and invaded Sis. His forces remained there for nearly a month ravaging and plundering before they returned to Anatolia. The Mamluks do not seem to have responded to Temürtash's messages, but this did not prevent them from reaping the benefits from his attack. Although they collected a tribute from the Armenians, who were seeking to appease the Mamluks, they also launched later that

proceeded next to Kayseri, where he plundered churches and killed Greek Orthodox priests. The *Martydom* then recounts how in the city of Erzurum in eastern Anatolia, an unnamed judge obtained from the Mongol governor Temürtash a decree ordering the forced circumcision and conversion to Islam of a local bishop named Grigoris and his uncle. We learn about the ordeals the poor bishop bravely withstood at the hands of the cruel judge and his tyrant accomplice, the Mongol amir. The account ends with the bishop's martyrdom and subsequent Christ-like resurrection.[47]

An Armenian colophon reports similar events taking place in Erzurum in 1314, the year Temürtash first arrived in Anatolia: the demolishing of churches, the enforcement of the *jizya* in Anatolia, and the mass conversion of Armenians to Islam.[48] Yet the resurfacing of hostility toward the Christian community in Erzurum could also have been linked to the remarkable surge in Muslim religious building projects that the city was experiencing from the turn of the fourteenth century. "The Ilkhanid gateway into Anatolia," Erzurum had "the greatest concentration of madrasas recorded in Anatolia in this period, as well as the peak of this kind of activity under Ilkhanid rule, whether in Iran or Anatolia."[49] The city's growing centrality and visibility under Ilkhanid rule made the city a compelling stage for casting the Mongol commander Temürtash as the new Ilkhanid champion of the Islamic legal order.

V. MAHDI AS REFORMER: QUESTIONING TEMÜRTASH'S MESSIANIC IDEOLOGY

Temürtash is primarily known for his aggressive anti-Beylik policy. His retrieval of Konya from the Karamanids in 1323 marked the start of his extensive military campaigns against

year another campaign against the Armenians, conquering several key fortresses that the latter refused to hand over. ʿImād al-Dīn Ismāʿīl b. ʿAlī Abū l-Fidāʾ, *The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince: Abu'l-Fidāʾ, Sultan of Ḥamāh (672–732/1273–1331)*, tr. P. M. Holt (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1983), 81–82; Abū l-Fidāʾ ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya*, 15 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1988), 14: 100, 102; Mufaḍḍal Ibn Abī l-Faḍāʾil, *Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 und 1341 in der Chronik des Mufaḍḍal b. Abī l-Faḍāʾil*, ed. and tr. S. Kortantamer (Freiburg: K. Schwarz, 1973), 11 (Ar. text); Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 117–18.

47. Copied after 1567, the text is not dated and only one manuscript of it is extant. *Hayoc' nor vkanere: 1155–1843* (Armenian neomartyrs), ed. Y. Manandean and H. Ačarean (Vagharshapat: Ṭparan Mayr Atʿoṛoy S. Ējmiatsin, 1902), 121–28. A short synopsis of the martyrology is found in David R. Thomas et al., eds., *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Biobibliographical History*, vol. 4: *1200–1350* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 794–97. I am grateful to Zara Pogossian and Ishayahu Landa for their help with reading this text. Dimitri A. Korobeinikov links this persecution to the decline of the Orthodox Church of Kayseri: "Orthodox Communities in Eastern Anatolia in the Thirteenth to Fourteenth Centuries, Part 2: The Time of Troubles," *al-Masāq* 17.1 (2005): 1–29, at 6.

48. Sanjian, *Colophons*, 58. Chupan arrived with Temürtash in Anatolia and settled in the Mongol winter quarters of Karanbuk between Erzurum and Sivas. Melville, "Anatolia," 89. Another event took place in Erzincan in 1314, when three Franciscan missionaries were tried and executed after denigrating the Prophet Muḥammad. The head of the Franciscans in nearby Trebizond reported that their burial was arranged by the Armenian community in Erzincan. The Armenian bishop of Erzincan "canonized" the Franciscan martyrs. N. S. Johnson, "Franciscan Passions: Missions to the Muslims, Desire for Martyrdom and Institutional Identity in the Later Middle Ages" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Chicago, 2010), 320–22. The persecution of the missionaries took place roughly around the same time that the Greek Orthodox Church lost its place in the city. S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1971), 289–90. Öljeitü's reign was also marked by a deterioration in relations between the Mongols and the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia following the assassination of King Het'um II by a Mongol commander named Bularghu who was stationed in Cilicia. A. Stewart, "The Assassination of King Het'um II: The Conversion of the Ilkhans and the Armenians," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 15.1 (2005): 45–61.

