

On the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*, a Lost Work Attributed to Bhartṛhari: An Examination of Testimonies and a List of Fragments

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The fifth-century grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari has long attracted scholarly attention, and deservedly so: his magnum opus, the *Vākyapadīya*, had a profound impact on later Indian schools of thought, Brahmanical as well as Buddhist. The *Vākyapadīya* is not, however, the only grammatical and/or philosophical work ascribed to Bhartṛhari in addition to a commentary on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*: according to several sources dating back at least to the tenth century, the same author also composed a *Ṣabdadhātusamikṣā* or *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣāi*, which, unfortunately, has not come down to us, and which is still shrouded in mystery, as its main topic, and even title and attribution, are considered uncertain to date. The goal of this article is to examine the available fragments and testimonies and to establish on their basis that the work, the original title of which must have been the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*, endeavored to show that the whole phenomenal world is made of six elements (earth, fire, water, air, ether, and consciousness) while ultimately defending a nondualistic point of view. Verses quoted by later authors as belonging to the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā* are gathered and translated in an appendix to the article.

AN INTRIGUING LOST WORK

Bhartṛhari's *magnum opus*, the *Vākyapadīya*,¹ has drawn much scholarly attention for over a century and triggered some heated debates, the most famous of which pertains to the authorship of the old *Vṛtti* that comments on its first two parts.² But the *Vākyapadīya* is by no means the grammarian-philosopher's only work: he is also believed to have authored a commentary—usually referred to as the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*—on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*.³ The attribution of the *Śatakatraya* to the author of the *Vākyapadīya* seems to be late and

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1. The work is divided into three parts (*kāṇḍa*) and it seems that the title *Vākyapadīya* originally applied only to the first two of them, while the three parts together were called the *Trikāṇḍī* (Aklujkar 1969: 547–55). Several commentaries on it are preserved: a *Vṛtti* on the first two *kāṇḍas* (with important lacunae in the second one); a *Paddhati* by Vṛṣabhadeva on both the *kārikās* and *Vṛtti* of the first *kāṇḍa*; a *Ṭikā* on the second *kāṇḍa* attributed to Punyarāja; and Helārāja's *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* on the third *kāṇḍa*. The *kārikās* mentioned here are numbered according to K. A. Subramania Iyer's editions, but the text of Wilhelm Rau's edition is also given whenever it differs.

2. On this debate see, e.g., Biardeau 1964; Iyer 1969: 16–35; Aklujkar 1972; Bronkhorst 1988; Aklujkar 1994a; Houben 1997a and b, 1998, 1999, and 2003: 144–57.

3. This work was edited, on the basis of a single, incomplete manuscript, as the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, although this may not have been its original title (see Aklujkar 1971). Among reasons for considering that the text preserved in this manuscript is Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* (a commentary mentioned by a number

probably spurious,⁴ but several scholars⁵ have noticed in the past decades that a tradition dating back at least to the tenth century of our era ascribes to Bhartṛhari another work of which very little is known. To date, the latter's content remains shrouded in mystery: only a few scattered fragments of it survive through later quotations,⁶ and its title is uncertain, as two versions of it are found in the sources that allude to it, namely, *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* and *Ṣaddhātusamīkṣā* (more precisely, these are two versions of the full title, since the work is also often referred to with abbreviated forms such as *Samīkṣā* and *Dhātusamīkṣā*).⁷ What this "examination" (*samīkṣā*) was really about is far from obvious at first sight, as the word *dhātu*, in a grammatical context, usually means 'verbal root', but if this is how it is to be interpreted here, the title *Ṣaddhātusamīkṣā* hardly makes sense (*ṣaṭ*^o means 'six', but there are thousands of roots in the Sanskrit language), while *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* ("an examination of the verbal roots of language") sounds oddly redundant—not to mention that the few fragments that have come down to us have nothing to do with verbal roots. And whatever the title of this work was, even its attribution to Bhartṛhari has recently been questioned.⁸

This article does not claim to answer all the vexed questions surrounding this intriguing lost work. Its goal is merely to clarify once and for all the issue of its title and to show, through the examination of a few thus far neglected references to it in later Indian philosophical literature, that even if no manuscript of it ever comes to light, we can still hope to obtain some precious informations on its content simply by paying attention to what its medieval readers had to say about it. Since to my knowledge, no attempt has been made so far to gather the known quotations from this text, a list of fragments is given below as an appendix.

WAS THE TITLE OF THE WORK ŚABDADHĀTUSAMĪKṢĀ OR ṢADDHĀTUSAMĪKṢĀ?

The remarks that first drew attention to this lost work ascribed to Bhartṛhari are found in the *Śivadrṣṭi* by Somānanda (c. 900–950) and its commentary (*Vṛtti*) by Utpaladeva (c. 925–975).⁹ The passages in question, which seem to be known to all the modern scholars who mention Bhartṛhari's lost *Samīkṣā*, occur immediately after Somānanda completes his lengthy criticism of Bhartṛhari's contention that ultimate reality is to be equated with the subtle level of speech (*vāc*) called Paśyantī.¹⁰ Somānanda then accuses Bhartṛhari of going well beyond his abilities as a mere grammarian when he claims to venture into metaphysical territory¹¹ and ends up displaying a sheer simulacrum of knowledge, which, Somānanda adds, he offers not only "here" (*iha*) but also in another work:

of ancient authors, including Yijing) is the fact that the fragments quoted by various Indian authors as belonging to this work are found in the manuscript (see, e.g., Iyer 1969: 4).

4. See Kosambi 1948: 78–79 and Bronkhorst 1994.

5. See Sarma 1940 (to my knowledge, this is the only paper thus far devoted to the work in question, at least according to its title; but in fact only two pages of this six-page long article really deal with it); Sastri 1959: 61; Frauwallner 1959: 113; Iyer 1969: 9–10; Torella 1994: xxvi–xxvii; Bronkhorst 1994: 38–39; Dyczkowski 1994: 293; Houben 1995: 7; Murti 1997: 14; Torella 2008: 513; Nemeč 2011: 60 and 200; Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011: 202; Torella 2014: 573; Nemeč 2016: 352.

6. It is of course quite possible that manuscripts of this text have survived somewhere but have not been spotted and examined yet.

7. See appendix below, under fragments 1, 2, and 7.

8. Bronkhorst 1994: 38–39.

9. See, e.g., Sarma (1940: 67), who, while briefly mentioning the *Śivadrṣṭivṛtti* passage, adds "this is the only reference to it that I have come across so far," after which the author, completely setting aside the issue of the *Samīkṣā*, proceeds to reject the attribution of the *Śatakatraya* to Bhartṛhari.

10. On this discussion see, e.g., Gnoli 1959, Torella 2008, Nemeč 2011, and Torella 2014.

11. This is probably a critical allusion to assertions such as the one found in *Vākyapadīya* 1.22cd: *tad vyākaraṇam āgamya paraṃ brahmādhigamyate* || "[Those who] have learnt grammar reach the Highest Brahman."

What is the point of [your] investigation of [soteriological] knowledge (*vijñānānveṣaṇa*) that has left the plane of grammar [and] is not an appropriate topic of discussion for you? [And it is] not only here [that you] have stated this pseudo-knowledge (*vijñānābhāsa*): [you have] also expressed it in the *Samikṣā*.¹²

Utpaladeva explains the passage in the following way:

Your investigation of the correct knowledge to be pursued with treatises that have liberation as their goal has “left the plane of grammar”—[grammar being] nothing but the activity of teaching the correct words that are the causes of the understanding of meaning —; [this investigation], which is “not appropriate for you,” [i.e., not appropriate] as a task for you, is useless! And not only has the learned Bhartṛhari stated this pseudo-correct knowledge precisely here, with this discourse on Paśyantī, but also in the *Śabdadhātusamikṣā*.¹³

In the 1934 Kashmir Series of Text and Studies (KSTS) edition of Utpaladeva’s *Vṛtti* (made on the basis of a single *śāradā* manuscript)¹⁴ as well as in the partial edition of the *Śivadrṣṭi* and *Vṛtti* thereon in a recent study by John Nemeč,¹⁵ the title is given as *Śabdadhātusamikṣā* (although none of the manuscripts used for the latter bears this reading);¹⁶ and most scholars have accepted this without discussion. Taking for granted that just like Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyaḥādīya* and his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, this work too must have dealt with language, they seem to have found the presence of the word *śabda* in the title entirely natural. The use of the word *dhātu*, however, seems to have caused a certain uneasiness since the usual meaning of ‘verbal root’ in a grammatical context did not seem relevant here, so that

12. *Śivadrṣṭi* 2.72-73ab: *vaiyākaraṇatām tyaktvā vijñānānveṣaṇena kim | bhavatām aprastutena na kevalam ihoditam || vijñānābhāsanam yāvāt samikṣāyām udāhṛtam |*

13. *Śivadrṣṭivṛtti*: 83–84: *arthapratītihetuśābdānuśāsanavyāpāram eva vaiyākaraṇatām tyaktvā mokṣaprayojanaiḥ śāstrair yat samyagjñānam anusaraṇīyaṃ tadanveṣaṇena bhavatām karaṇīyatvenāprastutena* na kiṃcīt. na kevalam cātraiva paśyantyaḥhidhānena samyagjñānābhāsa evokto yāvāt chabdadhātusamikṣāyām api vidvadbhartṛhariṇā. [* karaṇīyatvenāprastutena S2, S3, S4, KSTS Ed : akaraṇīyatvenāprastutena Nemeč 2011 (em.).]*

14. The other manuscript used for the KSTS edition (a *devanāgarī* “transcript” of a manuscript preserved in Madras) does not contain Utpaladeva’s commentary but only Somānanda’s stanzas (see the Preface to *Śivadrṣṭi*: i–ii). In Nemeč 2011: 81, the author explains that “all of [his] efforts to obtain a copy” of the “Srinagar manuscript” (a *śāradā* manuscript from the Research Library in Srinagar for which J. Nemeč gives no catalogue reference) “failed, due in no small part to the current political instability in the Kashmir Valley.” It should be noted in this respect that in fact several *śāradā* manuscripts containing Somānanda’s *Śivadrṣṭi* with Utpaladeva’s commentary are preserved in Srinagar: see S1, S2, and S3 in the bibliography below (S4 is in *devanāgarī*; all of these manuscripts were scanned by the National Mission for Manuscripts in 2005). It is very likely, however, that the *śāradā* manuscript on which the KSTS edition was based is none of the above, and that it is rather D3, which is now preserved at the National Archives of India (Delhi) and has been there since 1948: see Ratié forthcoming a, n. 49. As explained there, I could not study this manuscript in much detail during my last visit to the National Archives of India in 2012; besides, at the time I was pursuing a different line of research, so that regrettably it did not occur to me to check whether the manuscript did have the reading recorded in the KSTS edition for the title of the lost work ascribed to Bhartṛhari.

15. Nemeč 2011.

16. The *śāradā* manuscript J has the obviously corrupted reading *yāvāt chabdatusamikṣāyām*, the two *devanāgarī* manuscripts P and R read *yāvāt chabdasamikṣāyām*, and according to J. Nemeč, G (a *śāradā* manuscript preserved in Göttingen that I could not consult independently) has *yāvāt cha---tusamikṣāyām*. Nemeč (2011: 90) explains that “any reading in the manuscript that is missing due to damage to the physical manuscript, such as fraying at the ends of the folio in question, is marked with three dashes: ---,” so that it is not possible to know from this how many *akṣaras* are missing; one also wonders whether this was an attempted correction, or just “fraying at the ends of the folio.” Among the Srinagar manuscripts that were not consulted by Nemeč, S3 shares the KSTS reading, while S2 and S4 p.c. have *yāvāt chabdasamikṣāyām* (*yām* S4 a.c.; the missing text, *yāvāt chabdasamikṣā*^o, was added in the right margin; the passage is not preserved in S1).

the vague meaning of ‘root-cause’ was preferred among the few historians who ventured an explanation of the title. Thus K. A. Subramania Iyer:

The name of the work is in accordance with the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. The name of the work means: Investigation into the word as the *dhātu*, that is, the root-cause (the Ultimate Reality). This title agrees with Bhartṛhari’s *Śabdādvaīta*, the doctrine that the ultimate Reality from which the universe proceeds is of the nature of the word.¹⁷

Mulakaluri Srimannarayana Murti makes similar remarks:

Somānanda . . . remarked that Bhartṛhari has also dealt with . . . the higher knowledge about the ultimate reality, transgressing the limits of the grammarian in this book which is meant for explaining the forms of the noun and the verb. For Bhartṛhari *śabdadhātu-samikṣā* means an inquiry into the root cause (*dhātu*) of *śabda*, i.e. Śabdabrahman, the Ultimate reality, corresponding to what was expounded in the *Brahma-kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. Therefore all the works of Bhartṛhari are based on one principle that Vyākaraṇa is intimately connected with the Ultimate reality, namely Śabdabrahman, besides explaining the form of words in Sanskrit.¹⁸

More recently, other scholars (Johannes Bronkhorst, John Nemeč, Mark Dyczkowski), although aware that there is another version of the work’s title, have chosen to keep using the one found in the KSTS edition.¹⁹ This is rather surprising, since in 1994 Raffaele Torella had already published a book²⁰ in which he noted that two different titles are attributed to the work: in the *Spandapradīpikā*, a commentary on the *Spandakārikā* by Bhāgavatopala/Utpalavaiṣṇava²¹—another Kashmirian author who must have lived slightly later than Utpaladeva²²—the title of the work is said to be the *Ṣaḍdhāṭusamikṣā*;²³ and according to Torella, this latter form of the title is certainly the correct one.

Torella’s reason for preferring the second version²⁴ is to be found in the sequel of Utpaladeva’s commentary on the *Śivadṛṣṭi*. For according to Somānanda,²⁵ Bhartṛhari cannot rightfully claim—as he does in a verse of his *Samikṣā* quoted by Somānanda himself and

17. Iyer 1969: 10. Note that some further remarks by this author seem to indicate that Iyer was not as entirely certain of the meaning of the word *dhātu* in this title as he seems to be here (ibid.): “It may not be out of place to mention that the presence of the word *dhātu* in the title of the work reminds one of the titles of some Buddhist works such as *Dharmadhātupraveśa*, *Saviśuddhadharmadhātujñāna* and *Vajradhātumaṇḍala*. The significance, if any, of this resemblance has yet to be determined.”

18. Murti 1997: 14.

19. See, e.g., Bronkhorst 1994: 39 n. 10: “Professor Raffaele Torella informs me that there are good reasons to believe that this work was rather called *Ṣaḍdhāṭusamikṣā*”; yet Bronkhorst uses the title *Śabdadhāṭusamikṣā* throughout the paper. Dyczkowski, although aware that Bhāgavatopala calls the work *Ṣaḍdhāṭusamikṣā*, mentions the *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti* passage and the title *Śabdadhāṭusamikṣā*, merely adding (Dyczkowski 1994: 293) “there seems no reason to doubt that this was another name for this work,” and quoting (ibid.: en. 129) the remarks on this title in Iyer 1969. As for Nemeč (2011: 59, 67, 200, and 202), as far as I can see in this work he betrays no awareness of any variant in the title, but a few years later Nemeč (2016: 352–53) notes (n. 28) that “Torella has suggested that one should rather understand the title of this work to be the *Ṣaḍdhāṭusamikṣā*”; yet the author keeps using the title *Śabdadhāṭusamikṣā*.

20. Torella 1994.

21. On the name of this author see Torella 2016: 425, n. 1.

22. See Sanderson 2009: 109.

23. See appendix, under fragment 6 (the same author also refers to this work as the *Dhāṭusamikṣā*, see ibid., under fragment 2). According to the *Spandapradīpikā* edition, all the consulted manuscripts bear the reading *Ṣaḍ*°.

