

perhaps more suitable, though naturally they have their own drawbacks and scholars tend to favor one term over the other.

My second remark concerns the impact of Neoplatonic thought on Ibn Barrajān and on the Andalusī intellectual scene at large. It seems to me that in relation to the Ikhwānian-Neoplatonic background of Ibn Barrajān's thought, there is still much comparative work to be done. Casewit correctly emphasizes that from Ibn Masarra's time onward, Andalusī mystics (including Ibn Barrajān himself) were very much inspired by Ikhwān al-Ṣafā's *Rasā'il* and perhaps also by other Ismaili works or Ismaili oral teachings. Key cosmological doctrines in Ibn Barrajān's writings as mentioned above; the idea of parallel worlds and the belief that a correspondence exists between man (the microcosm), the universe (the macrocosm), and the Quran; the view according to which the invisible-spiritual and the visible-corporeal worlds are ontologically connected; the concept of *amr* and cyclical perceptions of time; and, last but not least, the very idea of *i'tibār* in its mystical formulation—these notions were no doubt derived inter alia from the Ikhwānian corpus. As Casewit correctly remarks, Ibn Barrajān adapted and modified these notions, and was no less inspired by other sources as well, primarily the Quran and hadith. Yet what exactly are the similarities and differences between the Ikhwānian Neoplatonic worldview and Ibn Barrajān's teachings? Can we trace Ikhwānian terms (or Neoplatonic expressions in general) in Ibn Barrajān's writing, or are they replaced by an entirely different nomenclature, and if so, in what manner and why? Are Ibn Barrajān's approach and method in this context different from those of Ibn Masarra, Ibn Qasī, and Ibn al-ʿArabī? These weighty questions could not be treated in such an already exhaustive book as *The Mystics of al-Andalus*, but it is to be hoped—and looked forward to—that the author will address these issues in the future.

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Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Īlkhānate of Iran. By MICHAEL HOPE. Oxford: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016. Pp. x + 238. \$90, £60.

A large number of studies have recently appeared on various aspects of the history of the Mongol World empire as well as of the post-1260 Mongol oecumene, along with a focus on its component parts. In particular, the Ilkhanate successor state, in Iran and surrounding countries (ca. 1260–1335), has received a healthy amount of attention. We have now important discussions on a wide range of subjects from Ilkhanid history—intellectual and cultural developments, relations with the indigenous populations (Muslim and otherwise), the role of the local bureaucratic elites, religious interaction and conversion, economic history, international relations (with both other Mongol and non-Mongol states), military history—but lacking was a comprehensive examination of the flow of political events (although Boyle's long article from 1968 in vol. 5 of *The Cambridge History of Islam* was an excellent start), along with a reasonable attempt to explain their dynamics and underlying logic. This new book by Michael Hope has attempted to fill this gap.

The basic theme of Hope's study is that Mongol history, in the formative period of Chinggis Khan's reign (from the late 1100s to his death in 1227), the subsequent generation of the united Mongol empire (until ca. 1260), and the ensuing Ilkhanid state in Iran, underwent alternating phases of patrimonialist and collegial rule. In the former we find a powerful ruler, supported by loyal senior officers and bureaucrats; in the latter are weaker sovereigns and policy largely determined by a group of *noyat* (pl. of *noyan*), high-ranking officers who each commanded a division (*tümen*) and worked more or less in concert. This group of influential grandees, along with the princes, was referred to as *aqā-nar* (sing. *aqā*, lit. "older brother"). As delineated by Hope, Chinggis Khan's rule was not surprisingly patrimonialist, while those of Ögödei (1229–1241) and Güyük (1246–1248) were clearly collegial. Möngke (1251–1259), on the other hand, created a strong patrimonialist regime. His brother Hülegü (reigning from ca. 1260 as a de facto independent ruler until his death in 1265) was unable to establish such a