49. P. Blessing, *Rebuilding Anatolia after the Mongol Conquest: Islamic Architecture in the Lands of Rūm, 1240–1330* (repr. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016), 129–30.

the Beyliks in Rūm, which he continued throughout the 1320s.[50] His career as governor, however, began with the persecution of Christians and his invasion of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia.[51] Temürtash's persecution of the Armenians and Christians, moreover, speaks to a larger campaign of enforcing public morality in Anatolia leading to his messianic revolt. The Anatolian historian Aqsarāʾī, who devoted his didactic history to his governor Temürtash but ended it just prior to the uprising, explicitly links Temürtash's restoration of order and justice in Anatolia, his anti-Turkmen policies, and his implementation of regulatory measures to the signs of the manifestation of the Mahdi.[52] Aqsarāʾī furthermore praises Temürtash for enforcing the *ghiyār* on the Jews and Christians of Rūm, "who had become so like the Muslims in appearance that they could not be told apart." The centrality of these measures for Aqsarāʾī, and moreover for his historiographical vision, can be further gleaned from the striking way he chose to end his history. *Musāmarat al-akhbār* closes with a long quote from Ibn al-ʿArabī's (d. 1240) letter of counsel (*naṣīḥa*) to the Saljuq sultan ʿIzz al-Dīn Kaykāʾūs I (r. 1211–1219), enumerating the various regulations of "the pact of ʿUmar" (*shurūṭ ʿUmar*). Aqsarāʾī urges his patron to follow Ibn al-ʿArabī's advice and enforce on the dhimmi communities of Anatolia the "pact" in its entirety.[53]

As Charles Melville points out, it seems likely that Temürtash was following orders issued at the court of the young Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd.[54] According to Mamluk reports, when a deadly hailstorm hit the city of Sulṭāniyya in Shaʿbān 720 (September 1320), the alarmed Ilkhan was convinced by the jurists that this was a sign of divine rage and he ordered the immediate closing of all brothels and taverns throughout the Ilkhanate. In Sulṭāniyya alone, more than ten thousand wine barrels were reported to have been collected, emptied, and burned. According to a merchant who witnessed the events, this public display of repentance and piety was also carried out, although less fervently, in the cities of Tabriz, Baghdad, and Mosul. Churches in the vicinity of Tabriz were destroyed, old mosques were repaired, and new ones constructed.[55]

50. In addition to the Karamanids, Temürtash's forces also hit the Hamidoghlu Beylik and the Eshrefoglu Beylik hard. The latter never recovered from Temürtash's campaign and his gruesome execution of its ruler in 1326. Melville, "Anatolia," 91–92; R. P. Lindner, "Anatolia, 1300–1451," in *Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 1: *Byzantine to Turkey, 1071–1453*, ed. K. Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 1: 102–37, at 114. The Mamluk author al-ʿUmarī in particular notes the terror inflicted by Temürtash on the nascent Beyliks. He writes that were it not for Chupan's arrival a year later to deal with his rebellious son and the Mamluk sultan's patronage of the Karamanids, the most powerful Beylik at the time, they would not have been able to withstand Temürtash's military might. Al-ʿUmarī, *al-ʿUmarī's Bericht über Anatolien*, 29–32, 51–52 (Ar. text).

51. Possibly even with Karamanid support. Other Ilkhanid rebels in Anatolia—for example, Sülemish, who rebelled against Ghāzān in 1298—also sought an alliance with the Karamanids. Stewart, *Armenian Kingdom*, 128–36.

52. Aqsarāʾī, *Musāmarat al-akhbār*, 325–26, stating: *Az amārāt-i ẓuhūr-i mahdī yakī an ast ki shirāb rā . . . az bilād va-diyār chinān zāʾil gardānīdah ast* ("one of the signs . . . is that he [Temürtash] has obliterated like this the wine, which is the mother of all evil . . . from the lands and countries").

53. Ibid., 327–29. Ibn al-ʿArabī had an intimate relationship with ʿIzz al-Dīn Kaykāʾūs I, serving as his spiritual guide and teacher. It has been noted that Ibn al-ʿArabī's letter of counsel "seems to be directly related to the sultan's struggle to quell the Christian rebellion in Antalya, breaking out in 1212, the year the letter was written" and expresses the sultan's fear of Christian dominance that "should be understood in accordance with his self-proclaimed role of reviving Islam in face of Christian expansion into Muslim lands, during a time when Crusades in both Spain and the Levantine coastal region posed a real threat to Muslim sovereignty." S. N. Yıldız and H. Şahin, "In the Proximity of Sultans: Majd al-Dīn Iṣḥāq, Ibn ʿArabī and the Seljuk Court," in *The Seljuks of Anatolia: Court and Society in the Medieval Middle East*, ed. A. C. S. Peacock and S. N. Yıldız (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 173–205, quotations at 189–90.

54. Melville, "Anatolia," 91.

55. Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fi funūn al-adab* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1985), 32: 333–34; 33: 35. Fearing for his own position as the supreme combater of

Yet, it is possible that in his declaration of war against moral vices, Abū Saʿīd was responding to a wider crisis that had enveloped Ilkhanid society, resulting from a series of disasters: a deadly two-year-long drought, raids on Ilkhanid borders, internal rebellions, most notably that of the Mongol amirs in 1319, and extensive depopulation in Diyar Bakr, Iraq, and Jazira.[56] Abū Saʿīd might have been trying to regain divine favor, if not also win over the public, who perhaps attributed these disasters to failures in enforcing public morality and Sharia in the Ilkhanate.