24. See Torella 1994: xxvi–xxvii n. 39, and Torella 2014: 573.

25. *Śivadṛṣṭi* 2.74c: *anantasyānubhūtiḥ kā . . .* || “What experience can there be of this infinite [nature]?” I take the rest of the half-verse (*paricchedaṃ vināṭmanah*) as going with the first words of the next verse (*anante’vagamaḥ kutra . . .*), according to *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti*: 86 (*tathā hy āṭmanah svarūpasya paricchedam iyatāṃ vinānante vastuni kutrāṃśe’vagamō’stu . . .*).

that appears to have been the *maṅgala* verse of the work²⁶—that reality, “the body of which is nothing but an infinite (*ananta*) consciousness that is unlimited by place, time and [form],” can only be grasped through “one’s own experience.” According to Utpaladeva, such an experience is impossible for the following reason:

Since [this] is a pluralistic doctrine (*bhedavāda*), given that [its proponent] accepts six elements (*dhātuṣaṭka*), the association [of the reality that he praises] with space and time is inevitable; therefore the infinity (*anantatva*) [that the verse ascribes to the ultimate reality] should [rather] be called a limitation by space and time!²⁷ And therefore what experience could there be of [this entity supposedly] unlimited by place and time? [Somānanda] means that their relation is impossible.²⁸

Utpaladeva is making clear here that the work in question bore its title because its author admitted six *dhātus*,²⁹ and as already emphasized by Torella, this shows that we should discard the KSTS reading *Śabdadhātusamikṣā* as the *lectio facilior*³⁰—*facilior* because when it comes to Bhartṛhari, we immediately expect a reference to language, and also because the six *dhātus* mentioned in passing in Utpaladeva’s *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti* do not seem to be reminiscent of any notion found in the *Vākyapadīya*. It is very probable that for these two reasons, the reading *Śaḍdhātusamikṣā* was later felt to be defective and wrongly corrected into *Śabdadhātusamikṣā*.

But this passage in Utpaladeva’s *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti* is not the only piece of evidence that the Śaiva nondualists who lived in Kashmir around the end of the first millennium CE undoubtedly knew this work under the title *Śaḍdhātusamikṣā*. As explained below, in a recently discovered and edited fragment of his lost *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*, Utpaladeva alludes to some “proponents of the theory of the six elements” (*śaḍdhātuvādin*), and Abhinavagupta

26. For this verse see appendix, fragment 1.

27. This is a difficult passage and I am not certain whether my understanding of it is correct. According to Torella 2014: 573, the compound *deśakālaparyavasānam* may be a corruption for *deśakālaparyavasānam*, and *ity anantatvaṃ deśakālaparyavasānam ucyeta* can be understood as “so, endlessness must be understood as an absence of spatial and temporal limits.” The emendation is elegant. I wonder, however, if here Utpaladeva is not rather criticizing the quoted verse, according to which reality is both infinite (*ananta*) and unlimited by space, time, etc. (*deśakāladāyanavacchinnā*), by saying that since its author admits that reality is made of six different *dhātus*, instead of asserting that it is unlimited by space and time, he should acknowledge that it is associated with differences, including spatial and temporal ones: the so-called infinity of the ultimate consciousness talked about in the verse under scrutiny cannot be experienced, not only because—as Somānanda’s verse and the sequel of Utpaladeva’s commentary point out—there can be no apprehension of an infinite reality in the finite sphere of experience, but also because the ultimate consciousness cannot truly be infinite, i.e., unlimited by space and time, in a system that allows for six elements and therefore rejects nonduality. In any case, as pointed out by Torella, the accusation of *bhedavāda* here can only be directed at the author of the *Samikṣā*, and “Utpaladeva here gives indirect voice to an unspoken criticism of the contradiction found in this work, which presents a non-dualistic and absolutistic approach while containing in its very title the admission of a plurality of principles.”

28. *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti*: 86: *dhātuṣaṭkopagamād bhedavāde deśakālayogo’vaśyambhāvity anantatvaṃ deśakālaparyavasānam* ucyeta, atāś cāparyavasitadeśakālasya** kānubhūtir*** na tayoḥ saṃbandho yukta ity arthaḥ. [*deśakālaparyavasānam S2, S4, KSTS Ed, Nemeč 2011: om. S3: deśakālaparyavasānam em. Torella 2014. **ucyeta, atāś cāparyavasitadeśakālasya S2, S4, KSTS Ed, Nemeč 2011: daśakālasya S3. ***kānubhūtir S2, S3, S4, Nemeč 2011 : sānubhūtir KSTS Ed.]*

29. As noted in Torella 2014, the interpretation offered in Nemeč 2011: 202 n. 371—according to which the “dualists” referred to by Utpaladeva are Naiyāyikas—makes no sense since it is still the opening verse of the *Samikṣā* that is being criticized. Note that the footnote from the KSTS edition on which Nemeč’s interpretation is based (*naiyāyikādimate*) is most probably not Kaul’s (as assumed in Nemeč 2011, *ibid.*), but rather comes from an old marginal annotation in the *śāradā* manuscript used by Kaul when he edited the text (on this *śāradā* manuscript see n. 14 above).

30. Torella 2014: 573.

explains in his commentary that in that passage Utpaladeva is targetting “the author of the *Ṣaddhātusamikṣā*” (*ṣaddhātusamikṣākāra*);³¹ moreover, earlier in his commentary on Utpaladeva’s *Vivṛti*, Abhinavagupta already mentions the *Samikṣā*, which he also explicitly ascribes to Bhartṛhari (*tatrabhavant*).³² And as will be seen below, in both passages of his *Vivṛtivismarsinī*, Abhinavagupta specifies that these six *dhātus* are to be understood as 5+1 elements. This is an important point, because it enables us to rule out once and for all the hypothesis of a corruption of the word *Śabda*^o into *Ṣaṭ*^o in these texts: the reading *Ṣaddhātusamikṣā* must have been prior to the reading *Śabdadhātusamikṣā*.

WHAT ARE THE KNOWN FRAGMENTS ABOUT?

Now, what are the fragments of this work about? The verses of which I am aware³³ defend a nondualistic view according to which reality is, as the already mentioned fragment 1 says, an infinite consciousness (*cit*) that is unlimited or uninterrupted by “place, time, etc.” (*dikkālādi*) and that can only be known through “one’s own experience” or “the experience of oneself” (*svānubhūti*).

That the *brahman* is in fact free of temporal and spatial sequence is of course an idea that is strongly asserted by Bhartṛhari from the very outset of his *magnum opus*;³⁴ and the same work also states that the whole content of our ordinary experiences, although affected by temporal and spatial limitations, is in fact nothing but the *brahman*, which remains in and of itself free of these limitations.³⁵

31. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarsinī*, vol. II: 131 (see n. 67 below).

32. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarsinī*, vol. I: 93 (see n. 69 below).

33. See appendix; I have not come across any prose passage quoted as belonging to the *Samikṣā*.

34. The *brahman* is said to be “beginningless and endless” (*anādinidhana*) in *Vākyapadīya* 1.1, and *Vṛtti*: 2–3 comments: *kālabhedadarśanābhyāsenā mūrtivibhāgabdhāvanayā ca vyavahārānupātibhir dharmādharmaīḥ sarvāsv avasthāsv anāśritādinidhanam brahma . . .* “The *brahman*, which, in all conditions, receives no beginning or end from the properties and absences of properties that ensue in the realm of ordinary practice (*vyavahāra*) from the repeated apprehensions of temporal differences and from the notion of the [spatial] distinction between material forms . . .”

35. According to *Vākyapadīya* 1.1, it is the *brahman* that “appears in the form of objects” (*arthabhāvena vivartate*). *Vṛtti*: 8–9 explains: *ekasya tattvād apracyutasya bhedānukāreṇāsatyavibhaktānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartaḥ*. “Apparent transformation (*vivarta*) is the fact that what is one and does not lose its reality takes on other forms that are distinct [from each other] and unreal by seemingly acquiring (*anukāra*) difference.” See also, e.g., *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.8: *vikalparūpaṃ bhajate tattvam evāvikalpitam | na cātra kālabhedo’sti kālabhedaś ca gṛhyate* || “Reality itself takes on the form of conceptual distinctions (*vikalpa*) [whereas in fact it remains] free of conceptual distinctions; and in it there is no temporal differentiation, and [yet] temporal differentiation is apprehended [in it].” Divisions, and particularly temporal ones, are due to ignorance (*avidyā*) and disappear when one recovers the true knowledge of reality, as is pointed out in *Vākyapadīya* 3.9.62cd: *prathamam tad avidyāyām yad vidyāyām na vidyate* || “This [vision of time] that is first and foremost (*prathama*) in [the realm of] ignorance is not found at all in [that of] knowledge.” Cf. Helārāja’s *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, vol. II: 64: *ata evaitat kāladarśanam avidyāyām saṃsārahetubhūtāyām prathamam bhedāvbhāsamayo hi saṃsārah, bhedaś ca deśakālābhyām, tatra ca kālabhedo jagatsrṣṭer ādyaḥ. akramā hi paśyantirūpā saṃvit prāṇavṛttim upārūdhā kālātanā pariḡrhitakrameva cakāsti . . .* “For this very reason this vision of time is first and foremost in [the realm of] ignorance, which is the cause of the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsāra*); for the cycle of rebirths consists in differentiated phenomena, and difference [occurs] through space and time; and among them, temporal differentiation comes before the [phenomenal] world’s creation. For consciousness (*saṃvit*) in the form of [the subtle level of speech called] Paśyanti is free of sequence (*akrama*), [yet] when associated with breath activity (*prāṇavṛtti*), it is manifest as if it had acquired sequence in the form of time.” In fact, however, the *brahman* remains perfectly free of any temporal limitation (ibid.: 65): *niṣkramam hi brahmatattvam vidyāmayam akālakalitam avidyāvaśāt kramarūpopagraheṇa yathāyatham vivartate . . .* “For the reality that is the *brahman*, which is devoid of sequence, remains temporally unaffected [inasmuch as it is] full of knowledge; [yet] due to ignorance, it appears (*vivartate*) in a gradual way due to its taking on a sequential form.”

Admittedly, according to Bronkhorst, the content of fragment 1 is in conflict with Bhartṛhari's philosophy as it is found in the stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya*,³⁶ since the latter never identify the *brahman* with consciousness,³⁷ so that the *Samīkṣā* "can hardly be accepted as having been composed by the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari."³⁸ It seems to me, however, that at least some of the verses in the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* can lend themselves to an interpretation that equates speech (and therefore reality or the *brahman*) with consciousness,³⁹ and this is at any rate how the Śaiva nondualists⁴⁰ or their contemporary Helārāja⁴¹ read them. Most importantly, even if the tenth- and eleventh-century Śaiva authors mentioned above were wrong in attributing the *Samīkṣā* to the author of the *Vākyapadīya*, there must have been some doctrinal grounds that enabled this identification: the Śaivas, who knew Bhartṛhari's thought very well, could not have assumed that this work was Bhartṛhari's if they had failed to notice any resemblance with the theses defended in the *Vākyapadīya*, or at least with their interpretation in its commentaries. So in what follows, without assuming anything as to the actual authorship of the *Samīkṣā*, I would like to highlight a few more ideas that appear to be shared by the *Samīkṣā* and the *Vākyapadīya* as explained in the available commentaries.

Fragment 2 in the appendix below is about the Self (*ātman*) having the status of an object of knowledge (*meya*) because it appears as if it were "variegated due to ignorance" (*avidyāśabala*), so that this Self fails to grasp its own (subjective and/or unitary) nature. The verse can certainly be understood in several ways, and the lack of context makes any interpretation somewhat risky; in any case it brings to mind the statements in the *Vākyapadīya* to the effect that subject, object, and knowledge/experience are in fact one single reality that only appears to be differentiated, just like a dreamer's consciousness that presents itself in the form of other selves and objects and fails to recognize its own Self in this variety.⁴²

36. Bronkhorst is of the opinion that the *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* is not by Bhartṛhari himself (see n. 2 above).

37. Bronkhorst 1992: 58 ("jamais dans les strophes du *Vākyapadīya* le Brahman—qui apparaît sous nombre de désignations différentes—n'est identifié à la conscience") and n. 12.

38. Bronkhorst 1994: 39.

39. See in particular *Vākyapadīya* 1.115–16 and 118: *na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād rte | anuvidham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate || vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāsvatī | na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī || . . . saīṣā saṃsāriṇāṃ sañjñā bahir antaś ca vartate | tanmātram avyatīkrāntaṃ caitanyaṃ sarvajātiṣu ||* "In this world, no apprehension occurs without conforming to speech: every cognition is manifest as if it were pervaded by speech. If consciousness lost its eternal nature of speech, the manifesting consciousness (*prakāśa*) could not be manifest—for it is [this nature of speech] that enables reflective awareness (*pratyavamarśinī*) . . . It is this [nature of speech] that exists as the internal and external consciousness of transmigrating individuals: in all species [of living beings], consciousness (*caitanya*) is nothing but this [nature of speech] and does not exist beyond it."

40. See, e.g., Abhinavagupta, *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavivṛtivismarśinī*, vol. I: 212–13.

41. On Helārāja's conviction that Bhartṛhari's *brahman* is a consciousness (*saṃvit*) equated with the Paśyanti level of speech, see, e.g., *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*, vol. II: 64, quoted above, n. 35.

42. See, e.g., *Vākyapadīya* 1.4: *ekasya sarvabhījasya yasya ceyam anekadhā | bhoktrbhoktavayarūpeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthītī ||* "The [*brahman*], which is one and contains seeds of everything, and which exists in various forms—that of the experiencing subject and of the experienced object, as well as that of experience . . ." Cf. *Vṛtti*: 21–22: *ekasya hi brahmaṇas tattvānyatvābhyāṃ* sattvāsattvābhyāṃ cāniruktāvirodhīśaktiyupagrāhyasyā-satayarūpapravibhāgasya svapnavijñānapuruṣavad abahistattvāḥ** parasparavilakṣaṇā bhoktrbhoktavayabhogagranthayo*** vivartante. tasya ca granthyantararūpasamatikrameṇa vivṛttagranthiparicchedasayeyam anekadhā loke vyavahāravayavasthā prakalpate. [*tattvānyatvābhyāṃ corr. : tattvānyatvābhyāṃ Ed. **abahistattvāḥ conj. (cf. Paddhati: 22) : bahistattvāḥ Ed. ***bhoktrbhoktavayabhogagranthayo corr.: bhoktrbhoktrvyabhogagranthayo Ed.]* "For the segments (*granthi*) [into which reality seems to be divided, namely] the experiencing subject, the experienced object, and experience, appear as distinct from each other [whereas] they have no external reality, just like a man in a dreaming consciousness; [they] belong to the *brahman*, which is one and supports powers that are not

The latter idea is explicitly stated in fragment 7 of the *Samikṣā*, which specifies that only *māyā* produces such forms as “cognitions, objects of cognition, and so on” (*jñānajñeyādī*). It might also be worth noting in this respect that Utpaladeva, in his commentary on the *Śivadrṣṭi*, explains that in Bhartṛhari’s system the Madhyamā and Vaikharī planes of language—and therefore of reality—are insentient (that is to say, they really belong to the realm of objects) “insofar as their forms are variegated due to ignorance” (*avidyāśabalarūpatayā*),⁴³ an expression that clearly echoes *avidyāśabala* in fragment 2.⁴⁴

Fragment 7 states that reality (*tattva*), which is pure (*śuddha*), cannot be the cause of the phenomenal display (*prapañca*) because then this phenomenal display could never disappear, its cause being ever present, so that only *māyā* can be responsible for it; yet fragments 3 and 4 insist that ignorance (*avidyā*) is not a positive entity or a real thing (*vastu*)—if it were, reality would not be one, as something would exist besides the *brahman*. The idea is in keeping with the *Vākyapadīya*’s assertion that even what we consider to be unreal is ultimately nothing but the Brahman itself,⁴⁵ and it brings to mind Helārāja’s remarks to the effect that if the unreality that constitutes *prapañca*⁴⁶ were something besides the Brahman, the very principle of nondualism would be lost.⁴⁷

contradictory, nor expressible as either identical with or different from [it, or even] as existing or as nonexistent. And in the world, [we] imagine its existence in the realm of ordinary practice as differentiated, [whereas] this [*brahman*] displays the separation between these segments [precisely] by transcending the form of these differentiated segments.” (Regarding the word *granthi*—literally, ‘knot’—Vṛṣabhadeva is of the opinion that it means a ‘modification’, *vikāra*, as can be seen, e.g., in *Paddhati*: 10: *granthiśabdah . . . vikāravacanaḥ . . .* “The word *granthi* means *vikāra* . . .”; however, the term also denotes the joints of a bamboo cane for instance, and it seems that in this context it refers to something that appears to be both distinct and connected with other distinct entities.) See also *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.14: *tasya śabdārthasambandharūpam ekasya dṛśyate | tad dṛśyaṃ darśanaṃ draṣṭā darśane ca prayojanam* || “[We] see that what consists in the word, the meaning, and their relation belongs to this one [reality]—it is the perceived object, perception, the perceiving subject, and the goal of perceiving.” See also *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, vol. I: 117: . . . *draṣṭṛdṛśyarūpatayā ca tasyaiva vivartaḥ. tayā hi dṛśyaṃ tāvad bhāvajātaṃ saṃvidrūpārūḍham. vedyamānaikatvād eva vedanaikaparamāṛtham, aprakāśasya prakāśamānatāyogād iti pūrvakāṇḍe dvayasiddhau ca vītatya vicāritam. draṣṭāpi jīvātmā avidyākṛtāvachchedo niyataḥ saṃsārī bhoktā brahmaiva cetanatvād bhāvato bhedanūpapatter iti tatraivāveditam.* “It is this same [one reality] that appears (*vivarta*) in the form of the perceiving subject and perceived object. For to begin with, due to this [appearance in this double form], the ‘perceived object’—[that is to say,] all the objective entities—rests on the form of consciousness (*saṃvit*); [and] it has as its ultimate reality nothing but consciousness, because it is one with what is being cognized, since what is not the manifesting consciousness (*prakāśa*) cannot have the status of what is being manifested: this has been explained in detail in the [*Vākyapadīya*]’s first *Kāṇḍa* and in [my] *Advayasiddhi*. As for the ‘perceiving subject,’ [that is to say,] the Self who is a conscious individual (*jīvātman*), the transmigrating subject who is bound [insofar as it is] limited by ignorance, the experiencing subject—it is nothing but the *brahman*, because given that it is conscious (*cetana*), due to its [very] nature [it] cannot be differentiated—this has been explained in the same [works].” On Helārāja’s lost *Advayasiddhi*, see, e.g., Iyer 1969: 38 and Vergiani 2016: 587 n. 157.