regime, and such were the reigns of his sons Abaqa (1265–1282) and Tegüder Aḥmad (1282–1284). The latter's successor, his nephew Arghun, followed suit until 1289, when he launched a short-lived effort to establish his own authority, supported by the forceful if not always politic minister Saʿd al-Dawla. This determined attempt was cut short by the sovereign's death in 1291. The confused times during the reigns of Geikhatu (1291–1295) and Baidu (only several months in 1295), a heyday of renewed collegial rule, were ended by the energetic and strong Ghazan (1295–1304), whose reign was one of ever strengthening royal authority and reform to buttress it. However, Ghazan's early death returned hegemony to the senior amirs, and their preponderance characterizes the reigns of the last two Ilkhanids, Öljeitü (1305–1317) and Abū Saʿīd (1317–1335), both relatively weak rulers. Indeed, although this is not explicitly said by Hope, a look at the almost century and a half of Mongol history surveyed here in some depth shows that more often than not it was the collegial phase that was dominant. This, we are to believe, is how most of the time the Mongol World empire was ruled and expanded, and its successor state in the Near East survived and even prospered.

There is much that commends this book. It shows a lot of the nitty-gritty of internal Mongol politics in greater detail and scope than has previously been presented. Many Mongol senior commanders are known to students of Mongol and Ilkhanid history, and their roles are not really a secret, yet their jostling for power and maneuvers vis-à-vis the rulers and other members of the Chinggisid royal family over the entire span of the Ilkhanate period had not yet been presented with such care. This study goes beyond just telling the story and tries to make sense of the inner logic of these politics. All this is based on a fairly wide reading of the relevant Persian and other sources. The judicious reference to modern studies in Persian can be appreciated. Not all of us exploit this resource.

At the same time, I remain unconvinced by the general argument and in the end am also unsatisfied with the treatment of the material. We are to believe that the Mongol empire and at least one of the successor states were ruled much of the time by committee, at least for the reigns of Ögödei and Hülegü. In other words, under the formal rule of the avuncular Great Khan Ögödei, but without a strong leader, the empire muddled on, dramatically expanding in the process. His nephew Hülegü—who had a less convivial personality—also oversaw a dramatic expansion of conquered territory and consolidation of rule, essentially staking out an independent kingdom in the post-Möngke period, without really controlling the state.

Without claiming that these rulers had complete and unlimited power throughout their regimes, the reality is one of strong, yet savvy rulers. Behind geniality, on the one hand, and a more reserved public persona, on the other, were powerful leaders who knew how to control and manipulate those around them, whether royal relatives (men—including the many sons-in-law—and women, both as individuals and as a group), senior commanders, important bureaucrats, or vassal rulers. Before dealing with Hülegü in a little more detail below, I will just note that there is little doubt that behind Ögödei's soft words, he employed an iron fist to achieve political ends.

There are two general problems with Hope's approach. First is the assumption—certainly for the above two reigns—that the elite commanders were working together rather than mostly at cross purposes. This is hard to conceive of in principle, let alone in practice. Second, there is some confusion between the senior and junior members of the royal family and these high-ranking officers. This may be connected to a somewhat free use of the expression *aqā wa īnī*, a Persian rendition of the Mongolian terms *aqā* (*agha*) and *ini*, older and younger brother respectively. To the best of my understanding (based inter alia on Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente in Neupersischen*, 1: 133–40, esp. 134–35), this generally refers to the senior and junior princes of the Mongol royal family, i.e., the family (not only descendants) of Chinggis Khan, whose agreement and backing—perhaps tacit in most cases—was sought by the rulers. While *aqā* might be added as a sign of respect to the name of an individual high official or commander (as with Arghun Aqa, the governor and administrator in Iran, d. 1278, or Geremün Agha, who with 1,300 Mongol troops deserted to the Mamluks in 1263), I do not find it convincing that it was applied in a collective sense to the whole Mongol elite.

In addition, even if the senior officers were working in concert some of the time and taking advantage of a weak ruler to advance their own interests, this is only part of the story. Mongol politics were always a complicated and messy affair. Besides the Khan or Qaghan himself, there were royal women,

princes with various degrees of kinship to the ruler (and some of them older, perhaps thinking that they had a stronger claim on the throne), royal sons-in-law, the generals, senior bureaucrats and officials (some of Muslim Iranian origin, others of steppe provenance), and various vassals (an interesting topic in its own right). There was plenty of opportunity to jostle for power and influence; those who lost out usually did not have the opportunity to retire. Stability could be achieved and even enjoyed for relatively long periods, but in order to attain it, even the most powerful and charismatic of rulers needed to maintain vigilance, and employed a combination of carrot and stick approaches so as to keep on top and to get things done.