Whether Temürtash was following the orders of the Ilkhan or not, he and his party—among whom was the above-mentioned judge Ṭashtī—took the regulation of public morality and the persecution of the Christian communities in Anatolia a step further, setting the stage for the proclamation of Temürtash as Mahdi, the reformer. This understanding of the Mahdi is already found in the eighth century.[57] Claims of reform and the purification of the faith provided rulers and rebels alike an ideological platform for their political agendas. This also entailed a loosening of "the chronological relation of the *mahdī* to the end of time and his sectarian and genealogical affiliation" allowing for a certain flexibility in the designation of individuals as Mahdis.[58]

Such an understanding fits Temürtash's short-lived messianic revolt and furthermore corresponds with the broader tendency in the Ilkhanate at the turn of the fourteenth century to cast the convert Muslim Mongol rulers as divinely chosen Sunni reformer kings and renewers of the legal order, as expressed, for example, in the writing of Rashīd al-Dīn. The vizier depicts the Ilkhans Ghāzān and Öljeitü each as representing the second stage of God's plan to renew and revive the Muslim community, which follows the infidel Mongol conquests and rule intended on "wiping the slate clean" from the earlier corruption of Islam and the Sharia under the caliphate.[59] Ilkhanid court authors such as the vizier extensively experimented in the early fourteenth century with Persian and Islamic religious and political titles and structures in an attempt to express, reaffirm, and further elaborate their Chinggisid patrons' assertion to govern through a unique affinity with heaven.[60] The discourse of Islamic religious renewal and messianic reform was well suited for reconstructing in Islamic terms the

vice, the Mamluk sultan soon followed with his own measures in the sultanate. Ch. Melville, "The Year of the Elephant: Mamluk-Mongol Rivalry in the Hejaz in the Reign of Abū Saʿīd (1317–1335)," *Studia Iranica* 21.2 (1992): 197–214, at 205.

56. The drought and raids resulted in a severe depopulation of an area that produced about a quarter of Ilkhanid revenue during the first years of Abū Saʿīd's reign. According to al-Nuwayrī (*Nihāyat al-arab*, 32: 290–92), who obtained his account from ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Birzālī, Diyar Bakr, Mosul, Mardin, Jazira, and Mayyafarqin had it worse than Sanjar and Iraq. The drought was accompanied by a severe rise in food prices and food shortage, locusts, and freak hailstorms, and seems to have triggered the raids by nomads from Syria and Kurdish tribes into Ilkhanid territories. S. K. Raphael, *Climate and Political Climate: Environmental Disasters in the Medieval Levant* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 16, 67–69. It is also worth noting that Temürtash's revolt overlapped (or slightly preceded) a major drought that extended from Damascus to Aleppo (resulting in what Abū l-Fidāʾ called "the red year"). Ibid., pp. 8–9. For the distribution of Ilkhanid revenues, see I. P. Petrushevsky, "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Īl-Khāns," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 5: *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*, ed. J. A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), 483–537, at 498.

57. In his study of Abbasid messianism, Hayrettin Yücesoy concludes that "the idea of *tajdīd*, religious renewal and restoration, emerged as one of the fundamental components of messianic discourse since the second Islamic century." H. Yücesoy, *Messianic Beliefs and Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 2009), 133.

58. Ibid., 139–40.

59. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, ed. Rawshan and Mūsavī, 1: 287–90; ed. Thackston, 1, 141–42. See also al-Qāshānī, *Taʾrīkh-i Ūljāytū*, 13.

60. I discuss this further in my article "Theologies of Auspicious Kingship" (n. 36 supra).

Chinggisid sacral kingship, reaffirming the divine mandate of individual Ilkhanid rulers. The Mahdi was assigned directly by God, and like the Mongol claim to the lack of confessional or ritual binding of heaven's choice and the validation of divine selection through empirical demonstration, the identity of a Mahdi too could be established through the successful performance of the prescriptive role of the puritan reformer, not only on genealogical or confessional grounds.

Just as the discourse of *tajdīd* or the claim to the lack of a "binding address" of God's favor might be recruited to support Chinggisid legitimation, either could also be appropriated by competing claimants challenging Ilkhanid rule. Indeed, Temürtash's supporters draw on this Ilkhanid experimentation with the image of the Mongol Muslim reformer ruler. Temürtash's persecution of Christian communities in Anatolia and his campaign of public morality therefore would confirm his role as the ultimate reformer, potentially also reaffirming his identity as the new addressee of divine favor.[61] Heaven's selection of Temürtash would have been further supported through his demonstration of success. Perhaps, therefore, it is no coincidence that in Aflākī's eyewitness account of the revolt, Temürtash's announcement of his revolt and his proclamation as the ultimate reformer and periodic restorer of Islamic law took place immediately after his victorious entrance into Konya and the expulsion of the Karamanid invaders. His retaking of Konya marked, moreover, a transition in his course in Anatolia, from anti-dhimmi policies to a greater focus on military campaigns against the emergent Beyliks,[62] and several sources describe the terror and devastation Temürtash's successful military campaigns in Anatolia inflicted on them in the next few years.[63]

VI. THE ANATOLIAN PERSPECTIVE

Aqsarāʾī's history offers invaluable insight into the way Temürtash's Mahdi claim was perceived and harnessed by the post-Saljuq elite for the restoration of an urban-centered Perso-Islamic order in Anatolia.[64] A native of the city of Aksaray and a scribe (*munshī*) at

61. In Aflākī's account, Temürtash's self-proclamation combines the astrologically derived title of Lord of Auspicious Conjunction (*ṣāḥibqirān*) and the messianic Mahdi, suggesting as well that Temürtash's Mahdi claim was understood as support for his being the new addressee of God's favor. A contemporaneous Mamluk author, Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Yūsufī, justified the Mamluk al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's execution of Temürtash in 1327 (after the latter sought refuge at his court) with mention of a letter that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad reportedly received from the Karamanid Bey. The latter implored the sultan to kill Temürtash for his crimes against the Beyliks in Anatolia. Al-Nāṣir was also alarmed by the letter's claim that "several astrologers from the East informed him [Temürtash] that he will rule the East [the Ilkhanate] and Egypt." Al-Yūsufī, *Nuzhat al-nāzir fī sīrat al-malik al-Nāṣir* (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1986), 439. For al-Nāṣir's motives for breaking his promise of asylum to the Mongol governor, see Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 117–25.