43. *Śivadrṣṭivṛtti*: 82: *tan madhyamādeḥ savibhāgatvena dvaitāvasthāne saty avidyāśabalarūpatayā jaḍatvāt . . .* “So given that [according to you], the Madhyamā and [Vaikharī planes] belong to the condition of duality inasmuch as they have parts, [and] since they are insentient insofar as their forms are variegated due to ignorance . . .”

44. Utpaladeva also glosses Somānanda’s assertion in *Śivadrṣṭi* 2.38 that Bhartṛhari’s Madhyamā level of speech is variegated (*śabala*) with the words *bhinnagrāhyācchuritā*, “covered with apprehended objects that are differentiated” (*Śivadrṣṭivṛtti*: 60).

45. *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.7: *na tattvātattvayor bheda iti vṛddhebhya āgamah | atattvam iti manyante tattvam evāvicāritam* || “The authoritative tradition that has come down (*āgama*) from the elders is that there is no difference between being real (*tattva*) and being unreal (*atattva*): what [we usually] consider to be unreal is nothing but reality that has not been thoroughly examined [yet].”

46. Helārāja glosses *atattvam* in *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.7 (for which see n. 45 above) with *prapañcaḥ* (*Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, vol. I: 112, l. 10).

47. *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*, vol. I: 112: *ayam atrārthaḥ. nehādvaitanaye satyāsatyē dve rūpe staḥ, advaitahānīprasaṅgāt. kintu pāramārthikam ekam evādvayaṃ tattvam. tac cānādisiddhāvidyāvīlāsitasahaṃ pramātr-*

Fragments 3 and 4 also point out that ignorance, since it has no existence of its own, cannot perform any destruction (*nāśa*) or modification (*vikāra*) that would affect reality in any way, an idea that echoes Bhartṛhari's statement that *vikāras* do not belong to reality although the latter *appears* to be affected by them,⁴⁸ since reality is precisely what remains once all transient modifications are set aside.⁴⁹ Fragment 5 concludes—apparently from the idea expressed in fragments 3 and 4,⁵⁰ and just as Helārāja will⁵¹—that only the conscious individual (*jīva*) is bound by ignorance, while the Highest Self (*paramātman*) remains unaffected by bondage and liberation; and according to fragment 6, this “absolutely tranquil” reality is, contrary to bound individuals, free of all acts (*karman*), the latter being the cause of *samsāra*.

WAS THE SAMĪKṢĀ ABOUT PAŚYANTĪ?

So three things at least are beyond doubt:

1. The lost work to which several Śaiva authors active in the tenth and eleventh centuries allude, and which they explicitly ascribe to Bhartṛhari, was known to them as the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā*;
2. this work was decidedly nondualistic in that it asserted the existence of a single *brahman* consisting of nothing but an infinite consciousness unlimited by place and time;
3. yet it somehow also made room for the existence of six elements (*dhātu*)—and the Śaiva nondualists ridicule this as proof of its author's inconsistency.

It is very difficult to say anything else about the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā* on the mere basis of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* and its commentary. Some modern scholars have assumed, from Somānanda's criticism of the *Vākyapadīya* before he turns to the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā*, that the latter must also have presented the subtle level of speech (*vāc*) called Paśyantī as the highest reality. This was the case of Iyer:

viśayatayā yathātattvam anavabhāsamānam ity anekavikalpaparighaṭitākārārūpatayā vyavahāram avatarati. tathā ca tad evākāranānāvtonnīyamānasvarūpabhedam cakāsti, nānyat, tadvyatirikṣyānyasyābhāvāt. “This is the meaning of this [verse 3.2.7]: in this nondualistic system, there are not two forms that would be [respectively] real and unreal, because [otherwise] as a consequence nonduality would be annihilated. Rather, there is only one ultimate reality that is nondual. And this [unique reality, since it is] capable of appearing as the [various] objects of [various] knowing subjects due to an ignorance the existence of which is beginningless, is not manifest as [it] really [is]; so it descends into the realm of ordinary practice (*vyavahāra*) in the form of aspects that are produced by numerous conceptual constructs. And thus only this [reality] is manifest [as] possessed of a differentiated nature brought about by this multiplicity of aspects—and nothing else [is manifest], because there is nothing else that would be distinct from it.”

48. See *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.9–10: *yathā viśayadharmānām jñāne'tyantam asambhavaḥ | tadātmeva ca tat siddham atyantam atadātmakam || tathā vikārarūpānām tattve'tyantam asambhavaḥ | tadātmeva ca tat tattvam atyantam atadātmakam ||* “Just as properties [that belong to insentient] objects cannot exist at all in consciousness, and [yet] this [consciousness], which is established not to consist in these [properties] at all, appears as though it consisted in them; in the same way, forms that [are subjected to] modification (*vikāra*) cannot exist at all in reality (*tattva*), and [yet] this reality, which does not consist at all in these [forms], appears as though it consisted in them.”

49. See *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.11, quoted below, n. 96.

50. Note that fragment 5 is quoted immediately after fragment 4 by Bhāgavatotpala in *Spandapradīpikā*: 5.

51. Cf. *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* ad *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.5, vol. I: 110: *yathāvaraṇādindriyaśaiva prakāśaśaktiḥ pratibadhyate na viśayo vikriyate tathānādyavidyāvachchedaprakalpitavibhāgānām jīvānām eva saṃvedanaśaktir niyamate . . .* “Just as it is only a sense organ's power of manifesting that is blocked [when someone] covers it for instance, [but for all that] the object [itself] is not modified (*vikriyate*), in the same way, it is only the conscious individuals' (*jīva*) power of consciousness that is restricted, [these conscious individuals] being [limited] parts [of reality] (*vibhāga*) that are [in fact merely] imagined [to be thus limited] due to the separation [that results from] beginningless ignorance.”

Somānanda criticizes Bhartṛhari for straying away from the main task of a grammarian . . . He further says that Bhartṛhari has done this, not only in the *Vākyapadīya* but also in his *Samikṣā* where he has set forth the so-called higher knowledge, namely, *Paśyantī* . . . Utpala is very definite about Bhartṛhari being the author of a work called *Śabdadhātusamikṣā* which like the *Vākyapadīya*, spoke about *Paśyantī* as that higher knowledge which leads to liberation . . . It is clear from the way in which Somānanda and Utpaladeva speak about it that they knew it to be a work of Bhartṛhari and to deal with *Śabdādvaita*.⁵²

Iyer reiterates this assertion a few pages later:

Somānanda criticizes Bhartṛhari for straying away from his function of being a grammarian and indulging in the quest for true knowledge not only in his *Vākyapadīya* but also in his (*Śabdadhātu*)*samikṣā* . . . While explaining this portion of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*, Utpala says that the learned Bhartṛhari, by speaking about *Paśyantī* only, has propounded a mere semblance of knowledge and quotes two verses⁵³ from the *Śabdadhātusamikṣā* . . .⁵⁴

In fact, however, neither Somānanda nor Utpaladeva explicitly states that the *Samikṣā* dealt with *Paśyantī*, or for that matter with any linguistic issue dealt with in the *Vākyapadīya*: the passages quoted above⁵⁵ can be understood without any reference to the levels of speech (or even language in general), and they can be read as merely accusing Bhartṛhari of having displayed his pseudo-knowledge about soteriological matters not only in the *Vākyapadīya* but also in the *Samikṣā*. One might even wonder whether what Somānanda meant with the opposition “not only here . . . but also in the *Samikṣā*” was not something like: not only in Bhartṛhari’s grammatical works, but also in a work such as the *Samikṣā* that does not concern itself with grammatical issues. This, of course, is a mere possibility, but one that can hardly be ruled out on the basis of the scant amount of information at our disposal.

WHAT ARE THE SIX *DHĀTUS*?

Now, what are the six *dhātus* of which the work is supposedly an examination? Unfortunately, none of the fragments listed below contains the word *dhātu* or mentions a set of six entities that might be identified with these *dhātus*, so that we are left with no choice but to try and guess what they may have been.

Torella—the only scholar who had so far adopted the thesis that the work was about six *dhātus*—suggests with some skepticism that the *Samikṣā* might have been an examination of the six Vaiśeṣika categories (*padārtha*), while rightly noting that the use of the word *dhātu* in this sense seems particularly odd.⁵⁶

There are, however, several Indian traditional lists of six “elements” called *dhātus*; they usually include the five material elements or *bhūtas* (earth, water, fire, air, ether) plus a sixth element described as consciousness (*vijñāna*, *cetanā*) or the Self (*ātman*). Such lists are

52. Iyer 1969: 9–10 (emphasis mine).

53. In fact Utpaladeva only quotes one verse from the *Samikṣā*: the one that appears immediately above it in the KSTS edition is Somānanda’s (see appendix, B3).

54. Iyer 1969: 13 (emphasis mine). This passage is quoted in Bronkhorst 1994: 38 (my apologies for wrongly ascribing it to Bronkhorst himself in a previous version of this article). See also the remarks quoted above in Murti 1997: 14.

55. See nn. 12 and 13.

56. Torella 1994: xxvii n. 39: “This work may possibly have been an examination of the six Vaiśeṣika categories (even though I am not aware of any other occurrence of the term *dhātu* in the sense of *padārtha*.” Cf. Torella 2014: 573: “It is true that the number of six may remind us of the number of categories in classical Vaiśeṣika, but, at least to my knowledge, the term *dhātu* was never used in this sense in Vaiśeṣika literature.”

found in Buddhist sources⁵⁷ as well as in medical literature,⁵⁸ and the *Carakasamhitā* also ascribes a sixfold *dhātu* typology to some “old Sāṅkhya [proponents]” (*sāṅkhyair ādyaiḥ*).⁵⁹

In this connection it should be noted that Bronkhorst seems to have entertained the possibility that the *Samīkṣā* might have had to do with the Buddhist theory of the six *dhātus*.⁶⁰ Yet one wonders why Bhartṛhari, whose *Vākyapadīya* is a profoundly Brahmanical work, should have adopted such a typology, unless of course his *Samīkṣā* was a *critical* examination. The hypothesis brings to mind the Buddhist tradition of *parīkṣās* (thus Dharmakīrti’s *Sambandhaparīkṣā* contains a fierce criticism of the Brahmanical views on relation), and one could suspect that this *samīkṣā* similarly endeavored to refute a Buddhist theory of six elements (perhaps while humorously mimicking the Buddhist philosophical genre of *parīkṣās*). Yet this is entirely at odds with Utpaladeva’s testimony, as the latter criticizes Bhartṛhari for his acceptance (*upagama*)⁶¹ of the six *dhātus*, which would make no sense if the *Samīkṣā* were only intended as a refutation of the Buddhist *śaḍdhātus*.

As for the hypotheses that the *Samīkṣā* might have dealt with the medical list of *dhātus* or that which was supposedly accepted by ancient Sāṅkhya authors—it sounds more probable, all the more since Bhartṛhari was undoubtedly acquainted with medical literature.⁶² Yet one fails to see any obvious connection with the metaphysical and epistemological principles expounded in the *Vākyapadīya*, and one might therefore feel inclined to adopt Torella’s conclusion in his 2014 article to the effect that “what Bhartṛhari must have meant by these ‘six essences’ we are not in a position to know”:⁶³ indeed, the *Śivadrṣṭi* and *Śivadrṣṭivṛtti* do not contain enough clues for us to determine what the six *dhātus* in question might have been.

THE ŚAḌDHĀTUVĀDINS IN UTPALADEVA’S ĪŚVARAPRATYABHIJÑĀVIVṚTI AND ABHINAVAGUPTA’S COMMENTARY THEREON: ON DHĀTUS AND INDRIYAS

There are, however, other important testimonies regarding the content of the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā*. Thus in a recently discovered fragment of his *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*,⁶⁴ Utpaladeva alludes to some “proponents of the theory of the six elements” (*śaḍdhātuvādin*).

57. On the Buddhist *śaḍdhātus*, see, e.g., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, chapter 1: 28 on *Abhidharmakośa* 1.27: *ya ime tatra śaḍ dhātava uktāḥ pṛthivīdhātur abdhātus tejodhātur vāyudhātur ākāśadhātur vijñānadhātuh . . .* “In this regard, the six elements are said to be the elements of earth, water, fire, air, ether, and consciousness (*vijñāna*).” Cf. La Vallée Poussin 1923: 49 n. 2 for sources (including the *Śīkṣāsamuccaya*, on which see also n. 60 below).

58. See, e.g., *Carakasamhitā*, Śarīrasthāna 4.6: 316: *garbhas tu khalv antarikṣāvāyavnitoyabhūmivikārasa cetanādhiṣṭhānabhūtaḥ. evam anayā yuktyā pañcamabhūtavikārasamudāyātmako garbhasa cetanādhiṣṭhānabhūtaḥ, sa hy asya śaṣṭho dhātur uktaḥ*. “But surely, the embryo is a modification (*vikāra*) of ether, air, fire, water, and earth, [and it] is the seat of consciousness (*cetana/cetanā*); thus according to this reasoning, the embryo consists in a combination of modifications of the five elements [and] is the seat of consciousness, for it has been said that this [consciousness] is the [embryo]’s sixth element.” On the five elements to which *cetanā* is added in medical literature, see, e.g., Filliozat 1964: 26–27 and 27 n. 1; see also Roṣu 1978: 161 (on the term *śaḍdhātuka* understood as comprising the five usual elements plus *cetanā*) and Bronkhorst 2002: 117, which quotes the *Carakasamhitā* passage mentioned above and suggests that this theory was imported from Buddhist sources.

59. The list includes the five usual elements and the *ātman*: see Motegi 2013: 46 and n. 39.

60. As far as I know this hypothesis is found nowhere in Bronkhorst’s publications, but see Torella 1994: xxvii n. 39, which mentions the possibilities that it may have been either an examination of the Vaiśeṣika’s *padārthas* “or (J. Bronkhorst’s personal communication) of the six *dhātus* mentioned in Buddhist works, such as the *Śīkṣāsamuccaya*.”

61. See n. 28 above.

62. As already pointed out in Kielhorn 1883.

63. Torella 2014: 573.

64. On the fragment in which Utpaladeva alludes to the *śaḍdhātuvādins*, see Ratié forthcoming a. On recent discoveries regarding *Vivṛti* fragments, see Ratié 2017 and forthcoming b.