One of the pivots of this study is the analysis of certain terms or expressions. In some cases, however, it would appear that Hope has taken some liberties. In addition to what I consider the overly liberal application of the terms *aqā* and *ini*, there is the plural *aqā-nar*, which Hope often applies as a collective term for the elite of the Mongol empire or its successor Ilkhanid state. For support, Hope cites Juvaynī in the Boyle translation (1: 185): “During the *quriltai* of 1229, however, the *aqā-nar* are referred to as the senior aristocracy, rather than as individuals. Juvaynī states that the question of the succession to Chinggis was discussed by the leading ‘princes, noyans and emirs’” (p. 46). I will note that the term *aqā-nar* nowhere appears in the original Persian text (*Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā*, ed. Qazwīnī, 1: 146). Juvaynī does mention the *zādagān-i pādshāh wa noyānān wa umarā* along “with so large an army” (*bā chandān lashkar*), all of whom “spoke of the affairs of the realm and the testimony of Chingiz-Khan and read over again and again the written statements made by his sons that the Khanate should be settled on Ögetei. This counsel they adopted, and all the *princes* [my emphasis, RA] with a unanimity unmingled with evil or strife said to Ögetei [. . .].” Thus, even if the *noyat* and emirs “spoke of the affairs of the realm,” etc. (along with the army, so it would have been quite a conversation), in the end, the princes made the decision. There is no reason to equate the term *aqā-nar* with “noyans and emirs,” who were in any case not part of the appointment decision-making process. This particular passage cannot be taken to show that even early on, the non-royal elite were of final consequence. In addition, while *aqā-nar* does appear frequently in the *Secret History of the Mongols* (see I. de Rachewiltz, *Index to the Secret History of the Mongols* [Bloomington, 1972], 184), I am not familiar with it in either Juvaynī’s *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā* or Rashīd al-Dīn’s *Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh*. To adopt it as a catch-all phrase to describe the elite of the post-Chinggisid united Mongol empire or the Ilkhanate is misleading, giving an impression of a coherent body of decision-makers that never existed, either formally or otherwise.

Then there is the matter of *jasāq* (*yasaq*) and *yosun*, i.e., Chinggisid law and Mongol custom; in this volume it is often the touchstone that the senior officers used to justify their “collegial” approach to government (see, e.g., p. 56). This may well be true, but it is only part of the story. Frequently, Chinggisid rulers and princes, along with senior officers, would vindicate their actions and policies in these terms, particularly when directed toward another Chinggisid ruler or prince, as well as problematic officers. Using the expression “law(s) and tradition(s)” mainly as a way to support the collegial approach is confusing. It was actually a frequently used expression, adopted readily to cast aspersions on an opponent or to weaken his claim, while strengthening one’s own.

Some of the case studies for collegial rule need to be reexamined, in my view. For example, Baiju’s frequent independent behavior toward Hülegü is seen as exemplifying both a weak ruler and an arrogant senior officer. The situation, however, is much more complicated. *Pace* Hope, Baiju was, of course, the Jochid man on the scene (this is clearly shown by Peter Jackson in *The Mongols and the Islamic World* [2017], 121) and Hülegü could thus only push him so far in these early years. Nevertheless, even before his arrival in this part of Iran, Hülegü ordered Baiju and his troops out of Azerbaijan, with its extensive pastures and its proximity to the Jochid state (*ulus*), and had him move to Anatolia. No question who was the boss here. Based on a faulty understanding of identical Arabic passages: Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-fikra*, ed. Richards, 41, and al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-ādab*, ed. ‘Ashūr, 27: 384 (the latter probably dependent on the former), Hope suggests (p. 96) that Baiju had delayed in participating in the Baghdad campaign of early 1258, but this is not warranted by the account in Rashīd al-Dīn, the main source for the period, who had no reason to present Baiju in a positive light, particularly when compared to the great-grandfather of his patron Ghazan. Be that as it may, with the outbreak of open war between Hülegü and the Jochid Khan Berke around the winter of 1261–62, Baiju is soon eliminated. How can the authority of Hülegü be in doubt, certainly vis-à-vis Baiju?