62. Aflākī, *Manāqib al-ʿārifīn*, 2: 977–78; tr. O'Kane, 684–85. Temürtash's victory in Konya might have been commemorated in a mosque built in Samsun dated to 723*h*, where an inscription states that the mosque was built during the days of the great sultan Abū Saʿīd and "Commander (*noyan*) Temürtash, may his victory be glorious." M. Z. Oral, "Anadolu'da Ilhani devri vesikalari: Temurtash noyin zamaninda yapilmish eserler ve kitabeleri," in *V. Turk Tarih Kongresi* 9.5 (Ankara, 1960): 208–15.

63. Several contemporaneous, especially Mamluk, authors describe Temürtash as an invincible and fearsome warrior, while others portray him as arrogant and oppressive, and suggest that these were the reasons for his downfall and execution at the Mamluk court. See, for example, Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar*, vol. 9, ed. H. R. Roemer (Cairo and Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1960–1994), 347–48; al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-ʿaṣr*, 2: 112; Abū l-Fidāʾ, *Memoirs of a Syrian Prince*, tr. Holt, 90.

64. Aflākī (*Manāqib al-ʿārifīn*, 2: 977–78) also reports that Temürtash's announcement received widespread support among judges and leading religious figures in Ilkhanid Anatolia. Relying on Aqsarāʾī, Şevket Küçükhüseyin argues that Temürtash addressed his pro-Islamic message to the primarily Muslim administrative ranks of Anatolia against the backdrop of the crisis they were experiencing in the three decades since the collapse of the Saljuq

the local bureaucracy, Aqsarāʾī is able to provide a local point of view of the events taking place. Caught up in several turbulent incidents at the end of the thirteenth century, he emerges as a politically involved member of the administrative ranks, the local Persianate elite. He was appointed under Ghāzān to the position of administrator of the religious trusts (*awqāf*) of Rūm—an office that, as Melville notes, probably brought him influence and wealth, but even a greater measure of trouble and financial duties.[65] Aqsarāʾī writes that he intended the work as a gift for his patron Temürtash as it was the custom of the educated to award their masters gifts, yet as a poor and humble servant he could not think of anything else that was appropriate. He expresses his hope that the readers at court will convey the contents of this volume (*majmūʿa*) to the blessed ears of the Mongol commander.[66] The didactic message of his history tallies well with other Ilkhanid and Anatolian historians, who also sought to steer their Mongol patrons toward acculturation and embrace of the practices and the norms of government of their Muslim subjects.[67] In his history, Aqsarāʾī appears particularly invested in this project, emphasizing, for example, the just rule of both the Muslim and non-Muslim Ilkhans. Even Chinggis Khan is praised for his God-fearing nature in contrast to the arrogance of the Khwārazmshāh.[68]

Aqsarāʾī's message to Temürtash can be identified in the historian's idealizing description of the Ilkhan Ghāzān as a model Perso-Islamic ruler, and moreover, as a Mahdi-like militant reformer. According to *Musāmarat al-akhbār*, Ghāzān defeated his cousin Baidu with the aid of angels in an apocalyptic battle scene.[69] Overturning Baidu's satanic emergence (*khurūj*) and the defilement of Muslim sacred sites by the hordes of Christian priests and Buddhist monks under Baidu's rule, Ghāzān embodies the ideal just Muslim king, who, following his victory, sets out on an impressive array of building projects throughout the Ilkhanate. As elsewhere in his history, Aqsarāʾī here equates justice with building (*ʿimārat*), quoting, for example, ʿAbd al-Malik's dictum: "Fortify it with justice."

If we follow Aqsarāʾī's advice for the rebel governor, whose actions and policies Aqsarāʾī deemed to be the "signs of the manifestation of the Mahdi," Temürtash was meant to repel the evil and "filth" of the Turkmen,[70] abolish all brothels, enforce Sharia on the dhimmis,

government. Ş. Küçükhüseyin, *Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung im Prozess kultureller Transformation* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011), 233.

65. Melville defines *Musāmarat al-akhbār* as a work combining both an Anatolian local view and an emphasis on contemporary events with a model of a "general" history. Ch. Melville, "The Early Persian Historiography of Anatolia," in *History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: Studies in Honor of John E. Woods*, ed. J. Pfeiffer and S. A. Quinn (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 135–66, at 145–46.

66. Aqsarāʾī, *Musāmarat al-akhbār*, 3–6. In the preface (p. 4), Aqsarāʾī furthermore praises Temürtash as *mahdī al-zamān* and *dārāy-i jahān* (world conqueror).

67. Ch. Melville, "From Adam to Abaqa: Qadi Baidawi's Rearrangement of History," *Studia Iranica* 30 (2001): 67–86.

68. Ch. Melville, "Early Persian Historiography," 155–56. For the broader tendency of fourteenth-century Ilkhanid authors to retrospectively "monotheisize" Chinggis Khan's biography, see M. Biran, *Chinggis Khan* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), 114–21.