The allusion occurs in the course of a discussion on the existence of sense organs (*indriya*) understood as instruments of perception that are utterly imperceptible but must be inferred in order to account for the fact of perception. In this connection Utpaladeva mentions two currents of thought that claim to explain perception without assuming the existence of distinct entities called *indriyas*:

For it is not [universally acknowledged that] no [perception] at all can be accounted for without speculating about the [imperceptible] sense organs (*indriya*); thus some propound the theory of the six elements while not taking the sense organs into account in any way, [and] others⁶⁵ defend the theory of the two [sorts of combinations of four elements—namely, the sort that produces consciousness and the one that does not—without taking imperceptible sense organs into account either].⁶⁶

Abhinavagupta's commentary explains the passage in the following way:

And [we] observe the [following] among philosophers: even if [something] exists [as] a real entity, they do not concern themselves with the aspect [of it] that is useless [and] speculative—for example, regarding such [imperceptible things] as the sense organs, [this is] for instance [the case of] the author of the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*, or of the followers of Bṛhaspati. For the former acknowledge that everyday practice (*vyavahāra*) is accounted for if this much [is admitted]: the five elements (*bhūtapañcaka*) and consciousness (*cetanā*), because such other [things] as the sense organs are included in these; whereas the latter admit that everyday practice [consisting in the relationship between] an apprehending [subject] and an apprehended [object] is accounted for if a particular modification called “consciousness” arises in the four elements from [some of their] various combinations, and if this modification does not arise [from other such combinations].⁶⁷

According to Abhinavagupta's commentary, which explicitly mentions the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*, the “theory of the six elements” (*ṣaḍdhātuvāda*) propounded in that work includes the “set of five elements” (*bhūtapañcaka*)—i.e., the traditional list of earth, water, fire, air, and ether—to which consciousness (*cetanā*) is added. Besides, we learn from this passage that according to this theory, perception can be explained in its entirety as the result of a mere combination of the six elements, without inferring the existence of sense organs (*indriya*) that would be fundamentally distinct from these elements; or, as Abhinavagupta puts it, according to the author of the *Samikṣā*, the *indriyas* are already included within the six elements.

65. According to Abhinavagupta, these “others” are “followers of Bṛhaspati” (*bārhaspatya*), i.e., some materialists (*cārvāka*) who embrace the ideas expressed in the *sūtras* traditionally ascribed to Bṛhaspati. According to the latter, the relationship between the apprehending subject and the apprehended object is the mere result of various combinations between four material elements; thus the fragments of the *Bṛhaspatīsūtras* do not deny the very existence of sense organs, but they refuse to consider them as essentially different from the subject's perceptible body or the perceived object; whereas the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theories of vision for instance present the visual organ as an imperceptible ray of light fundamentally distinct from the perceiving body and perceived object, the materialists see the *indriyas* as mere aggregates made of the same matter constituting the subject and object. See Ratié forthcoming a, n. 83.

66. Ed. in Ratié forthcoming a: *yathā hīndriyavicāraṃ vinā na na kiñcid upapadyate, tathā hi kecid indriyāpavarjanenaiva ṣaḍdhātuvādināḥ, anye taddvayavādināḥ.*

67. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtīvimarśīni*, vol. II: 131: *dr̥ṣṭam cedam prāmāṇikānām yat saty api vastuny anupayogināṃśena na prayasyanti vicāritena yathendriyādiṣu ṣaḍdhātusamikṣākārādyā bārhaspatyā* vā. ekair** hi bhūtapañcakaṃ cetanā ceṭiyati vyavahārasamāptir aṅgikṛtā tatraivānyasyendriyāder anupraveśāt. anyair api bhūtacatuṣṭaye vicītramelanoditasamvedanākhyavikāraṇiṣeṣe nuditatadvikāre ca grāhakaagrāhyavyavahārasamāptir upagatā. [*ṣaḍdhātusamikṣākārādyā bārhaspatyā vā T : ṣaḍdhātusamikṣākārādyo vārhatyo vā S12, J10, J11 : ṣaḍdhātusamikṣākārādyo bā(vā)rhatyo vā Ed. **ekair J10, J11, T, Ka (quoted in Ed., vol. II: 131, fn. 1) : eka S12 : etair Ed.]*

THE *SAMĪKṢĀ* IN ABHINAVAGUPTA'S COMMENTARY ON *ĪŚVARAPRATYABHIJÑĀ* 1.1.4:
MORE ON THE *DHĀTUS* AND PERCEPTION

Abhinavagupta also makes some interesting remarks regarding this *ṣaḍdhātuvāda* earlier in his *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*. The passage occurs as Abhinavagupta is commenting on a passage of Utpaladeva's lost *Vivṛti* where the latter was considering the views of "those who are refined [by the study of] treatises" (*śāstrasamskṛta*)—as opposed to the "practice of ordinary people" (*lokavyavahāra*)—as to whether the phenomenal world is distinct from consciousness.⁶⁸ In this connection Abhinavagupta, probably merely following Utpaladeva's lead in the *Vivṛti*, sums up the content of the *Samikṣā* (this time explicitly ascribed to Bhartṛhari, whom Abhinavagupta usually calls *tatrabhavant*) in the following way:

Even though for a [follower of] Sāṅkhya, the twenty-five principles (*tattva*) are manifest [as the universe], to begin with, experience (*anubhava*), that is, immediate perception, consists in nothing but this: the sole five elements (*bhūta*) and consciousness (*cetanā*)—and nothing more. This is why for the master [Bhartṛhari] (*tatrabhavant*), the universe is [entirely] explained as soon as the six elements (*dhātuṣaṭka*) are explained—it is with this intention that he has undertaken their *Examination* (*Samikṣā*). It is also this [set of six elements] that is manifest in cognitions that arise from hypothetical inferences or scripture; [and] anything else is nothing but a mere combination [of these elements]. For example, [the property of] consisting in the subtle sensory object (*tanmātra*) of smell lies in the [element (*dhātu*) of earth]—that same earth that may possess various smells, some pleasant, others unpleasant, etc.—insofar as [earth] is devoid of particularities and subtle.⁶⁹

Abhinavagupta thus provides us with several clues as to what the *dhātus* must have been in the *Samikṣā*. Not only does he tell us, twice, that they consisted of the five traditional elements plus *cetanā*; he also explains that according to the lost treatise, the sense organs (*indriya*) are nothing over and above these *dhātus*—and that, taken together, they constitute the entirety of our cognitive experiences, their objective content included.

This might seem problematic as it apparently reveals a serious discrepancy between the pluralism of this *ṣaḍdhātuvāda* and the monism strongly asserted in the verse quoted by Somānanda and Utpaladeva, and in fact in all the other verses quoted by later Indian authors as belonging to the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*: the fragments of which I am aware all seem to deal with nondualistic notions and defend the idea that reality is essentially one. But this apparent contradiction is in keeping with Utpaladeva's reproach in his *Śivadrṣṭivṛtti*: there the Śaiva precisely accuses Bhartṛhari of contradicting his own monism with his theory of the six elements. Besides, this seemingly inconsistent attitude is not to be discarded as entirely unlikely if one considers that other Indian philosophers had to conciliate somewhat conflicting views of this kind.

68. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, vol. I: 92: *nanu śāstritānām yad bhāti tat kim idāniṃ cidrūpād bhinnam evāsty ity āsāṅkyāha śāstrasamskṛtānām api*. "But then for those who are versed in treatises (*śāstrita*) [as opposed to ordinary people], should [we] admit that what is manifest [in perception] is radically distinct from what consists in consciousness? Having anticipated this [question, Utpaladeva] states [the next *Vivṛti* sentence, which begins with] 'even for those who are refined [by the study of] treatises (*śāstrasamskṛta*) . . .'"

69. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, vol. I: 93: *sāṅkhyasya yady api pañcaviṃśatis tattvāni sphuranti, tathāpi pañcaiva bhūtāni cetanā ceṭy etāvanmātre tāvat sākṣātkārarūpo'nubhavo nādhike. tata eva tatrabhavato dhātuṣaṭkanirūpaṇa eva viśvaṃ nirūpitaṃ bhavatītyāśayena tatsamikṣodyamaḥ. saṃbhāvanānumānāgamajānīteṣv api jñāneṣu tad eva bhāsate, kevalaṃ yojanāmātram adhikam. yathā pṛthivy eva yā surabhyasurabhyādivicitragandhā tatraiva viśeṣatyāgena saukṣmyeṇa ca gandhatanmātrarūpateti*.

Thus the *dhātus* are not alien to Vedāntic literature, and their status was in fact discussed even by staunch proponents of nondualism, because they appear in Upaniṣads that describe them as emanating from the Self. According to the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* for instance, the five *dhātus* emerge from the Self, and from them arise in turn plants, food, and men;⁷⁰ the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* explains that breath, the mind, and all the *indriyas* as well as the five elements arise from the Self,⁷¹ etc. Vedāntins had to explain the contradictory aspects in the various versions of this emanation.⁷² Admittedly, the *Brahmasūtras*, at least according to Śāṅkara's interpretation, disagree with the idea that *cetanā/cetana*, consciousness/[something] conscious (understood as a limited conscious individual), might constitute a distinct *dhātu*: they criticize the view that the transmigrating individual is, just as the elements, a product of the Self,⁷³ and Śāṅkara argues that there is no "conscious (*cetana*) element (*dhātu*) besides the omniscient Lord."⁷⁴ Yet the very fact that Śāṅkara criticizes such theses seems to indicate that the belief in the existence of a sixth *dhātu* consisting in consciousness (*cetanā*) or the conscious individual (*cetana*)—a belief found at least in medical literature⁷⁵—was shared in his time by some of those who acknowledged the Upaniṣads' authority. Besides, Śāṅkara specifies that the five elements, the sense organs, as well as the mind (*manas*) are not to be understood as realities that would be essentially distinct from the Brahman, since ultimately they are nothing but transformations of the unreal name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*).⁷⁶

70. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1: 300: *tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ, ākāśād vāyuh, vāyor agnih, agner āpaḥ, adbhyaḥ pṛthivī, pṛthivyā ośadhayah, ośadhībhyo'nnam, annāt puruṣaḥ*. "From this Self has arisen ether; from ether, air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from water, earth; from earth, plants; from plants, food; from food, man."

71. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3 (see n. 78 below).

72. See in particular chapter 2.3 in the *Brahmasūtras* and their commentaries.

73. See *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.17, "there is no [individual] Self [that would be a product of the Brahman] because there is no scripture [to support this] and because according to these, [i.e., scriptures,] it is permanent" (*nātmāsruter nityatvāc ca tābhyah*), and the presentation by Śāṅkara of the doubt that the *sūtra* claims to remove (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, vol. II: 601): *asty ātmā jīvākhyaḥ śarīrendriyapañjarādhyakṣaḥ karmaphalasambandhī. sa kiṃ vyomādivad utpadyate brahmaṇaḥ, āhosvid brahmavad eva notpadyata iti śrutivipratipatter viśayaḥ . . .* "There is a Self called the conscious individual (*jīva*), who guards the prison of the body and sense organs and to whom the results of actions belong. [Now,] due to [an apparent] disagreement between scriptures, there is a doubt as to whether this [individual self] arises from the Brahman just as ether and [the other elements], or whether it does not arise, just as the Brahman itself."

74. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, vol. II: 611: . . . *yāvad eva cāyaṃ buddhyupādhisambandhas tāvaj jīvasya jīvatvaṃ saṃsāritvaṃ ca. paramārthatas tu na jīvo nāma buddhyupādhiparikalpītasvarūpavyatirekeṇāsti. na hi nityam uktasvarūpāt sarvajñād īśvarād anyas cetano dhātūr dvitīyo vedāntārthanirūpañāyām upalabhyate*. "And only as long as there is a connection with the adventitious property of the intellect is the conscious individual (*jīva*) a conscious individual and a transmigrating subject (*saṃsārin*); but in reality, there is no such thing as the so-called conscious individual apart from a fake nature that is the adventitious property of the intellect; for while expounding the meaning of the Vedānta [corpus] one never finds any other conscious (*cetana*) element (*dhātu*) besides the omniscient Lord whose nature has [already] been stated."

75. See n. 58 above.

76. See *Upadeśasāhasrī* 1.19: *te nāmarūpe'vyākṛte satī vyākriyamāṇe tasmād etasmād ātmana ākāśanāmākṛtī saṃvṛte. tac cākāśākhyaṃ bhūtam anena prakāreṇa paramātmānaḥ sambhūtaṃ prasannād iva salilān malam iva phenam. na salilam na ca salilād atyantabhinnaṃ phenam . . .* "The name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*), being unmanifested, came to have the name-and-form of ether when distinguished from this very Self. And in this way the element (*bhūta*) called ether arose from the Highest Self, just as dirty foam [arises] from a clear water; foam is neither water nor altogether distinct from water." See again *ibid.*, 1.20: *tato'pi sthūlabhāvam āpadyamāṇe nāmarūpe vyākriyamāṇe vāyubhāvam āpadyete, tato'py agnibhāvam agner abbhāvam tataḥ pṛthivībhāvam ity evamkrameṇa pūrvapūrvānupraveśena pañcamahābhūtāni pṛthivyantāny utpannāni . . .* "Then name-and-form, taking a gross form [and] becoming manifest, take the form of air; then that of fire, [and] from fire, that of water; then that of earth—through such a process where [each] preceding [element] thus includes (*anupraveśa*) the succeeding one, the five gross elements (*pañcamahābhūta*) ending with earth have arisen." *Upadeśasāhasrī* 1.22 also specifies: *manas*

It is also worth noting that one of the main issues dealt with in Vedāntic literature regarding these *dhātus* is their relationship with the *indriyas*:⁷⁷ thus Śāṅkara argues at length that the latter are not to be understood as entities that would exist over and above the *dhātus*, since they are in fact nothing but the *dhātus* themselves⁷⁸—an idea that could be seen as close to the *Samīkṣā*'s view on *indriyas* as Abhinavagupta presents it.

BHARTṚHARI ON THE *DHĀTU* OF EARTH IN THE *MAHĀBHĀṢYADĪPIKĀ*

Now, in the works whose attribution to Bhartṛhari is not disputed, there are a few mentions of the *dhātus*, and whether or not the *Samīkṣā* is really Bhartṛhari's, they are relevant to our inquiry. They are of course essential clues if the author of the *Vākyapadīya* and *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* also composed the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā*; but even if the Śāivas' attribution of the *Samīkṣā* to Bhartṛhari is spurious, these passages are still worth examining since they could have been one of the bases for this wrong attribution.

cendriyāni ca nāmarūpātmakāny eva, annamayaṃ hi somya mana ity ādiśrutibhyaḥ. “And the mind and organs also consist of nothing but name-and-form, since scripture [says so, as *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.5.4]: ‘For the mind, son, is made of food [i.e., earth] . . .’” (On the interpretation of *anna* as earth rather than food, see, e.g., *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.12.)

77. See, e.g., chapter 2.3 in the *Brahmasūtras* and their commentaries, in particular *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.15: *antarā vijñānāmanasī krameṇa talliṅgād iti cen nāvīṣeṣāt.* “If [one argues that] on account of inferential signs [proving] it, the intellect (*vijñāna*) and the mind (*manas*) [must arise] in succession between [the Self and the five elements, we reply:] no, because there is no difference [between the organs and the elements].” On the meaning of *vijñāna* here according to the commentators see n. 78 below.