Likewise, Arghun Aqa, in the east of what was soon to become the all but independent Ilkhanate, was a powerful, but also highly efficient administrator and officer. His loyalty now assured, why would Hülegü want to get rid of him? Whether Arghun Aqa entertained a “collegialist view of power” is irrelevant. Of course, he needed “to be courted by the Ilkhan” (p. 98); that is what a Mongol ruler did, even the most powerful and “patrimonialist,” with gifts, titles, lands, and the delegation of authority. However, one should not forget that these governors, senior officers, and important administrators enjoyed their sinecures at the ruler’s pleasure—certainly in the case of Hülegü.

The survey of Hülegü’s reign and his march to the west is also marred by several factual mistakes and not fully substantiated claims. According to Juwaynī (and followed by Rashīd al-Dīn), Hülegü—like Qubilai in the east—received twenty percent of the entire army. This is understood (p. 99) to mean twenty percent of the forces left to Tolui by Chinggis Khan (according to Rashīd al-Dīn, a total of 101,000 men), but the source clearly means that it was drawn from the entirety available to the Mongols. Along with Qubilai’s campaign, Hülegü’s march was an effort of all the various branches of the royal house, albeit led by a Toluid, a brother of the new Qaghan (see T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* [1987]). Two pages later, Hope states that after the conquest of Baghdad, “Hülegü then reported his success to Möngke, who expanded this mission to include the conquest of al-Shām (Syria) and Egypt.” The basis of this claim is unclear, but Rashīd al-Dīn, for one, mentions that in Möngke’s original commission to Hülegü, the advance to Egypt was noted.

There are more of these minor, albeit annoying, mistakes, but one also comes across inadequate interpretations of the historical content. Thus, we are told simply (p. 110) that “Berke was deeply affronted by the murder of three Jočid princes and could not let it go unpunished.” This is correct as far as it goes, but is far from sufficient for understanding the outbreak of warfare between Hülegü and his cousin Berke. There was the whole question of control over the Caucasus region and Azerbaijan (and perhaps more), and the resulting tax revenues. And there was the matter of Berke’s conversion to Islam and his displeasure at the murder of the caliph (surely a secondary reason, but one raised by the Mamluk sources). The execution of the Jochid princes was clearly the straw that broke the camel’s back, and may represent the breakdown of relations between the Jochids and Iranians Toluids rather than be the cause for them.

Space prevents me from discussing later chapters of Ilkhanid history, but I must note that I found the interpretation for Abaqa’s reign (1265–1282) also unsatisfying and unconvincing.

The basis of the study is a broad reading in the Persian sources, mainly penned by writers in the Ilkhanate who were government officials and thus close to the ruling circles. Perhaps these works might have been read at times more critically, and taken less at face value. Over all, much credence is given to Rashīd al-Dīn’s accounts without raising the possibility of this historian’s clear biases, which have been pointed out by several scholars.

Increasingly, scholars have begun to understand the vast importance of Waṣṣāf’s great work for Ilkhanid history, and applied themselves to reading this “turgid history” (to use Judith Pfeiffer’s expression). It is referred to frequently in Hope’s study, but it soon becomes clear that what was employed was the summary adaption into modern Persian by ‘Abd al-Muḥammad Āyatī. This last mentioned was not an editor, but a summarizer, and not always an accurate one. I have little doubt that the investment in reading the “real thing” would have paid off in more interesting and relevant evidence for the history of the Ilkhanate.

Recent years have also seen an increasing recourse to Arabic, mostly Mamluk, sources for the study of Mongol history, particularly of the Ilkhanate. This study reflects that trend. Unfortunately, there are frequent mistakes in the transliteration of Arabic or of Persian words of Arabic origin—e.g., ‘*umarā*’, with an errant ‘*ayn*’ (p. 128 and passim); for *muḥimāt*, read *muḥimmāt* (p. 53 and elsewhere); for *Ḥabīb al-Sīr*, read *Ḥabīb al-Siyar* (p. 107 n. 104); for ‘*amāl*’, read ‘*unmāl*’ (p. 119), etc.; and Arabic (and Persian) titles are sometimes given in a rather cavalier fashion (on p. 21, the title of Bar Hebraeus’s chronicle is rendered as *Mukhtaṣar al-Tārikh-i al-Dāwal*, which, in addition to the mistakes, seems to be confusing Bar Hebraeus’s Arabic chronicle, written under the name Ibn al-‘Ibrī, and his Syriac work with more-or-less the same scope). I am not one who thinks a few mistakes in the transliteration of Arabic disqualifies a study, but this has perhaps gotten out of hand. Some more care should have been shown by both author and publisher.