69. The clash between the two armies on the battlefield—the angelic army of Ghāzān against Baidu's dark forces—and the havoc it causes are likened to the resurrection of the dead (*ḥashr*). The depiction of this battle as an apocalyptic moment is evident not only from the images of (Quranic) cosmic cataclysms and catastrophes (the transfigurations of the earth and mountains, the blackening of the sky and Saturn), but also from Aqsarāʾī's use of Quranic references, scattered throughout the text, e.g., the drums of the battlefield are the blowing of the Trumpet (*nafkh-i ṣūr*) of the angel Isrāfīl on the day of resurrection. Aqsarāʾī, *Musāmarat al-akhbār*, 183–88.

70. The notion of "purification" is central to Aqsarāʾī's presentation of Temürtash's mission in Anatolia, that is, enforcing Islamic public morality, especially with regard to alcohol and the Christian communities, and removing the Turkmen, whom Aqsarāʾī often refers to as impure. This seems to have been a common theme in anti-Christian rhetoric. In Burhān al-Dīn al-Anawī's *Anīs al-qulūb* (completed in 1211), a history of the prophets with an extensive

and embark on a grand plan to restore Anatolia's urban centers to their previous Saljuq-age glory.[71] If we read Aqsarāʾī's history as a reflection of the broader concerns of the local Persianate urban elite in the aftermath of the collapse of Saljuq rule in Anatolia, Temürtash's claim to Mahdihood seems to have been conceived by his Anatolian audience not as fulfillment of the role of the eschatological redeemer, but as a synthesis of the ideal Perso-Islamic monarch and the ultimate moral regulator and reformer. Aqsarāʾī's history thus suggests how Temürtash's "local" supporters might have sought to reinterpret, if not also to entirely redirect Temürtash's revolt toward the restoration of what they perceived as a deteriorating Perso-Muslim order in Anatolia. Rather than a universal reformer, Aqsarāʾī's Mongol Mahdi is a local savior.

VII. FROM CHINGGISID DIVINE RIGHT TO TIMURID *MUJADDID* KINGSHIP

In the factional struggles that ensued after the dissolution of the Ilkhanate with the death of the last Ilkhan, Abū Saʿīd, the Chupanid faction—along with other post-Ilkhanid factions, such as the Jalayirids—declared their inheritance of Ilkhanid rule through the enthronement of puppet khans with unverified Chinggisid ancestry. Yet the Chupanids also sought alternative avenues to further support their claim to the transfer of God's favor.[72] According to the fifteenth-century Timurid historian Naṭanzī, the Chupanid contender Malik Ashraf (r. 1343–1357) was allegedly told by his supporters that "no charisma (Turkic *ughūr*) remains in the house of Chinggis Khan," and was advised to assume therefore the honorific title of Ashraf ("of noble descent"), in the manner of past kings and to rule independently.[73]

Despite the short duration of Temürtash's rebellion, his claim to Mahdihood was also appropriated to promote Chupanid legitimacy. In 1337, nine years after Temürtash was executed at the Mamluk court where he had fled, Temürtash's son Ḥasan used the remarkable resemblance of one of his father's former slaves to his master to assert that his father Temürtash had, in fact, escaped his execution. The ruse appears to have worked, as Ḥāfiẓ Abrū and Ahrī both note that the doppelgänger caused great commotion, and that the crowds and the riffraff (*arādhil va avbāsh*) gathered around the latter, starting a disturbance (*fitna*).[74]

According to reports that arrived at the Mamluk court, the imposter was sighted with yellow banners reading: "There is no God but God alone, Muḥammad is the messenger of God, Temürtash is the freedman of God (*ʿatīq Allāh*)." It was further reported that the doppelgänger rode in a great procession hidden from all sides by his children, and that he had his

section devoted to anti-Armenian polemics, the Armenians are described as "the filthiest, most unclean and ill-fated of all the Christians." A. C. S. Peacock, "An Interfaith Polemic of Medieval Anatolia: Qāḍī Burhān al-Dīn al-Anawī on the Armenians and Their Heresies," in *Islam and Christianity in Medieval Anatolia*, ed. idem et al. (London: Routledge, 2015), 233–61, at 240.

71. On Saljuq nostalgia in Anatolia, see A. C. S. Peacock, "Seljuq Legitimacy in Islamic History," in *The Seljuqs: Politics, Society, and Culture*, ed. C. Lange and S. Mecit (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2011), 79–95.

72. Malik Ashraf, for example, established on the throne an alleged offspring of Chinggis Khan, who had previously served as a wardrobe keeper, and named him Anūshirvān Khan. Further tapping into Iranian notions of just monarchy, Malik Ashraf ordered that a chain with bells be attached to the window of his chamber. The chain was named "justice" (*ʿadl*) and any person who had a complaint could pull on the chain to inform the ruler of his grievance. A similar chain existed during the time of the celebrated sixth-century Sasanian king Anūshirvān. Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 158–59. The Jalayirids, on the other hand, were the most persistent and adamant about following and maintaining the Ilkhanid model of legitimacy. See P. Wing, *The Jalayirids: Dynastic State Formation in the Mongol Middle East* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2016).