78. See Śāṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.15 (quoted n. 77 above) in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, vol. II: 598: *bhūtānām utpattipralayāv anulomapratiḥlakramābhyāṃ bhavata ity uktam. ātmādir utpattiḥ pralayaś cātmānta ity apy uktam. sendriyasya tu manaso buddheś ca sadbhāvāḥ prasiddhāḥ śrutismṛtyoḥ, buddhiṃ tu sārathīṃ vidhī manāḥ pragrahaṃ eva ca | indriyāni hayān āhur ityādilingebhyaḥ. tayor api kasmīnścid antarāle krameṇotpattipralayāv upasaṃgrāhyau sarvasya vastujātasya brahmapratyabhūpagaṃ. api cātharvaṇa utpattiprakaraṇe bhūtānām āmanaś cāntarāle karaṇāny anukramyante, etasmā jayate prāṇo manāḥ sarvendriyāni ca | khaṃ vāyur jyotiḥ āpaḥ pṛthivī viśvasya dhārīni || iti. tasmāt pūrvoktotpattipralayakramabhaṅgaprasaṅgo bhūtānām iti cet, na, avīṣeṣāt. yadi tāvad bhautikāni karaṇāni tato bhūtotpattipralayābhyāṃ evaiṣāṃ utpattipralayau bhavata iti naitayoḥ kramāntaram mṛgyam. bhavati ca bhautikatve liṅgaṃ karaṇānām. annamayaṃ hi somya mana apomayaḥ* prāṇas tejomayī vāg ity evaṃjātyakam. vyapadeśo ‘pi kvacid bhūtānām karaṇānām ca brāhmaṇaparivrājakanyāyena netavyaḥ. [*apomayaḥ *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.5.4: *ośadhayaḥ* Ed.]* “[Here is what someone might object: ‘So far you] have said that the elements’ (*bhūta*) arising occurs gradually, and that their dissolution occurs in the reverse order; [you] have also said that [their] arising begins in the Self and that [their] dissolution ends in the Self. But the existence of the mind (*manas*) together with the sense organs (*indriya*) and intellect (*buddhi*) is well known through both scripture and tradition, because there are some inferential marks such as [the following from *Kāthopaniṣad* 3.3cd–4a]: “Know the intellect as the charioteer, and the mind as simply the chariot; they say that the sense organs are the horses.” And since it is admitted that all things arise from the Brahman, the arising and dissolution one after the other of the [mind, sense organs, and intellect] too must be accepted [as something that occurs] at some point between [the Self and the five elements]. Moreover, in the Ātharvaṇa [*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3], in the part on the arising [of the universe], the sense organs are enumerated between the elements and the Self: “From this [Self] arise breath, the mind, and all the sense organs (*indriya*); ether, air, fire, water, [and] the earth bearing everything.” Therefore this contradicts the elements’ order of arising and dissolution [as you have] previously stated [it].’ If [someone were to object this, we would reply: this is] not [the case], because there is no difference [between the sense organs and the elements]. If, to begin with, the organs consist of the elements, then their arising and dissolution simply occur as the arising and dissolution of the elements, so [we] do not have to look for an additional succession for them. And it so happens that there is an inferential mark regarding the organs’ consisting of the elements, such as in [*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.5.4]: ‘For the mind, son, is made of food [i.e., earth]; breath, of water; speech, of fire.’ That the elements and organs are mentioned as distinguished in some respect is to be understood in the same way as [when we call certain men] *parivrājakas*, [i.e., wandering brahmin mendicants, as if they were distinct from those whom we call] brahmins[, whereas in fact those whom we call *parivrājakas* are brahmins].”

The most important of these is found in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, where, while commenting on Patañjali's famous assertion "for substance is permanent [whereas] shape is transient" (*dravyam hi nityam ākṛtir anityā*),⁷⁹ Bhartṛhari adds:

The element (*dhātu*) "earth" is permanent. What is the true nature of the element "earth"? A conceptual construct (*vikalpa*). What is the true nature of a conceptual construct? Consciousness (*jñāna*). What is the true nature of consciousness? Om—but that is the Brahman. This is what [can] be said, [but] from this [point] on, the ordinary usage (*vyavahāra*) of words and meanings ceases to apply: this object is beyond ordinary usage.⁸⁰

It has been suggested that in fact these are not Bhartṛhari's words but a quotation from an unknown source.⁸¹ The hypothesis, far from obvious,⁸² cannot be ruled out, but whether Bhartṛhari is citing someone else or not here, he is emphasizing that the first element in the traditional list of *dhātus* is not an independent substance that would have a reality of its own, but a mere conceptual construct that can only be said to be an eternal substance insofar as ultimately it is nothing but the Brahman.

Jan Houben has noted that this passage is quoted by the Jain author Mallavādin,⁸³ as can be seen from Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādin's lost *Dvādaśāranayacakra*.⁸⁴ It seems impossible to establish from Siṃhasūri's remarks whether Mallavādin attributed this particular passage to Bhartṛhari himself or to someone else;⁸⁵ at any rate the text quoted by Mallavādin includes the sentence beginning with *tad etad uktaṃ bhavati*.⁸⁶ In Mallavādin's

79. *Mahābhāṣya*, vol. I: 7 (ll. 11-12); see n. 94 below.

80. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, chapter 1: 22: *nityaḥ pṛthivīdhātuḥ. pṛthivīdhātuḥ kiṃ satyam. vikalpaḥ. vikalpe kiṃ satyam. jñānam. jñāne kiṃ satyam. om atha tad brahma. tad etad uktaṃ bhavati—ataḥ paraṃ śabdārthavyavahāro nivartate, vyavahārātīto 'yam artha iti*. There are certainly different ways of understanding these lines (particularly the last part, see n. 82 below); my translation is indebted to the one offered in Bronkhorst 1987: 79.

81. See Abhyankar and Limaye 1965: x: this is "presumably a quotation, whose source is untraced." Cf. Houben 2009: 404: "a curious citation found in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* . . ."

82. Those who suggest that it is a quotation do not explain why it seems so to them (although Abhyankar and Limaye [1965: x] mention that "*dhātu* seems to be a Buddhist term"—an odd remark given the mention of the *brahman* in the same passage, but one in keeping with Iyer's reaction to the word *dhātu* in the *Samikṣā*'s title, see n. 17 above). The presence of *iti* might admittedly be taken as a sign that Bhartṛhari is quoting another text, but then one would rather expect *iti* before *tad etad uktaṃ bhavati*. As for the latter expression, it could of course mean (as *tad uktaṃ bhavati* often does in commentaries) "this is what is said" in the sense of "this is what this [passage] means" (in which case the *iti* could indicate the end of the explanation started with *tad etad uktaṃ bhavati*); this is apparently how Siṃhasūri understood it (see n. 86 below). Given the meaning of the last sentence, however, it seems more probable that in this particular case *tad etad uktaṃ bhavati* rather means that *only this and nothing more can be expressed by words*, and that beyond this point nothing can be said because the true nature of the Brahman is beyond the scope of ordinary language.

83. See Houben 2008: 90 and 2009: 404.

84. *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*: 373–74.

85. Admittedly, the citation appears in chapter 4 whereas Mallavādin criticizes the grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇa*) in chapter 5. This, however, is not evidence that Mallavādin did not regard the quotation as Bhartṛhari's, as he very often quotes Bhartṛhari, not to mention that the latter is in fact almost absent from chapter 5. See Houben 2009: 403–6, with the concluding remark: "The important conclusion to be drawn from this brief overview is that Mallavādin did not identify Bhartṛhari with the grammarians. Pāṇini and Patañjali, and occasionally Kātyāyana, are cited to illustrate the viewpoint of the grammarians. Bhartṛhari, however, appears elsewhere in the work. He is treated as an author in his own right . . ."

86. Siṃhasūri only gives *etad uktaṃ bhavati*. See *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*: 374: *tasyārthaṃ kathayati etad uktaṃ bhavati—ataḥ paraṃ śabdārthavyavahāro nivartate nirvikalpatvād iti*. "He explains the meaning of the [statement just given by saying] 'this is what this means.' 'From this [point] on the ordinary usage of word meanings ceases to apply'—[i.e.,] because [this reality] is devoid of conceptual constructs." It is unclear whether Siṃhasūri knew that *etad uktaṃ bhavati* was part of the quotation or thought that these were Mallavādin's own words. Note also that the editor, Jambuvijaya, takes *nirvikalpatvād iti* as a quotation of Mallavādin's work, which seems

work the whole passage was apparently introduced with the statement: “And in this doctrine, the meaning of words, which is eternal and takes the form of all [things], is a substance.”⁸⁷

This passage was also known to Helārāja,⁸⁸ who quoted it⁸⁹ while commenting on *Vākyapadīya* 3.1.32⁹⁰ and while explaining that according to those who are “nondualists” (*advaitin*) and “know scripture” (*āgamavid*), the reality of various objects made of gold is gold, but gold itself is only real insofar as it is made of the element fire (*tejas*), which in turn has as its ultimate reality the Brahman that is nothing but consciousness (*cit*):

Because [that] whose form occurs as a result of ignorance (*avidyā*) [and] which comes and goes in all things is not real, [we] call it “individual instance.” “For that only is real in which reality is not destroyed,” [says the *Mahābhāṣya*;⁹¹ i.e.,] that which has a lasting (*anvayin*) form and is not cancelled despite [the occurrence of] different cognitions is real, [and it] is called “universal” (*jāti*) by the nondualists (*advaitin*). For example, the [various] modifications [called] “necklace,” “*svastika*[-shaped ornament],” “[pair of] earrings,” etc., [since they] exist while being incompatible with each other, are the objects of transient cognitions, whereas only “gold” is real, [since it] has a reality that can be determined from a lasting cognition. In the same way, when [we] wish to express another[, deeper] nonduality [within what we call gold, we say that in gold] “fire” (*tejas*) only is real. [And] as regards [fire] in turn, the non-duality that is the cause of it, i.e., the final, ultimate nature (*prakṛti*) that is real, that lasts throughout all modifications, whose waves are tranquil, which is nothing but a compact mass of consciousness (*cit*), those who know scripture [call it] “the Brahman.” This was said [in the following]: “What is the true nature of the element ‘earth’? A conceptual construct. What is the true nature of a conceptual construct? Consciousness. What is the true nature of consciousness? Om—but that is the Brahman.”⁹²

Towards the end of his commentary on the same verse, Helārāja links the idea expressed in this quotation with the thesis that all universals are but differentiations of the “great being” (*mahāsattā*) identified with consciousness (*cit*).⁹³ Unfortunately, he does not provide the

unlikely: it is not impossible that Mallavādin himself had given an explanation for the quoted sentence *ataḥ paraṃ śabdārthavyavahāro nivartate*, but he obviously quoted the whole passage found in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, including *vyavahārāto 'yam arthaḥ* (see *ibid.*), which comes immediately after *ataḥ paraṃ śabdārthavyavahāro nivartate* in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, so that it seems more probable that Siṃhasūri himself added this gloss while commenting on the passage quoted in full by Mallavādin.

87. See Jambuvijayaji's reconstruction of Mallavādin's *mūla*-text in *Nyāyāgamānusārīnī*: 373: *etasmimś ca naye dravyam eva śabdārtho nityaḥ sarvāmakaḥ*.

88. As already noted in Abhyankar and Limaye 1965: x, and Bronkhorst 1987: 132, en. 7.

89. With the variants *vijñānam* and *vijñāne* for *jñānam* and *vijñāne* for *jñāne*. Note that Siṃhasūri shares the readings *jñānam* and *jñāne* with the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*.

90. *satyāsatyau tu yau bhāvau pratibhāvaṃ vyavasthitau | satyaṃ yat tatra sā jātir asatyā vyaktayaḥ smṛtāḥ ||* “Of the real and unreal features (*bhāva*) found in every entity (*bhāva*), the real one is the universal (*jāti*), [whereas] the individual instances (*vyakti*) are known to be unreal.”

91. I assume (with Iyer, see his edition of *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* 1: 40) that the quotation *tad eva hi satyaṃ yasmimś tattvaṃ na vihanyate* is a reference to *Mahābhāṣya*, vol. I: 7, with *satyam* instead of *nityam* (*tad api nityaṃ yasmimś tattvaṃ na vihanyate*).

92. *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* 1: 40–41: *avidyāpravṛttrūpasya sarvapadārtheṣv āgamāpāyino 'satyatvād vyaktir iti vyavahārah. tad eva hi satyaṃ yasmimś tattvaṃ na vihanyate ity anvayirūpaṃ bhedapratyayeṣv abādhyamānaṃ satyaṃ jātir iti vyavahṛtam advaitibhiḥ. tad yathā rucakasvastikakuṇḍalādayo vikārāḥ parasparopamardena bhavanto 'sthirapratyayaviśayāḥ, suvarṇam ity eva tu satyam anvayivijñānavaseyasatattvam. evam abhedāntaravivakṣāyām* teja ity eva satyam. tatrāpy abhedas tatkāraṇam ity antyā parā prakṛtiḥ satyā sarvavikārānuṣyāyini praśāntakallolā cidekaghaṇā brahmety āgamavidaḥ. tad uktam—pṛthividhātau kiṃ satyam, vikalpaḥ, vikalpe kiṃ satyam, vijñānam, vijñāne kiṃ satyam oṃ atha tad brahmeti. [**abhedāntaravivakṣāyām* corr. : *abhedāntaravivakṣāyā* Ed.]*

93. *Ibid.*: 41: *citsāmānyasya sarvatrānugamād eva mahāsattārūpaṃ abhāvāpratiyogi* viśvasya jagataḥ satyarūpaṃ avadātadarśanaḥ sāksātkṛtyopadiṣṭam. [**abhāvāpratiyogi* ADH (critical apparatus, Ed.: 41) : *abhāvāpratiyogi* Ed.]* “Because the universal of consciousness (*citsāmānya*) pervades absolutely everything, that

source of the quotation, but in this respect two points are worth noting: first, his interpretation clearly echoes the *Mahābhāṣya* passage distinguishing shape (*ākṛti*, considered as transient) and substance (*dravya*, said to be permanent) on which Bhartṛhari happens to be commenting in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* when he mentions the real nature of the *dhātu* of earth, so that it is probable that here Helārāja has this particular passage of the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* in mind.⁹⁴ Second, while using Patañjali's example of gold and the various shapes that it might be given, Helārāja goes further than Patañjali: contrary to the latter, he specifies that gold is nothing but the *dhātu* of fire (*tejas*)—which in turn is nothing but the Brahman. In the *Dravyasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari himself refers several times to the idea that just like gold, reality is what remains when various transient shapes have disappeared and is what words ultimately express;⁹⁵ and while commenting on such assertions, Helārāja explicitly alludes to the *Mahābhāṣya* passage—and, it seems, to the statement in Bhartṛhari's commentary thereon that the Brahman itself is the reality of the *dhātus*: Helārāja mentions in this connection the *dhātus* of earth and water.⁹⁶

which consists in the great being (*mahāsattā*), which is not [even] the contrary of non-being (*abhāvāpratyogin*), which is the reality of the entire universe, is taught in blameless systems after making this obvious." On the idea that *mahāsattā* is not the contrary of non-being (*abhāvāpratyogin*) because it pervades even non-being (*abhāvavyāpin*), and on the necessity of correcting the reading *abhāvapratyogin* elsewhere in Helārāja's commentary, see Ratié 2010: 484–86 nn. 150 and 152.

94. The text of the *Mahābhāṣya* commented upon by Bhartṛhari runs thus (vol. I: 7): *dravyam hi nityam ākṛtir anyiā. kathaṃ jñāyate. evaṃ hi dr̥ṣyate loke, mṛt kayā cid ākṛtyā yuktā piṇḍo bhavati, piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdyā ghaṭikāḥ kriyante, ghaṭikākṛtim upamṛdyā kuṇḍikāḥ kriyante. tathā suvarṇam kayācid ākṛtyā yuktam piṇḍo bhavati. piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdyā rucakāḥ kriyante, rucakākṛtim upamṛdyā kaṭakāḥ kriyante, kaṭakākṛtim upamṛdyā svastikāḥ kriyante. punarāvṛttaḥ suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ punar aparayākṛtyā yuktaḥ khadirāṅgārasavarṇe kuṇḍale bhavataḥ. ākṛtir anyā cānyā ca bhavati dravyam punas tad eva, ākṛtyupamardena dravyam evāvaśīsyate.* "For substance is permanent [whereas] shape is transient. How do [we] know [this]? For in ordinary activity [we] observe the following: clay, [when] associated with a certain shape, becomes a lump; when one destroys the shape of the lump, small pots are made [of it]; when one destroys the shape of the small pots, small bowls are made [of it]. In the same way, gold, [when] associated with a certain shape, becomes a lump; when one destroys the shape of the lump, necklaces are made [of it]; when one destroys the shape of the necklaces, bracelets are made [of it]; when one destroys the shape of the bracelets, *svastika*-[shaped ornaments] are made [of it]; the lump of gold, [if] recreated and associated again with another shape, becomes two earrings having the glow of embers of *khadira* [wood]. And [while] shape becomes ever different, substance remains the same; from the destruction of a shape there only remains substance."