More importantly, however, is the seemingly careless approach to reading and citing the Arabic sources. As a single example (of many), I mention p. 128, where “both Vaṣṣāf and the Mamluk historian, Ibn al-Dawādārī, claim that Aḥmad [Tegüder] was simply referred to as ‘Aḥmad Agha’ in his correspondence with the provinces.” Ibn al-Dawādārī actually says: “His [Abaqa’s] brother Aḥmad Agha took control of the kingdom [or rule], and he was a Muslim and loved the Muslims.” There is nothing about provinces or writing to them. The cumulative effect of this weakens our faith in the analysis based on such readings.

This study is primarily important for drawing our attention to the role played by senior officers and other members of the Mongol elite in Mongol and Ilkhanid politics, and for demonstrating to us the need to subject this topic to a sophisticated and subtle analysis. I was not convinced, however, by the evidence adduced and the arguments presented that there was a consistent or even discernible swing between two ideological positions, the patrimonialist and the collegial, or that this dichotomy characterizes the political dynamic for the period studied here. We still await the study that explains the complicated relations between the Mongol elite and their rulers in a cogent and comprehensive way.

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The Mongols’ Middle East: Continuity and Transformation in Ilkhanid Iran. Edited by BRUNO DE NICOLA and CHARLES MELVILLE. *Islamic History and Civilization*, vol. 127. Leiden: BRILL, 2016. Pp. xiii + 346. \$149, €115.

During the Ilkhanid period (1260–1335 or 1353), the areas under Mongol rule—including present-day Iran, Azerbaijan, and eastern Anatolia—underwent far-reaching and consequential transformations. These changes are evinced both in the breaking up of earlier patterns and imposition and rise of new formations, which would continue to shape the eastern Islamic world, particularly in Iran, in the centuries to come, as well as in the acceleration and reinforcement of earlier processes, especially since the eleventh-century Seljuk invasions. To date, the most detailed study of changes and continuities under Ilkhanid (as well as Seljuk) rule has been Ann K. S. Lambton’s *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia* (1988). In recent years, however, other studies have come to explore, though not as comprehensively as Lambton’s seminal work, various aspects of continuity and change under Mongol rule as well as among the Mongols themselves in the Ilkhanate, focusing especially on questions related to Mongol Islamization and acculturation. This recent edited collection under review is a welcome contribution to this promising line of inquiry. One of the merits of the volume’s articles is that they largely avoid the more frequently visited issue of Mongol conversion to Islam, offering instead more refined and small-scale explorations of the theme of continuity and change in and around the Ilkhanate. That said, however, the reader might find it difficult to reconcile these very diverse “snapshots” into a more comprehensive presentation of continuities and changes in the given period. This leaves Lambton’s ground-breaking study, three decades from its initial publication, still the most instructive discussion of the place of the Ilkhanate in view of the larger shifting patterns in greater Iran, even if the work is in dire need of major revision and updating.

The volume is thematically divided. The first part, “The Mongol Conquest of the Middle East,” comprises two chapters on Mongol warfare contributed by the leading experts, Reuven Amitai and Timothy May. In the second section on “politics, economy and religion,” Esther Ravalde examines the renowned vizier Juwaynī’s (d. 1284) patronage networks and political negotiations. She makes two significant observations: first, that the influence of the vizier under this new style of Mongol government “was invested more in his person than in the office itself” (p. 63), and second, agreeing with Lambton, that overall the Ilkhanid period witnessed the imposition of more limitations and restrictions on the position of the vizier. Bruno De Nicola follows this with a compelling investigation of the transformations in the economic status of elite Mongol women following upon the expansion of financial