73. Muʿīn al-Dīn Naṭanzī, *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Muʿīnī*, ed. J. Aubin (Tehran: Kitābfurūshī-i Khayyām, 1336 [1957]), 158.

74. Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, *Ẕayl*, 202; Ahrī, *Taʾrīkh*, 65 (trans.), 165 (text).

face covered, supposedly to protect him from al-Nāṣir Muḥammad's assassins (*fidāwiyya*).[75] The veiling of the face, however, was also considered a sign of the awaited Mahdi, who concealed his identity until the right moment to unveil it.[76]

These creative legitimizing attempts notwithstanding, the Chinggisid descent-based principle remained in place throughout the fourteenth century, until after Temür's death (1405). Thus, it was only about a century after Temürtash's revolt that the notion of the ruler as a divinely designated religious reformer resurfaced once more as a useful avenue for proving the transfer of God's favor from the Chinggisids, alongside other expressions of sacral, auspicious kingship and divine choice, such as the *ṣāḥibqirān*. This new phase in the post-Mongol age of the politics of divine right is especially apparent in the assumption of the *mujaddid* tradition for Temür's son Shāhrukh (r. 1409–1447).[77]

According to the *mujaddid* tradition, the Prophet reported that "God will send to this community at the turn of every century a person who will renew its religion" (*inna Allāh yabʿathu li-hādhihi l-umma ʿalā raʿs kull miʾa sana man yujaddid lahā amr dīnihā*). The tradition, which emerged from within specific Shāfiʿī scholarly circles already in the tenth and eleventh centuries, was not a central concept in medieval Islamic religious thought.[78] Yet from the fifteenth century onwards, as the tradition's import grew among the scholarly ranks, the *mujaddid* title was also assigned to Muslim rulers and sultans.[79] Along with the accompanying discourse of religious renewal and reform (*tajdīd*), the title became part of the emergent "discursive realm" of Islamic sacral kingship in the early modern period.[80]

The Ḥanafī jurist, preacher, and "Sunni propagandist" Jalāl al-Dīn Qāyinī (d. 1434) utilized this *mujaddid* tradition to cast his Timurid patron Shāhrukh as a divinely chosen reformer king. Joining the scholarly circles of Herat in 1410 (813*h*), at the beginning of Shāhrukh's reign, Qāyinī was sent by Shāhrukh in 1415 (818*h*) to his native Quhistan to restore Sharia and expose heterodox elements and heretical believers. After his return, Shāhrukh appointed him as inspector of public spaces (*muḥtasib*) in Herat, in which office he began enforcing

75. Shams al-Dīn al-Shujāʿī, *Taʾrīkh al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad Ibn Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥī wa-awlādihi* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1977), 1: 122–23; Ibn Abī l-Faḍāʾil, *Ägypten und Syrien*, 71–73; al-Ṣafadī, *Aʿyān al-aṣr*, 2: 26–27, 115.

76. Moin, *Millennial Sovereign*, 136–37, 140. According to al-Shujāʿī, after four years of his "reign," the doppelgänger was killed by Temürtash's wife and son. Al-Shujāʿī, *Taʾrīkh*, 1: 122–23.

77. There are several isolated instances when the *mujaddid* tradition was used for rulers prior to Shāhrukh. For example, the odd history of Qāḍī Aḥmad, *al-Walad al-shafīq*—composed in Niğde (Anatolia) during the first half of the thirteenth century—lists the Saljuq Kılıç Arslan II among the renewers. A. C. S. Peacock, "Aḥmad of Niğde's *al-Walad al-Shafīq* and the Seljuk Past," *Anatolian Studies* 54 (2004): 95–107, at 102. The Qalāwūnid Mamluk sultan al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ (d. 1345) was also associated with the *mujaddid* tradition in a prose panegyric by a scribe named Ibrāhīm b. al-Qaysarānī (d. 1352). To resolve the fact that al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ's reign was mid-century, the author created a centennial historical scheme whereby the "*tajdīd* clock" starts with the last Ayyubid ruler of Egypt, a century before al-Ṣāliḥ's reign. See J. Van Steenbergen, "Qalāwūnid Discourse, Elite Communication, and the Mamluk Cultural Matrix: Interpreting a 14th-Century Panegyric," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 43 (2012): 1–28. Interestingly, the Ilkhan Ghāzān is described in the Safavid hagiography *Ṣafwat al-ṣafā* as *mujaddid min al-mulūk* ("a *mujaddid* king") of the seventh hijri century alongside Ṣafī al-Dīn as the "Sufi *mujaddid*" of the seventh century. Darwīsh Tawakkulī Ibn Bazzāz, *Ṣafwat al-ṣafā*, ed. G. R. Ṭabāṭabaʾī Majd (Tabriz: [privately printed], 1373 [1994]), 55–58. These examples, like that of the Ilkhanid vizier Rashīd al-Dīn, suggest the early malleability of the tradition.

78. The eschatological classification of the *tajdīd* tradition was a later fourteenth- or fifteenth-century innovation. E. Landau-Tasseron, "The 'Cyclical Reform': A Study of the *mujaddid* Tradition," *Studia Islamica* 70 (1989): 79–117; Y. Friedmann, *Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Aḥmadī Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1989), 97.