95. See, e.g., *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.4: *suvarṇādi yathā yuktam* svair ākārair apāyibhiḥ | rucakādyabhidhānānām śuddham evaiti vācyatām || [*yuktam] Ed. Rau : bhinnam Ed. Iyer.* "[Ultimate reality is expressed through words that directly express unreal limiting properties,] just like gold for example, which, [although] associated with transient forms, becomes, insofar as it is pure [of such associations], what is expressed by names such as 'necklace', etc." See also *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.15: *vikārapāgame satyam suvarṇam kuṇḍale yathā | vikārapāgame satyam tathāhuḥ prakṛtim parām ||* "Just as, when modifications disappear, [what is] real in the earring is gold, in the same way, they say that the ultimate nature (*prakṛti*) is the only real [thing]."

96. See *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.11 (*satyam ākṛtisamhāre yad ante vyavatiṣṭhate | tan nityam śabdavācyam tac chabdāt tac ca na bhidyate ||* "Reality is what remains at the end when [all] shapes are destroyed; that is permanent; that is expressed by words; and that is not different from the word.") and Helārāja's commentary thereon in *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*: 114–15: *tad eva hi nityam yasmiṃś tattvaṃ na vihanyata iti bhāṣyānusāreṇaitad ucyate. tathā hi tatoktam kanakam ity eva satyam punar aparayākṛtyā yuktam khadirāṅgārasavarṇe suvarṇakuṇḍale bhavata ity anenaiva dr̥ṣṭāntena vikārapēkṣayā bhinnasya brahmaṇaḥ satyatocyate. yathā hi tatra rucakādyākāropamardena suvarṇam ity eva satyam, evam anantavikāragrāmāpāye sarvānti vatiṣṭhamānam anapāyi brahmarūpaṃ satyam tad eva ca bhāvato nityam. āpekṣikaṃ tu jātyādīnām vyavahāre nityatvam ucyate. tathā hi vyaktyapāye jātir avatiṣṭhamānā gotvādikā nityā. tatrāpy aśvatvādibhedatyāge pṛthivīty eva satyam. tatrāpy aptvādibhedāpāye vastv ity eva satyam sarvaṇāmapratyāyayam. tatrāpi saṃvidrūpasānāpāyino 'nugamād viśayākāraviveke tad eva pāramārthikam satyam iti neti nety upāśīti bhāvanayā* codyate. saṃvic ca paśyantīrūpā parā vāk śabdabrahmamāyīti brahmatattvaṃ śabdāt pāramārthikān na bhidyate. [*bhāvanayā conj.: bhāvanāya Ed.] "For that only is permanent in which reality is not destroyed": this [verse] is stated in accordance with the [*Mahā*]bhāṣya's authority]. To explain: there*

ŚĀNTARAKṢITA'S MENTION OF THE THEORY THAT ELEMENTS MUST BE SEEN
(SAMĪKṢ-) AS TRANSFORMATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

This *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* passage also irresistibly brings to mind the description by the Buddhist Śāntarakṣita of the way some Vedāntins (*aupaniṣadika*) who are nondualists endeavor to show that the elements are in fact nothing but a single consciousness (*jñāna*):⁹⁷

Others, however, proclaim [the following]: this, namely earth, fire, water, and so on, is the apparent transformation (*vivarta*) of an eternal consciousness (*jñāna*); and the Self consists in it. Nothing that would be endowed with the characteristic of an [independent]⁹⁸ object of knowledge is found in them; therefore all this, [namely earth, etc.]⁹⁹ is examined (*samīkṣyate*) [as] a transformation of consciousness (*vijñānapariṇāma*).¹⁰⁰

According to the Vedāntic view recorded here, just as in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, the elements are nothing but illusory (?) transformations¹⁰¹ of consciousness (*jñāna*, *vijñāna*). And what is perhaps most striking about this description is that Śāntarakṣita uses the verb *samīkṣ-* to convey the idea that as soon as these elements are investigated, they turn out to be nothing but consciousness—or, to put it as Kamalaśīla does, to make clear that “these, namely earth and so on, are ascertained to consist in nothing but appearances of consciousness.”¹⁰² Although this is of course a mere conjecture, one cannot help wondering whether these

it is said that only ‘gold’ is real, [yet] ‘[if] associated again with another shape, it becomes two gold earrings that have the glow of embers of *khadira* [wood]’—with this very example, [what is] expressed is the reality of the Brahman differentiated according to these modifications. For just as, in that [example], what is real is only ‘gold’ [that remains] from the destruction of shapes such as necklaces and so on, in the same way, [‘at the end,’] i.e., when there is a total disappearance that is a destruction of all the innumerable modifications, what remains, [i.e.] is not transient, is reality, which consists in Brahman; and this very [reality] is permanent by nature. But in the sphere of everyday practice [we] talk about the permanence of universals, etc., [only] relatively [to the Brahman’s permanence]. To explain: when the individual [cows] are destroyed, the universal consisting in cowness for instance remains [and is therefore considered] permanent [relatively to the individuals]. As regards [this kind of universal] in turn, when one abandons the differences between [cowness] and horseness, etc., it is only ‘earth’ that is real; as regards [earth] in turn, when the differences with being water, etc., disappear, only ‘something’ (*vastu*) is real and liable to be conveyed by [the mere] pronoun [*tat*, ‘this’] (*sarvanāmapratyāyā*); in that [‘something’] in turn, because of the continuity of what consists in consciousness (*saṃvid*) and is not transient when one separates [it] from the [various] shapes of [consciousness’s] objects, that only is real—[i.e.] real in the ultimate sense; [i.e., the understanding of this reality] is sharpened (*codiyate*) by imagining [what it is not], according to [the Upaniṣadic injunction] ‘one must meditate on “not this, not this.”’ And consciousness, which is the reality of the Brahman insofar as it is the Supreme Speech in the form of Paśyanti that consists in the Śabdabrahman, is not distinct from the Word in the ultimate sense.”

97. See Kamalaśīla’s introduction to these verses in *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, vol. I: 156 (Ed. Ś): *apare’dvaitadarśanāvalambināś* caupaniṣadikāḥ kṣityādīpariṇāmarūpanityaikaajñānasvabhāvam ātmānaṃ kalpayanti. atas teṣāṃ eva matam upadarśayann āha—nityetyādi. [*’dvaitadarśanāvalambināś Ed. K : ’dvaitadarśanāvalambināś Ed. Ś.]* “And others, who rely on the doctrine of non-duality and are Vedāntins (*aupaniṣadika*), imagine that the Self consists in an eternal, single consciousness the form of which is transformed (*pariṇāma*) into earth, etc.; therefore it is their view that [Śāntarakṣita] presents while stating [the next verse] beginning with *nitya*.”

98. Cf. *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, vol. I: 156 (Ed. Ś): *na hi kṣityādayo jñānavyatiṛekeṇa grāhyalakṣaṇāpannāḥ santi . . .* “For earth and so on do not possess the characteristic of [being] an object of knowledge [while existing] independently of consciousness.”

99. Cf. *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, vol. I: 156 (Ed. Ś): *ayam iti kṣityādīḥ . . .*

100. *Tattvasaṅgraha* 328–29: *nityajñānavivartoyam kṣityatejojalādikaḥ | ātmā tadātmakaś ceti saṅgirante’pare panuḥ || grāhyalakṣaṇasaṃyuktam na kiñcid iha vidyate | vijñānapariṇāmo’yam tasmāt sarvaḥ samīkṣyate ||*

101. As already noted, e.g., in Nakamura 1983: 226, it appears from this (see also Kamalaśīla’s commentary quoted in n. 97 above) that “both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla took the words *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* as meaning the same thing, namely, ‘the evolution of the universe from the *ātman*.’”

102. *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, vol. I: 156 (Ed. Ś): *vijñānapratibhāsarūpā evāmi kṣityādaya iti vyavasīyante.*

verses are not an allusion to the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*, a work that may have been devoted to showing (1) that the whole of ordinary experience can be explained as a combination of the six *dhātus*, and (2) that ultimately these six *dhātus* are nothing but (*vi*)*jñāna*, understood as the Brahman. As far as I know, nothing in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* or its commentary indicates that Śāntarakṣita had Bhartṛhari in mind here,¹⁰³ and the fact that Śāntarakṣita criticizes the doctrine of *śabdabrahman* in another part of his work¹⁰⁴ might be considered a clue that Śāntarakṣita either did not have the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā* in mind when targeting “followers of the Upaniṣads,” or at least did not think that the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā* was authored by Bhartṛhari. However, as already noted by Nakamura, this passage is certainly reminiscent of Śāntarakṣita’s criticism of the *śabdabrahman* theory, as in both cases the Buddhist author applies similar arguments, showing first that in such a system consciousness must be permanent (which is absurd since it makes it impossible to account for phenomenal variety), and second, that if consciousness is permanent, there can be no liberation.¹⁰⁵

MORE ON THE ELEMENTS IN THE *PRAKĪRṆAKĀṆḌA* AS INTERPRETED BY PHULLARĀJA

Finally, it might not be out of place to mention that in the *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*, Bhartṛhari—at least according to the commentary which today fills a gap in Helārāja’s *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*, and which, according to manuscripts, is due to a certain Phullarāja¹⁰⁶—presents the five material elements as parts of an inner reality that appears as if it were external when taking on the form of these elements, although it also manifests itself as internal inasmuch as it takes the form of the “internal organ.”¹⁰⁷ The verse runs thus:

Ether, earth, air, the sun, oceans, rivers, directions—[these] are parts, made to exist in an external way, of the reality that is the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*).¹⁰⁸

Phullarāja explains that the first six words refer to the five material elements¹⁰⁹ and adds that “all these gross elements are the very life of the whole universe.”¹¹⁰ He also explains “the reality that is the internal organ” (*antaḥkaraṇatattva*) as “the reality called ‘internal organ’ that is manifest in an internal form, as being the internal organ,”¹¹¹ a comment that seems

103. Nakamura (1983: 254) is of the opinion that the attacked doctrine is very close to that of the *Māṇḍukyakārikās* (= *Āgamaśāstra*), mainly because of the identification of consciousness (*vijñāna*) with the Brahman.

104. The passage criticizing the *aupaniṣadikas*’ thesis occurs in chapter 7, which offers a lengthy critical examination of various *ātman* doctrines (*ātmaparikṣā*), whereas the *śabdabrahmaparikṣā* is to be found in chapter 5.

105. See Nakamura 1983: 255, which notices that these attacks are “reproduced in substance when criticizing the doctrine of Bhartṛhari.”

106. On these two gaps, see Iyer 1963: xiii. The author notes in this respect (*ibid.*): “All the manuscripts contain the indication of some scribe that the gaps have been filled up with the commentary of one Phullarāja. Who is this Phullarāja? Is he perhaps the same as Puṅyarāja? It is difficult to say anything definite.” Aklujkar (1974: 183–84 and 1994b: 23) defends the identification of Phullarāja and Puṅyarāja, but as pointed out by the author himself (Aklujkar 1974: 184), the evidence adduced in this respect “can hardly be called conclusive.”

107. As shown by Vincenzo Vergiani, however, the verse can also be understood without reading into it the five elements plus the internal organ: for an alternative interpretation of the stanza, see Vergiani 2004.

108. *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.41: *dyauḥ kṣamā vāyur ādityaḥ sāgarāḥ sarito diśaḥ | antaḥkaraṇatattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthītāḥ ||*

109. In the edition of the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* (vol. I: 264), Phullarāja glosses *dyauḥ* with *ākāśam*, *kṣamā* with *pṛthivī*, *sāgarāḥ* and *saritaḥ* with *āpaḥ*; of *ādityaḥ*, he says *tathādityalakṣaṇam api sakalatejasām pradhānaṃ divyaṃ tejaḥ*, “similarly, although characterized as ‘the sun,’ it is the essence of all fires, the divine/heavenly fire (*tejas*).”

110. *Ibid.*: *sarvāny etāni mahābhūtāni sakalajaḡajjīvitabhūtāni*.

111. *Ibid.*: . . . *antaḥkaraṇasaṃjñakaṃ antaḥkaraṇatvenāntararūpatayā pratibhāsamaṇaṃ yat tattvam . . .*

to imply that the reality in question is in fact much more than the internal organ of which it takes the form, all the more since Phullarāja concludes:

These are parts of this [internal reality, i.e.,] they are phenomena, reflections [of it] that occur externally, but in reality, of what sort could be this relationship between [something] external and [something] internal? It is the single, highest Śabdabrahman consisting in consciousness (*saṃvit*) that exists in these various forms—this is the meaning of this verse.¹¹²

Thus according to Phullarāja, this inner reality that appears externally as the five elements, and internally, as the internal organ, manifests itself in the form of space (hence the mention of directions, *diś*, in this verse) but also time (which the next verse introduces).¹¹³ Nowhere in these passages do the words *dhātu* or *cetana/cetanā* appear; yet one wonders whether the verse, at least according to Phullarāja's explanation, cannot lend itself to an interpretation according to which the five material elements, which appear to be external, as well as the conscious individual which appears to be internal, are in fact nothing but manifestations of a single reality that, although beyond spatial and temporal limitations, appears as if it were limited by space and time.

SOME PROVISORY CONCLUSIONS

Although this brief inquiry has absolutely no claim to exhaustivity, and although much is bound to remain uncertain as long as no manuscript of the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā* comes to light, we can safely draw a few conclusions regarding this lost work from the examination of the testimonies and fragments at our disposal:

1. The tenth- and eleventh-century Śaiva nondualists Somānanda, Utpaladeva, and Abhinavagupta knew a treatise called the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā*, and not *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* (which can only be a corruption of the original title).
2. They had no doubt that Bhartṛhari had composed it.
3. This treatise was about six elements (*dhātu*), i.e., the five material elements or *bhūtas* (earth, fire, water, air, ether) plus a sixth called consciousness/the conscious (*cetanā/cetana*).
4. The author of this work endeavored to show that the whole sphere of ordinary experience can be accounted for as a combination of these elements.
5. He argued that there is no need to postulate additional entities such as distinct sense organs (*indriya*) over and above the *dhātus* to explain perception.
6. As can be seen from the remaining fragments ascribed to this work and from the Śaivas' criticism of it, the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā* ultimately defended a strongly nondualistic point of view according to which the whole universe is in fact nothing but a single consciousness unlimited by space and time.

112. Ibid.: *tasyaivaite bhāgāḥ pratibimbakāḥ ābhāsā bahir avasthitāḥ, paramārthe tu kīḍṣo'ntarbahirbhāvaḥ, ekam eva saṃvinmayaṃ paraṃ śabdabrahma tathā tathāvasthitam iti kārīkārthaḥ.*

113. See ibid.: *mahābhūtarūpatvaṃ digrūpatāṃ cābhīdhāya kālarūpatāṃ tasyaiva pratipādayann āha.* "Having explained that [this single reality] takes the form of the gross elements as well as the form of space, [Bhartṛhari now] states [the following verse] while explaining that the same [reality also] takes the form of time." The next verse (*Vākyapadīya* 3.7.42) runs thus: *kālavicchedarūpeṇa tad evaikam avasthitam | sa hy apūrvāparo bhāvaḥ* kramarūpeṇa** lakṣyate ||* [**bhāvaḥ* Ed. Rau : *bhāgaḥ* Ed. Iyer. ***kramarūpeṇa* Ed. Rau : *pararūpeṇa* Ed. Iyer.] "This same single [reality] exists in a form that is limited by time; for this being, [although] devoid of succession, appears in a sequential form."

Beyond this point, we can only speculate as to what might have been the exact goal of the work and the tradition from which the six *dhātus* were borrowed. It seems to me rather likely—although this is by no means a certainty on my part—that the apparent discrepancy between, on the one hand, the dualism of a theory explaining the whole *vyavahāra* on the basis of six elements, and, on the other hand, the uncompromising nondualism defended in the *Samikṣā* fragments, could be explained for scriptural reasons: thus as pointed out above, Vedāntins had to accept the existence of a number of *dhātus* said to emerge from the Self in the Upaniṣads, although they also endeavored to show that such a multiplicity could only occur at an inferior ontological level. However, that the *Samikṣā* might have belonged to a Vedāntic tradition is nothing more than a hypothesis—one that could be strengthened by Śāntarākṣita’s allusion to the theory of *aupaniṣadika* according to which one must see (*samikṣ-*) in the various elements nothing but a transformation of consciousness, although, admittedly, neither Śāntarākṣita nor Kamalaśīla explicitly ascribes this theory to the author of a *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*. It might also be noted in this respect that Bhartṛhari is sometimes described as a Vedāntin by later authors¹¹⁴ and that several among those who quote fragments of the *Samikṣā* happen to be Vedāntins—notably Yāmunācārya and Pratyakṣasvarūpa.¹¹⁵

This latter point leads to the difficult question—which I am not able to answer satisfactorily—of the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*’s actual authorship. In this respect Somānanda’s testimony is unfortunately the earliest I know (as much as it is tempting to see in Śāntarākṣita’s verses an allusion to the *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*, nothing indicates that Śāntarākṣita thought this work to be Bhartṛhari’s). Besides, some authors who lived after Somānanda were apparently unaware of his alleged authorship of the *Samikṣā*: thus Vardhamāna, the twelfth-century author of the *Gaṇaratnamahodadhī*, merely states that “Bhartṛhari is the author of the *Vākyapadīya* and *Prakīrṇa* and the commentator of three chapters of the *Mahābhāṣya*.”¹¹⁶ On the other hand, such a testimony can hardly be considered to be decisive, all the more since it is not impossible that in this work devoted to a *gaṇapāṭha*, Vardhamāna simply did not see the point of mentioning works ascribed to Bhartṛhari that did not belong to the field of grammar.

At any rate, as argued above, even if the *Samikṣā* was not composed by the author of the *Vākyapadīya* and *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, such an attribution could not have simply occurred out of the blue and must have been grounded in some doctrinal similarities; and in this regard, the most important clue to date might be the passage in the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* where Bhartṛhari argues that the *dhātu* of earth is in fact nothing but consciousness and, ultimately, the Brahman. From this, from Helārāja’s developments on this passage in the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*, and from Phullarāja’s interpretation of *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.41,¹¹⁷ one might surmise that, whether

114. See Nakamura 2004: 457–60 (“Bhartṛhari the Vedāntin”), although some of the arguments mentioned there are certainly debatable. One of the most interesting passages in this respect (quoted in full *ibid.*: 3–4) is Yāmunācārya’s *Āmasiddhi*: 5, which says the following about the *Brahmasūtras*: “. . . ācāryaṭaṅkabhartṛprapañca-bhartṛmitrabhartṛharibrahmadattaśaṅkaraśrīvatsāṅkabhāskarādiviracitasītāsītavidhanibandhanaśraddhāviprabdhhabuddhayo na yathāvad anyathā ca pratīpadyante . . .” “Some, whose minds have been deceived by their faith in works of various sorts and uneven quality, composed by the masters Ṭaṅka, Bhartṛprapañca, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari, Brahmadatta, Śaṅkara, Śrīvatsāṅka, Bhāskara, and others, have not understood [the *Brahmasūtras*] correctly, and have [even] misunderstood them.” This passage made Iyer wonder if Bhartṛhari had also written a lost commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* (Iyer 1969: 15).

115. See appendix below.

116. *Gaṇaratnamahodadhī*: 2: *bhartṛharir vākyapadīyaprakīrṇakayoḥ kartā mahābhāṣyatīpīdyā vyākhyātā ca*. On the date of Vardhamāna, see, e.g., Cardona 1976: 362.

117. The *Vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1.118 also mentions some verses of unknown origin that describe the speech constituting reality as sixfold. See *Vākyapadīyavṛtti*: 193–94: *tathāha: bhedodgrāhavivartena labdhākāraparigrahā | āmnātā sarvavidyāsu vāg eva prakṛtiḥ parā || ekatvam anatikrāntā vānnetrā vānnibandhanāḥ || pṛthak*

or not it was by Bhartṛhari, the *Samīkṣā* argued not only, as Abhinavagupta explains, that the six *dhātus* are enough to account for all worldly cognitive experiences, but also that ultimately these six *dhātus* are nothing but the Brahman understood as the single consciousness unbound by space and time that is described in fragment 1. I realize, however, that so far this is nothing more than a likely hypothesis, and I can only hope that this preliminary and conjectural study can be quickly outdated by the discovery of additional fragments—or even of the entire text—of the *Śaḍdhātusamīkṣā*.

APPENDIX: FRAGMENTS OF THE ŚAḌDHĀTUSAMĪKṢĀ

A. Fragments quoted as belonging to the *Samīkṣā*

Only fragments that are explicitly said to belong to the *Samīkṣā* at least by some of the authors who quote them are presented here. It has been suggested that a few of the fragments that are attributed to Bhartṛhari without further details and cannot be found in his preserved works¹¹⁸ originally belonged to the *Samīkṣā*; they have not been included here, however, because the evidence linking them to the *Samīkṣā* seems too scant or even contradicted by several testimonies—such cases are examined below, under B. The following list of fragments is by no means exhaustive and hopefully can be expanded in the coming years; the translations below are all tentative.

A1.

*dikkālādyanavacchinnānantacinmātramūrtaye |
svānubhūtyekamānāya namaḥ śāntāya tejase ||*

Salutation to the tranquil fire (*tejas*)¹¹⁹ the body of which is nothing but an infinite consciousness that is unlimited by place, time, and [form, and] the only means of knowledge for which is one's own experience/the experience of oneself.

This verse—obviously a *maṅgala*¹²⁰—is quoted in Utpaladeva's *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti*: 84 as being stated by Bhartṛhari in the *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* (*śabdadhātusamīkṣāyām api vidvadbhartṛhariṇā . . .*); as shown above, *śabdadhātusamīkṣāyām* should be emended into *śaḍdhātusamīkṣāyām*. Somānanda himself

pratyavabhāsante vāgvibhāgā gavādayaḥ || śaḍvārām śaḍadhiṣṭhānām śatprabodhām śaḍavyayām | te mṛtyum ativartante ye vai vācam upāsate || Madeleine Biardeau translates (Biardeau 1964: 161–63): “C’est ainsi que l’on a dit: ‘Il nous est révélé que dans toutes les sciences, la forme originelle n’est rien d’autre que la Parole suprême qui s’est revêtue de formes en se manifestant avec des différenciations. Sans perdre de leur unité, les fragments de la parole, *gauḥ*, etc., apparaissent séparément, avec la Parole pour organe visuel et pour fondement. Cette Parole aux six portes, aux six sièges, aux six modes d’éveil, aux six impérissables, ceux qui méditent sur elle triomphent de la mort.’” Both Biardeau (ibid.: 163 n. 1) and Iyer (Iyer 1965: 114) find the quotation obscure (the former mentions these “mystérieux groupes de six,” the latter notes that “the word is said to have four sets of six things. What they stand for is not clear.”).

118. For lists of fragments (mostly, but not exclusively, verses) ascribed to Bhartṛhari, see Ram 1956 and appendix 4 in Abhyankar and Limaye 1965; see also Chaturvedi 1973 (none of these studies includes any of the fragments presented below under A).

119. *tejas* also (and often) means ‘light’, a meaning that, of course, is not to be excluded in this context; but the heart of the verse is an oxymoron that rests on the understanding of *tejas* as ‘energy’, ‘ardor’, ‘power’, etc., as shown by Somānanda’s criticism in ŚD 75b (*tejasve śāntatā katham*, “if it is *tejas*, how can it be tranquil?”); besides, it is not impossible that the word *tejas* in this benedictory verse already alludes to the main goal of the treatise, namely the examination of the six *dhātus*, by using a word that refers to the Brahman but also to the element ‘fire’.

120. The very fact that this is a benedictory verse could be seen as evidence that the *Samīkṣā* is a rather late work and may not have been composed by Bhartṛhari himself: on *maṅgalas* as a somewhat late phenomenon in śāstric literature and on the fact that many fifth-century treatises did not begin with *maṅgalas* (including Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya*), see Minkowski 2008. The argument, however, might not be compelling: the history of *maṅgalas* seems far from simple, not to mention that the practice seems to have become widespread from the sixth century onwards (Bhartṛhari is supposed to have been active until circa 510 according to Frauwallner 1961: 134–35). There

criticizes the stanza from *Śivadṛṣṭi* 2.73ab to 2.75, and while doing so he specifies that it is found “in the *Samikṣā*” (*samikṣāyām*, *Śivadṛṣṭi* 2.73ab).

As pointed out by a number of scholars, fragment 1 is often found in manuscripts of the *Śatakatraya*, as the very first verse of the *Nītiśataka*.¹²¹ According to D. D. Kosambi, the stanza is “spurious, a later addition” in the *Śatakatraya*, “as seen from numerous omissions.”¹²² Bronkhorst has pointed out in this regard¹²³ that although in his *Dhvanyālokalocana* Abhinavagupta sometimes quotes verses that belong to the *Śatakatraya*, he never gives any hint that he might believe them to be by Bhartṛhari; Bronkhorst further remarks that if the Śaiva nondualists ascribe this particular verse to Bhartṛhari, it is not because in their eyes it might belong to the *Śatakatraya*, since Somānanda and Utpaladeva explicitly state that it is from the *Samikṣā*.

The verse also appears at the beginning of the (*Laghuyoga*)*vāsiṣṭhasāra*,¹²⁴ one of the abbreviated versions of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (a late, much augmented version of the tenth-century Kashmirian *Mokṣopāya*),¹²⁵ and in Vallabhadeva’s *Subhāṣitāvalī*: 1 (no. 3), an anthology that, in its current form, is generally believed to have been compiled in the fifteenth century or later¹²⁶ and that attributes the verse to one Bhartṛhari (*bhartṛhareḥ*). The verse is also quoted twice (with an explicit allusion to Somānanda’s criticism of it) by Rājānaka Lakṣmīrāma in his nineteenth-century commentary (*Vivṛti*) on the *Parātrīśikā*, and it is ascribed to Bhartṛhari in both cases.¹²⁷

A2.

avidyāśabalasyāsyā sṭhitam meyatvam ātmanah |
*grhītam na*¹²⁸ *nījam rūpam śabalena tadātmanā ||*

The Self’s status as an object of knowledge exists insofar as [this Self] is variegated (*śabala*) due to ignorance (*avidyā*); [but] this variegated Self does not grasp its own nature/[but] the nature [thus] grasped in the variegated form of this [objectified Self] is not [truly the Self]’s.

This verse is quoted in *Spandapradīpikā*: 4 by Bhāgavatotpala, who introduces it by specifying that it is borrowed from the *Dhātusamikṣā* (*dhātusamikṣāyām ca*). On the compound *avidyāśabala*^o used by Utpaladeva in his *Śivadṛṣṭi* to describe the planes on which, according to Bhartṛhari, reality appears in the form of insentient objects, see nn. 43 and 44 above.

A3.

*sā cānṛtātmikāvidyā nānṛtasya hi vastutā*¹²⁹ |
*nāvastu*¹³⁰ *vastuno nāśam vikāram vā karoty atah ||*

are known examples of *sāstras* beginning with *maṅgalas* in the fifth century and even before (see, e.g., Minkowski 2008: 7).

121. See Sarma 1940: 67; Gnoli 1959: 73; Iyer 1969: 10; Bronkhorst 1994: 38–39; and Nemeč 2011: 200 n. 358.

122. Kosambi 1948: 62–63.

123. See Bronkhorst 1994.

124. As noticed in Kosambi 1948: 62. On the original title of the work as *Vāsiṣṭhasāra* see Slaje 2005: 39.

125. According to Hanneder 2006: 10, it is “a brief collection of verses (233 vss.), which contains a large percentage (61 vss.) of non-*Yogavāsiṣṭha* material, some clearly from a background different from the *Mokṣopāya* or *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.”

126. See Sternbach 1974: 22–23.

127. *Parātrīśikāvivṛti*: 7: *uktam hi śrīsomānandapādaiḥ: dikkālādilakṣaṇena vyāpakatvam vihanyate | avaśyam vyāpako yo hi sarvadikṣu sa vartate || iti. dikkālādyanavacchinnānantaccinmātramūrtaye | svānubhūtyekamānāya namaḥ śāntāya tejase || iti tatrabhavadbhartṛharipādair yat sarvātmatāyā lakṣaṇam kṛtam tad etad anena nirākṛtam . . . Ibid.: 196: tathā ca hariṇā . . .*

128. *grhītam na* Ed. : *na grhītam* S’1 (according to Ed.: 4, fn. 18).

129. *vastutā* Ed. : *vastu yā* S’1 (according to Ed.: 4, n. 19).

130. *nāvastu* Ed. : S’1 om. (according to Ed.: 4, n. 20).

And this ignorance has a fake essence; for what is fake is no real thing (*vastu*); therefore [this ignorance] that is not a real thing does not perform the destruction (*nāśa*) or modification (*vikāra*) of any real thing.

This verse is quoted by Bhāgavatotpala immediately after fragment 2 in *Spandapradīpikā*: 4.

A4.

*nācchādītasya tamasā rajjukhaṇḍasya vikriyā |
nāśo vā kriyate yadvat tadvann avidyayātmanaḥ ||*

When a piece of rope is hidden, no modification or destruction of it is performed by the darkness [that conceals it]; in the same way, [no modification or destruction] of the Self [is performed] by ignorance.

This verse is quoted immediately after fragment 3 in *Spandapradīpikā*: 5. It is quoted again in *Spandapradīpikā*: 17, this time with an explicit attribution to Bhartṛhari (*uktaṃ ca bhartṛhariṇā*).

A5.

*nātaḥ svato na parato bandho'sya paramātmanaḥ |
baddho'thāvidyayā jīvo muktis tasya hi tatṣaye ||*

Therefore there is no bondage (*bandha*)—whether [caused] by oneself or by something else—for the Highest Self; rather, it is the conscious individual (*jīva*) who is bound due to ignorance; for the [conscious individual]'s liberation occurs when [ignorance] ceases.

This verse is quoted by Bhāgavatotpala in *Spandapradīpikā*: 5, immediately after fragment 4.

A6.

*karmāṇi mohamūlāni saṃsṛteḥ kāraṇaṃ yataḥ |
tatṣayāt karmanīrmuktaḥ svasthaḥ śāntatamas tataḥ ||*

Since acts, which have delusion (*moha*) as their root, are the cause of the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsṛti*), thanks to the cessation of this [delusion], one is free of acts, one abides in oneself, one is absolutely tranquil (*śāntatama*).

This verse is quoted in *Spandapradīpikā*: 22, and there Bhāgavatotpala specifies that it comes from the *Śaḍdhāṭusamīkṣā* (*uktaṃ*¹³¹ *śaḍdhāṭusamīkṣāyām*).

A7.

*śuddhaṃ tattvaṃ*¹³² *prapañcasya na hetur anivṛtitaḥ |
jñānājñeyādirūpasya māyaiva janani tataḥ ||*

Reality (*tattva*), which is pure, is not the cause of the phenomenal display (*prapañca*), because it does not cease (*anivṛtti*); so it is only *māyā* that produces what consists in cognitions, objects of cognitions, and so on.

This verse is quoted in *Nayanaprasādīnī*: 60 (a commentary by Pratyakṣavarūpa, probably written at the end of the fourteenth century, on the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha), as being by Bhartṛhari and as belonging to the *Dhāṭusamīkṣā* (*ata eva dhāṭusamīkṣāyām brahmavitprakāṇḍair bhartṛharibhir abhihitam . . .*).¹³³

131. *uktaṃ* Ed. : *uktaṃ ca* D1 (according to Ed.: 22, fn. 16).

132. *śuddhaṃ tattvaṃ* Ātmasiddhi : *śuddhatattvaṃ* Nayanaprasādīnī.

133. This was noted by Sastri (1959: 61 n. 32), but the author omitted to explain what the abbreviation used (“NP”) meant, which puzzled a number of scholars (see, e.g., Iyer 1969: 10 n. 31). Houben (1995: 7 n. 10), after mentioning that “Somānanda and Utpalācārya” refer to the “*Śabdadhāṭusamīkṣā*,” adds: “Professor Aklujkar informs me that also Citsukha referred to the *Śabdadhāṭusamīkṣā*.” I assume (but I might be wrong of course) that this is the passage that Aklujkar had in mind, although it belongs to the commentary on Citsukha’s text rather than to the *Tattvapradīpikā* itself.