79. Melvin-Koushki, "Early Modern Islamicate Empire."

80. For the new "discursive realm" of kingship, see Moin, *Millennial Sovereign*.

adherence to the Sharia.[81] Qāyinī's *Naṣāyiḥ-i shāhrukhī* (completed in 1417) is the earliest text to attribute the title to Shāhrukh,[82] evidencing Shāhrukh's denunciation of Mongol court law (*yarghu*) and Chinggisid customary laws (*rusūm-i töre*) and his restoration of Sharia and destruction of wine vessels as proof of his status as *mujaddid* king. Qāyinī set his patron's reign according to the "*mujaddid* clock": Shāhrukh was the centennial renewer since his reign began in the year 811, exactly nine centuries after the Prophet's emigration to Medina (*hijra*).

Maria Subtelny has observed that *Naṣāyiḥ-i shāhrukhī* draws on both the Persianate genre of advice literature and works of the religious sciences, especially Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī jurisprudence and Quranic exegesis. According to Qāyinī's own statement, he intended to assemble a juridically oriented Persian mirror for princes.[83] Like Aqsarāʾī's didactic history, Qāyinī's counsel for Shāhrukh—"arguably the earliest Timurid political treatise"—and especially his description of Shāhrukh as a wine-spilling *mujaddid* shutting down the brothels in Timurid Khurasan constitute the *muḥtasib*'s formula for his ideal Perso-Islamic Sunni reformer king.[84]

İlker Binbaş suggests that Shāhrukh assumed the title of *mujaddid* in opposition to his brother and contender Mīrānshāh's strong support of the Chinggisid principle of descent-based succession. Sunni *tajdīd* became an ideological platform from which Shāhrukh could campaign for his own Shāhrukhid dispensation.[85] Indeed, Qāyinī interprets Shāhrukh's declaration of *tajdīd* to signify his adoption of an anti-Chinggisid stance. Yet, as Temürtash's rebellion suggests, Shāhrukh's claim to *tajdīd* does not reflect a Timurid rejection of the Chinggisid legacy and its replacement with a "purely" Islamic legitimizing model, but rather the continuous engagement of Turco-Mongol rulers and courts with the Chinggisid model of direct divine appointment. Like Temürtash's Mahdihood, the *mujaddid* title designated Shāhrukh as the new addressee of God's favor. The Timurid historian and occult expert Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī (d. 1454) interpreted Shāhrukh's *tajdīd* in this light, placing Shāhrukh's identification as *mujaddid* alongside the ruler's horoscope using the two arguments for Shāhrukh's divine selection —one astrologically derived and the other tradition-based.[86]

The Timurid court was furthermore aware of this being an Ilkhanid legacy and utilized it to legitimize Timurid pretensions of Eurasian dominance. This is apparent in Shāhrukh's correspondence with the Ming emperor Yongle (r. 1402–1424). In his letter, the emperor claimed that the Timurids were Ming vassals due to the transfer of the Heavenly Mandate (*ḥukm-i ilāhī*) from the Yuan Chinggisids to the Ming founder. In Shāhrukh's two responses,

81. M. E. Subtelny, "The Sunni Revival under Shāh-Rukh and Its Promoters: A Study of the Connection between Ideology and Higher Learning in Timurid Iran," *Proceedings of the 27th Meeting of Haneda Memorial Hall: Symposium on Central Asia and Iran, August 30, 1993* (Kyoto: Institute of Inner Asian Studies, 1993), 14–23; eadem, "The Curriculum of Islamic Higher Learning in Timurid Iran in the Light of the Sunni Revival under Shāh-Rukh," *JAOS* 115.2 (1995): 210–36; B. Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), 210–11.

82. This claim would be repeated by most Timurid historians, for example, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Samarqandī (d. 1482), who in his entry for the year 844*h* refers to the *mujaddid* tradition identifying Shāhrukh as the centennial renewer and claims that under his rule public morality was restored. ʿAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandī, *Maṭlaʿ-i saʿdayn va majmaʿ-i baḥrayn* (Tehran: Pazhūhishgāh-i ʿUlūm-i Insānī va Muṭālaʿāt-i Farhang, 1383/2004), 2.2: 739–41.

83. Subtelny, "Sunni Revival," 19. Qāyinī's work exists in one manuscript (the presentation copy) currently at the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, dated to 820 (1417).

84. İ. E. Binbaş, *Intellectual Networks in Timurid Iran: Sharaf al-Dīn ʻAlī Yazdī and the Islamicate Republic of Letters* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016), 261–65, quotation at 263.