It is also mentioned in Yāmunācārya's *Ātmasiddhi*: 63 without any attribution. It appears there whereas Yāmunācārya (eleventh century) has just quoted Dharmakīrti (*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.354, which is about the idea that cognition, although undifferentiated, appears in the differentiated forms of the 'apprehended object', *grāhya*, and 'apprehending subject', *grāhaka*). The quotation of Dharmakīrti's stanza occurs immediately after Yāmunācārya has mentioned "declared and hidden Buddhists" (*saugatāḥ prakāṭāḥ pracchannās ca*), as an example of what the declared Buddhists assert (*yathāhuh prakāṭāḥ . . .*); then Yāmunācārya quotes fragment 7 as an example of what hidden Buddhists state (*yathā vā prachannāḥ . . .*). So Yāmunācārya is accusing the author of this verse—according to which the distinction between cognitions, objects of cognition, and, presumably, the cognizing subject is a mere product of *māyā*—of being doctrinally close to the Buddhists while pretending not to be one of them.

Roque Mesquita, who examines this passage in his work on Yāmunācārya's *Samvitsiddhi*, knows and quotes the passage from the *Nayanaprasādini* identifying it as a quotation from the *Dhātusamīkṣā*; yet he seems to think that this is an alternative title for the *Vākyapadīya* (?), for he simply remarks that although the verse is "ascribed to Bhartṛhari," "it does not seem to be found in the *Vākyapadīya*,"¹³⁴ and considers that the verse cannot be by Bhartṛhari, on the grounds that (1) Bhartṛhari's system does not include the illusionistic notion of *māyā*; (2) in the *Ātmasiddhi* Yāmunācārya is concerned with refuting "modern" opponents rather than old ones (an argument somewhat surprising given that Dharmakīrti has just been mentioned and predates Yāmunācārya by several centuries); and (3) Bhartṛhari is never mentioned as a Vedāntic author (again, a rather surprising argument given that in the *Ātmasiddhi* Yāmunācārya himself mentions Bhartṛhari in a list of Vedāntic authors who have wandered off the right interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras*).¹³⁵ Mesquita concludes that the source of this verse remains unknown¹³⁶—a conclusion adopted by Bronkhorst.¹³⁷

B. Doubtful cases of quotations that have been suspected of belonging to the Samīkṣā

B1.

*yathā viśuddham ākāśaṃ timiropapluto janaḥ |
saṃkīrṇam iva mātṛbhīś citrābhir abhimanyate ||
tathedam amṛtaṃ brahma nirvikāram avidyayā |
kaluṣatvam ivāpannaṃ bhedarūpaṃ vivartate ||*

Just as someone afflicted with the [eye disease called] *timira* imagines the pure sky as if it were mingled with various forms, in the same way, due to ignorance, this immortal Brahman that is free of modifications appears (*vivartate*) as if it were stained and had a differentiated form.

Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, of which only a Tibetan translation survives, borrows—with only a few slight modifications—verses 53 to 85 of Bhartṛhari's *Sambandhasamuddeśa* in the *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*,¹³⁸ as well as two verses that, as noticed by Erich Frauwallner, are often quoted by later authors as being by Bhartṛhari; yet these two verses do not belong to the *Vākyapadīya* as we know it, and the author of the *Vṛtti* on the first *Kāṇḍa* (which Frauwallner takes to be Bhartṛhari himself) happens to quote them

134. Mesquita 1988: 75–76 n. 114: "Der folgende Śloka konnte bisher nicht eindeutig identifiziert werden. Er wird zwar von Pratyakṣasvarūpa in seinem Kommentar *Nayayaprasādinīvyakhyāyā* [sic] . . . zu Citsukhas *Tattvapradīpikā* . . . Bhartṛhari zugeschrieben . . . , scheint aber etwa im *Vākyapadīya* nicht auf."

135. See n. 114 above.

136. Ibid.: "Die Quelle bleibt also unbekannt."

137. Bronkhorst (1992: 59 n. 23) notes that the stanza "a été attribuée à Bhartṛhari" (no primary source is mentioned) but considers the attribution of this stanza to Bhartṛhari "tout à fait douteuse" on the basis of the remarks to this effect in Mesquita 1988.

138. See Frauwallner 1959: 107 ff. on this borrowing.

in his commentary on the first verse of the treatise. Frauwallner therefore assumes that these stanzas may have been part of the *Samikṣā*.¹³⁹

Indeed, the verses in question (the tenth and eleventh among twelve *kārikās* quoted in *Vṛtti*: 10–14 on *Vākyapadīya* 1.1, and introduced there by a mere *tathā hy uktam*)¹⁴⁰ are often cited by later authors, among whom the Buddhist Kamalaśīla, the Vedāntin Sureśvara, and the Śaiva dualist Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, but also the Jains Mallavādin, Abhayadeva, and Prabhācandra.¹⁴¹ It is also true that some of these later authors explicitly ascribe the verses in question to Bhartṛhari himself (thus Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha: *tathā cāha tatrabhavān bhartṛhariḥ . . .*);¹⁴² and even when no mention of Bhartṛhari is made, the context often makes clear that Bhartṛhari is seen as their author, as is the case for instance in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on *Tattvasaṅgraha* 144, where the quotation occurs in the midst of a criticism of the *śabdabrahmavāda*, which Śāntaraṣṭita and Kamalaśīla undoubtedly ascribe to Bhartṛhari.

Sadhu Ram, who had noticed some of these quotations, was of the opinion that in fact the whole group of twelve verses presented in editions of the *Vākyapadīya* as quoted by the *Vṛtti* were originally part of the *mūla*-text.¹⁴³ This, however, seems very unlikely given the syntactical structure of the first five verses in the *Vākyapadīya*: the first four include relative clauses that can only be understood in connection with the correlation in the following verses, and the correlative structure is lost if the series of verses in the *Vṛtti* is seen as integral to the verses of the *Vākyapadīya*.

At first glance it is therefore possible that, as surmised by Frauwallner, the *Vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1.1 quoted verses that were considered to be by Bhartṛhari by later authors because they happened to belong to another work of his, which, in the absence of any other source of information, could be taken to be the *Samikṣā*; and although Frauwallner did not explicitly extend the hypothesis to the twelve verses quoted in the *Vṛtti*, there is no reason not to consider the whole series (rather than just the tenth and eleventh verses) as possibly taken from the *Samikṣā*.

However, as far as I know, none of the authors who quote these verses mentions the *Samikṣā* or simply hints at the fact that they might not come from the *Vākyapadīya* itself. More crucially, two authors at least specify that the verses quoted in the *Vṛtti* are in fact borrowed from an unspecified *āgama* rather than from a work by Bhartṛhari. One of them is Vṛṣabhadeva, who, in his *Paddhati*, introduces the long quotation in the *Vṛtti* by saying:

Now [Bhartṛhari] shows how the meaning of this whole [first] verse [of the *Vākyapadīya*] is in conformity with *āgama*.¹⁴⁴

139. See *ibid.*: 113 (“Als Abschluss sind zwei Verse angefügt, die ebenfalls Bhartṛhari nachgebildet sind. Doch stammen die betreffenden Verse Bhartṛhari's, die häufig zitiert werden, aus einem andern Werk, nicht aus dem *Prakīrṇam*.”) and *ibid.*, n. 47: “Sie werden von Bhartṛhari selbst in seiner *Vṛttiḥ* zum 1. Kapitel des *Vākyapadīyam* zitiert . . . Vermutlich stammen sie aus seiner *Ṣabdadhātusamikṣā*.”

140. These verses run as follow: *yaḥ sarvaparikalpānām ābhāse 'py anavasthitaḥ | tarkāgamānumānena bahudhā parikalpitaḥ || vyatīto bhedaśaṃsargau bhāvābhāvau kramākramau | satyāṅṛte ca viśvātmā pravivekā prakāśate || antaryāmī sa bhūtānām ārad dūre ca dṛśyate | so 'tyantam ukto mokṣāya mumukṣubhir upāsyate || prakṛtītvam apī prāptān vikārān ākaroti saḥ | ṛtudhāmeva grīṣmānte mahato meghasaṃplavān || tasyaikam apī caitanyaḥ bahudhā pravibhajyate | aṅgārāṅkitam utpāte vārirāśor ivodakam || tasmād ākrītigotrasthād vyaktigrāmā vikāriṇaḥ | mārutād iva jāyante vṛṣṭim anto balāhakāḥ || trayīrūpeṇa tajjyotiḥ paramaḥ parivartate | pṛthaktīrthapravādeṣu dṛṣṭibhedanibandhanam || śāntavidyātmake yo 'mśaḥ taduhaitadavidyayā | tayā grastam ivājasraḥ yā nirvaktuḥ na śakyate || sarvataḥ parivartānāḥ parimāṇaḥ na vidyate | tasyā yā labdhasaṃskārā na svātmany avatiṣṭhate || yathā viśuddham ākāśaḥ timiroapluto janaḥ | saṃkīrṇam iva mātrābhiḥ cīrābhir abhimanyate || tathedam amṛtaḥ brahma nirvikāram avidyayā | kaluṣatvam ivāpannaḥ bhedarūpaḥ vivartate || brahmedaḥ śabdānirmāṇaḥ śabdaśaktinibandhanam | vivṛttaḥ śabdāmātrābhyastāsv eva pravīṇyate ||* For significantly differing translations, see Biarreau 1964: 27–29, Iyer 1965: 2–3, and concerning verse 4, Bansat-Boudon 2011.

141. For detailed references to these quotations see Nakamura 2004: 19 and Ram 1956: 63.

142. *Mṛgendrāgamaṭīkā*, *Vidyāpāda* 2.12ab: 64–65.

143. Ram 1956: 62–63.

144. *Paddhati*: 10: *idāṅim sarvasyaiva kārikārthasyāgamenānugamaḥ darśayati*.

The other witness is of particular interest to us, because he undoubtedly knew the *Samikṣā*: in his *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī*,¹⁴⁵ Abhinavagupta himself comments on the fourth among the verses that appear in the *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* (a stanza obviously quoted by Utpaladeva in his lost *Vivṛti*). Now, at the end of his explanation of this verse,¹⁴⁶ Abhinavagupta adds:

Thus has been shown the conformity of [Utpaladeva's] work with the *āgama* quoted by Bhartṛhari (*bhartṛharipaṭhitāgama*).¹⁴⁷

If this verse belonged to the *Samikṣā*, it seems wildly improbable that Abhinavagupta, who is one of our main sources concerning this lost work, might have failed to spot the origin of the quotation; and since the verses that Frauwallner suspects of belonging to the *Samikṣā* are most probably from the same source, it appears very unlikely that they originally belonged to the *Samikṣā*.

B2.

yad ādau ca yad ante ca yan madhye tasya satyatā ||
na yad ābhāsate tasya satyatvaṃ tāvad eva hi ||

That which [exists] at the beginning, at the end, and in between has reality; [but] not that which [merely] appears; for that has a reality that is only such/that only lasts for so long.

The eleventh-century Śaiva author Kṣemarāja quotes this verse while ascribing it to Bhartṛhari (*tatrabhavadbhartṛharinīpī . . .*) in *Spandanirṇaya*: 18 ad *Spandakārikā* 1.5. His younger contemporary Yogarāja, who only quotes the first half of this stanza in *Paramārthasāravivṛti*: 62, also ascribes it to Bhartṛhari (*iti tatrabhavadbhartṛharinirūpitanīyā . . .*). Bansat-Boudon notices¹⁴⁸ that the verse “is not found in the present *Vākyapadīya*” and wonders if it could have belonged to the *Samikṣā*.¹⁴⁹ The fragment, which she compares with *Āgamaśāstra* 2.6ab (*ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā* | “That which does not exist at the beginning and at the end is thus [nonexistent] at present too”), also brings to mind *Vākyapadīya* 3.2.11,¹⁵⁰ and it is quite possible that it belonged to the *Samikṣā*, but so far I could not find any evidence linking it to this work.

B3.

dikkālādīlakṣaṇena vyāpakatvaṃ vihanyate |
avaśyaṃ vyāpako yo hi sarvadikṣu sa vartate ||

The [all-]pervasiveness [of what you praise as the ultimate reality] is contradicted by the characteristic, [which you ascribe to this ultimate reality, of being unlimited by] place, time, and so on [and therefore not distinguished by them]; for [something that is all-]pervasive necessarily exists in all places [and so must be distinguished by all places].¹⁵¹

145. As pointed out by Bansat-Boudon (2011: 38–40), a part of the verse also appears in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, without any specification as to its source.

146. For an analysis and translation of this explanation see Bansat-Boudon 2011.

147. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī*, vol. III: 394: *iti bhartṛharipaṭhitāgamagranthasaṃvādo darśitaḥ*.

148. Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011: 202 n. 900.

149. Ibid.: “Might it be inferred that it belongs to the lost *Śabdadhātusamikṣā* quoted in *Śivadrṣṭivṛtti*, p. 84, as well as in *Spandapradīpikā*, p. 4 (as *Dhātusamikṣā*) and pp. 16 and 21 (as *Ṣaḍdhātusamikṣā*)?”

150. See n. 96 above.

151. My understanding of this verse rests on its explanation in *Śivadrṣṭivṛtti*: 84–85: . . . *iti lakṣaṇena digdeśakālair avacchedo viśiṣyamāṇatā niṣiddhā, tac cāyuktaṃ parimitadeśakālād arthāt* tasyāvacchedāt, anyathā sarvadikkālādiviśeṣaṇābhāve** vyāpakatvādi na syāt. vyāpako hi bhavet sarvadikṣv avaśyaṃ vartamānaḥ sarvakālāvachhinnaś ca nityaḥ . . . [*parimitadeśakālād arthāt S2, S3, S4, KSTS Ed., Nemeč 2011 : p.n.p. S1 : aparimitadeśakālābhyam conj. Torella 2014: 572. ** sarvadikkālādiviśeṣaṇābhāve em. Torella 2014: 572 : sarvadikkālādiviśeṣaṇābhāve S2, S3, S4, KSTS Ed., Nemeč 2011; p.n.p. S1.] “The delimitation [of this reality that you praise, i.e.,] its particularization by ‘directions’—[that is,] space—and time is ruled out by the characteristic that [you ascribe to it in the verse where you present it as unlimited by space, time, etc. (*dikkālādyanavacchinnā*)] and this is wrong, because this [reality must] be distinguished (*avaccheda*) from an object that [only] has a limited space and time [and it must therefore be particularized by all places and times]; otherwise, if it were not particularized by*

In the KSTS edition of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*, this verse, which occurs immediately before Utpaladeva's quotation of fragment 1 in his *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti*, is presented as another quotation given by Utpaladeva rather than a verse from Somānanda's *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*. According to K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, both stanzas belong to the lost work attributed to Bhartṛhari;¹⁵² this also seems to be Iyer's opinion.¹⁵³ However, the *Parātrīśīkāvivṛti* for instance clearly distinguishes Somānanda's criticism, formulated in this verse, from the *Samīkṣā* stanza that Utpaladeva quotes immediately after so as to explain what Somānanda is refuting;¹⁵⁴ and as noted by Torella, "obviously, the *śloka* beginning with *dikkālādī*° (p. 84, ll. 4-5), included in the *Vṛtti*, in fact belongs to the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*."¹⁵⁵ This verse was already translated as being part of Somānanda's criticism of the *Samīkṣā*'s stanza by Gnoli,¹⁵⁶ and the mistake had already been spotted and corrected by the KSTS editors themselves at the end of the volume (see *suddhyaśuddhipattra*: 84, l. 4: *dikkālādītyādiśloko—mūlaślokatvena jñeyah*).

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all places and times, [it] could not be [all-]pervasive and [permanent]. For [what is all-]pervasive must exist in all places; [and what is] permanent is what necessarily exists now and is distinguished (*avacchinna*) by all times." The passage is not easy and I do not claim that my understanding of it is entirely correct; nevertheless it seems to me that the translations of both *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* 2.73cd–74ab and the *Śivadr̥ṣṭivṛtti* ad loc. in Nemeč 2011: 200–201 are simply impossible given the context and phrasing of the argument (see Torella 2014: 572, for an alternative translation of the passage that is very clear, although the reading *parimitadeśakālād arthāt* might not be "evidently corrupt").

152. Sarma 1940: 67.

153. Iyer 1969: 13 (see n. 53 above). Bronkhorst (1994: 38) quotes this opinion without commenting on it.

154. *Parātrīśīkāvivṛti*: 7 (quoted in n. 127 above).

155. Torella 2008: 513 n. 6.

156. Gnoli 1959: 74.

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