85. Binbaş, "Timurid Experimentation," 278–79.

86. Binbaş, *Intellectual Networks*, 261–62.

one in Arabic and the other in Persian, the Timurid ruler is portrayed as a reformer king in identical terms to that which Qāyinī employs. Both Sharia enforcer and reformer, he is also heir to past Ilkhanid reformer kings: Ghāzān, Öljeitü, and Abū Saʿīd.[87] Shāhrukh's letters argue for continuing, even surpassing, the reformer king model of his Ilkhanid predecessors.[88] Furthermore, by condescendingly inviting Yongle to convert to Islam and implement Sharia throughout the Ming lands, Shāhrukh extends the reach of his *tajdīd* claims across Asia, becoming an appropriate heir to Chinggisid universalism.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Temürtash's rebellion demonstrates that the argument made nearly a century later by Shāhrukh to the Ming emperor for Ilkhanid–Timurid continuity through the model of the Muslim reformer king was, indeed, historically sound. Shāhrukh's claim to his position as the post-Mongol "Eurasian *mujaddid*" was rooted in the earlier Chinggisid–Islamic synthesis of the Ilkhanid court. Scholars consider the rise of the Timurid empire in the fifteenth century as a point of departure for new imperial, absolutist, and universalist Islamic ideologies that were an alternative to the restrictive, genealogical, and juridical definitions of the authority of Muslim rulers.[89] Yet these new political theologies were largely based on the earlier Ilkhanid experimentation with an Islamic political vocabulary that reflected and reified a new vision of Muslim emperorship. In their attempt to redefine and further expand through Islamic terms the Chinggisids' unique affinity with heaven, Ilkhanid cultural brokers such as the vizier Rashīd al-Dīn appropriated and experimented with religious titles and traditions. The Islamic discourse of religious reform and renewal offered a viable path for reconceptualizing the Chinggisid sacral kingship, especially the notion of heaven's unmediated appointment of Chinggis Khan and his offspring. The figure of the periodically designated religious reformer, *mujaddid* or Mahdi, proved to be a useful category for integrating the Chinggisid divine right. The identity of *mujaddid* and Mahdi reformers was also reaffirmed through empirical demonstrations, such as the implementation of measures to restore public compliance with the Sharia or of anti-dhimmi policies, rather than solely on the basis of genealogical or ritual grounds. Yet, as both Temürtash's rebellion and Shāhrukh's letters show, the discourse of *tajdīd* could be, and moreover was, also used to support claims to the transfer of God's favor and its assignment to a new divine addressee.

The experimentation with the model of the reformer king that began at the Ilkhanid court did not end with the Timurids. The discourse of *tajdīd* also went on to be a significant aspect of later Aqquyunlu and Ottoman legitimizing assertions, as did other elements of Chinggisid sacral kingship—for example, the paradigm of the law-maker king.[90] Chinggisid descent-

87. For the Timurid succession to the Ilkhanid Muslim model, especially as embodied by the Ilkhan Ghāzān, see also B. Manz, "Mongol History Rewritten and Relived," *Revue des mondes musulmans de la Méditerranée* 89–90 (2000): 129–49.

88. Samarqandī, *Maṭlaʿ-i saʿdayn*, 3: 158–66; J. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368–1884," in *The Chinese World Order*, ed. J. K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), 206–24, at 209–11.

89. See, for example, Moin, *Millennial Sovereign*; Binbaş, "Timurid Experimentation," 277–303; Melvin-Koushki, "Early Modern Islamicate Empire;" Ch. A. Markiewicz, "The Crisis of Rule in Late Medieval Islam: A Study of Idrīs Bidlīsī (861–926/1457–1520) and Kingship at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Chicago, 2015).

90. Markiewicz, "Crisis of Rule," 341; Burak, "Second Formation." The Aqquyunlu Ūzūn Ḥasan, for example, was declared the *mujaddid* of the fifteenth century; he too carried out similar measures to enforce the Sharia. He was presented as cracking down on vices such as fornication and gambling, suppressing extreme antinomianism, and extensively supporting the religious establishment. The Armenian colophons complain of his enforcement of the distinguishing dress code and the *jizya*. Woods, *Aqquyunlu*, 100–106, 140.

based authority might have waned after Shāhrukh's consolidation of his Timurid sovereignty, but the notion that the emperor was divinely selected remained central for the emergent early modern imperial ideologies. Attempts were moreover made to creatively extend the scope of such titles to designate the divine selection of entire dynasties. The Ilkhanid experimentation with the model of reformer Muslim king comes full circle in *Tawārīkh-i āl-i ʿUthmān*, the history of the House of Osman by the sixteenth-century Ottoman grand vizier and historian Luṭfī Pasha (d. 1563). The Ottomans—and Islamic history at large—are rearranged in accordance with a Sunni *mujaddid* schema. The renewers in Luṭfī Pasha's history are reformer kings who arrive at the turn of each century to reform and set aright Islam after its corruption by their malicious counterparts, the "anti-*mujaddid*s."[91] Luṭfī Pasha's history establishes the Ottoman *mujaddid* dynasty as the cure for the corrupting forces of the Chinggisids and their Timurid and Safavid heirs in the eastern Islamic world. He legitimizes the House of Osman, lined with *mujaddid* kings, in its entirety as the new addressee of divine favor. Thus, in Luṭfī Pasha's history, rather than signify the transferability of heaven's favor as it did under Temürtash, *tajdīd* is used, once again, to cement the claims of a single dynastic line to heavenly guaranteed prosperity and longevity.

91. Luṭfī Pasha introduces two poems, which he claims to report from the ulema of Transoxiana, in which Selim I (d. 1520), Luṭfi's ninth *mujaddid*, is credited with being the Mahdi for his victory over the Safavids and their heresies and his protection of the Muslim community. Here Luṭfī Pasha appears to conflate the titles of *mujaddid* and Mahdi to signify "reformer kingship." Cornell Fleischer has suggested that these two poems are an "evocative form of testimony to Selim's apocalyptic pretensions." Luṭfī Pasha, *Tevarih-i āl-i Osman* (Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Âmire, 1341[1925]), 6–12; C. Fleischer, "The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleymân," in *Süleymân the Magnificent and His Time*, ed. G. Veinstein (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1992), 159–77.